D.E.G. v. Juvenile Officer of Jackson Cnty.

• Decision Date: 16 June 2020
• Docket Number: No. SC 97869,SC 97869
• Citation: 601 S.W.3d 212
• Parties: In the Interest of D.E.G., Appellant, v. JUVENILE OFFICER OF JACKSON COUNTY, Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

601 S.W.3d 212

In the Interest of D.E.G., Appellant,

v.JUVENILE OFFICER OF JACKSON COUNTY, Respondent.

No. SC 97869

Supreme Court of Missouri, en banc.

Opinion issued June 16, 2020

The juvenile was represented by Tim Honse of the public defender's office in Kansas City, (816) 889-2099.

The juvenile officer was represented by Lori A. Fluegel, an attorney in Kansas City, (816) 694-9182, and Daniel G. Barry, an attorney in Kansas City.

George W. Draper III, Chief Justice

D.E.G. challenges the juvenile division's judgment dismissing its jurisdiction over him and allowing his case to be transferred to a court of general jurisdiction following a section 211.071¹ hearing. D.E.G. seeks to appeal directly from the juvenile division's judgment and challenges the constitutional validity of his section 211.071 hearing.

This Court holds a juvenile has the statutory right to appeal from any final juvenile division judgment. Accordingly, the case is retransferred to the court of appeals, Western District, for a determination of the merits of D.E.G.’s claims.

Factual and Procedural Background

In April 2018, the Juvenile Officer of Jackson County, Lori L. Stipp, filed a petition alleging D.E.G. required care and treatment due to his alleged conduct that would have been a crime had he been an adult. The Juvenile Officer requested a section 211.071 hearing to dismiss D.E.G. from the juvenile division's jurisdiction. The Juvenile Officer's certification report recommended D.E.G. be certified to stand trial in a court of general jurisdiction.

Following the certification hearing, the juvenile division entered its judgment of dismissal pursuant to section 211.071 that dismissed the juvenile petition and transferred jurisdiction over D.E.G. to a court of general jurisdiction. D.E.G. was released and discharged from the juvenile division. The state never filed charges against D.E.G.

In October 2018, the Juvenile Officer filed another petition alleging D.E.G. required care and treatment because he committed conduct that, had he been an adult, would have constituted first-degree assault and armed criminal action. On October 29, 2018, the Juvenile Officer filed a motion for a certification hearing pursuant to section 211.071. The Juvenile Officer's certification report recommended D.E.G. be certified to stand trial in a court of general jurisdiction. The certification hearing was scheduled for January 2, 2019.

On January 2, 2019, D.E.G. filed a motion to deny certification, challenging the constitutional validity of Missouri's certification process. D.E.G.’s motion was overruled; the certification hearing proceeded.

The only testimony at the certification hearing was provided by the Deputy Juvenile Officer Sandy Rollo-Hawkins (hereinafter, "Rollo-Hawkins"). Rollo-Hawkins’ testimony consisted of a summary of secondary resources she compiled to generate the certification report recommendation. D.E.G. objected to Rollo-Hawkins’ testimony regarding the report because she had no personal knowledge of the information it contained, it constituted hearsay, and it violated his constitutional right to confrontation. Rollo-Hawkins’ summary included details of the alleged conduct in the petition, details of prior unadjudicated referrals to the juvenile office, details of D.E.G.’s conduct in detention, statements made by D.E.G.’s mother, details of D.E.G.’s medical and mental health, and D.E.G.’s educational background. Rollo-Hawkins conceded she had no personal knowledge of any information contained in her report but merely compiled and reviewed other sources for the certification report.

Following the hearing, the juvenile division entered its judgment of dismissal pursuant to section 211.071 that dismissed the juvenile petition and transferred jurisdiction over D.E.G. to a court of general jurisdiction. D.E.G. was released and discharged from the juvenile division.

D.E.G. appealed the juvenile division's dismissal judgment to the court of appeals. This Court granted transfer prior to opinion. Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 10.

Appealability

D.E.G. raises six points on appeal, challenging the constitutional validity of his certification hearing. However, prior to addressing any constitutional challenge D.E.G. presents, this Court must determine whether this appeal properly is before it.² D.E.G. requests this Court review the appeals process established by In re T.J.H. , 479 S.W.2d 433 (Mo. banc 1972). The Juvenile Officer asserts the juvenile division no longer has jurisdiction over D.E.G.’s proceedings and requests this appeal be dismissed.³

"Under article V, section 5, it is for the legislature to set the requirements for the right to appeal." Goldsby v. Lombardi , 559 S.W.3d 878, 883 (Mo. banc 2018). "The right to appeal is purely statutory and, where a statute does not give a right to appeal, no right exists." First Nat'l Bank of Dieterich v. Pointe Royale Prop. Owners’ Ass'n Inc. , 515 S.W.3d 219, 221 (Mo. banc 2017) (quoting State ex rel. Coca-Cola Co. v. Nixon , 249 S.W.3d 855, 859 (Mo. banc 2008) ). Section 211.261 currently governs the right to appeal in juvenile cases.⁴ However, because the right to appeal in a juvenile case is defined by statute and the statute conferring that right has been amended since T.J.H. was decided, this Court must revisit whether a dismissal from juvenile division is appealable.

Statutory interpretation is an issue of law, which is subject to de novo review. Henry v. Piatchek , 578 S.W.3d 374, 378 (Mo. banc 2019). "This Court's primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative intent as reflected in the plain language of the statute at issue." State ex rel. Robison v. Lindley-Myers , 551 S.W.3d 468, 472 (Mo. banc 2018) (quoting Parktown Imps., Inc. v. Audi of Am., Inc. , 278 S.W.3d 670, 672 (Mo. banc 2009) ). "In construing a statute, the Court must presume the legislature was aware of the state of the law at the time of its enactment." Suffian v. Usher , 19 S.W.3d 130, 133 (Mo. banc 2000) (quoting In re Nocita , 914 S.W.2d 358, 359 (Mo. banc 1996) ). Accordingly, when the legislature amends a statute, we presume the legislature intended to change the existing law. State ex rel. Hillman v. Beger , 566 S.W.3d 600, 607 (Mo. banc 2019).

In 1972, this Court was tasked with determining whether an order from the juvenile division terminating proceedings and transferring jurisdiction of a child to a court of general jurisdiction pursuant to section 211.071, RSMo Supp. 1957, was "a final order from which an appeal shall be allowed." T.J.H. , 479 S.W.2d at 434. This Court incorrectly quoted both sections 211.071 and 211.261.⁵ Id. However, there was never any discussion, analysis, or examination of the statutory language at issue.

This Court determined an order dismissing a petition and relinquishing juvenile division jurisdiction was not a final, appealable order. Id. This Court proffered two reasons for its decision, based upon precedent and policy concerns expressed by other jurisdictions: (1) to allow an appeal would delay criminal prosecution; and (2) a juvenile division's waiver of jurisdiction could be challenged by filing a motion to dismiss an indictment in a court of general jurisdiction. Id. at 434-35.⁶ This Court, noting Missouri permits the filing of a motion to dismiss an indictment after the case is filed in a court of general jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 25.06,⁷ summarily dismissed the juvenile's appeal without any recognition or discussion of the statutory right to appeal. Id. at 435.

Since T.J.H. , Missouri courts consistently have held that once the juvenile division dismisses a case and transfers the cause to a court of general jurisdiction, there is no final judgment for purposes of appeal. See, e.g., State v. Thomas , 970 S.W.2d 425 (Mo. App. W.D. 1998) ; State v. K.J. , 97 S.W.3d 543, 546 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003). T.J.H . continued to be cited as valid precedent without any additional research or commentary regarding the actual statutory language at issue.

In 1994, the Missouri legislature amended section 211.261. Section 211.261.1 provides, "An appeal shall be allowed to the child from any final judgment, order or decree made under the provisions of this chapter and may be taken on the part of the child by its parent, guardian, legal custodian, spouse, relative or next friend." (Emphasis added). Further, the legislature added language in section 211.261.1 allowing "the juvenile officer [to appeal] from any final judgment, order or decree made under this chapter, except that no such appeal shall be allowed concerning a final determination pursuant to subdivision (3) of subsection 1 of section 211.031."⁸ The legislature also included two additional subsections to this statute that allow the juvenile officer to seek an interlocutory appeal from proceedings pursuant to section 211.031.1(3), notwithstanding the prior provision, and from orders suppressing evidence, a confession, or an admission.

In this case, the juvenile division entered a "Judgment of Dismissal pursuant to section 211.071" on January 9, 2019. In its judgment, the juvenile division set forth detailed reasoning to dismiss D.E.G. from its jurisdiction.⁹ The juvenile division concluded it was "ordered and adjudged" D.E.G. was released and discharged from its jurisdiction. Finally, the judgment was signed by the judge.¹⁰ Hence, the judgment dismissing the juvenile division's jurisdiction over D.E.G. was a final, appealable judgment. See Rule 74.01(a); c.f. In re M.P.W. , 983 S.W.2d 593, 597-98 (Mo. App. W.D. 1999) (finding the decision by the juvenile division to assume jurisdiction is an appealable judgment).

T.J.H. ’s Validity

This Court's decisions "should not be lightly overruled." Eighty Hundred Clayton Corp. v. Dir. of Revenue , 111 S.W.3d 409, 411 n.3 (Mo. banc 2003). "Stare decisis ‘promotes stability in the law by encouraging courts to adhere to precedents.’ " State v. Blurton , 484 S.W.3d 758, 792 (Mo. banc 2016) (Draper, J.,...