State v. Needham

• Decision Date: 09 May 1938
• Docket Number: 33131
• Citation: 182 Miss. 663,180 So. 786
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. NEEDHAM

180 So. 786

182 Miss. 663

STATE v. NEEDHAM

No. 33131

Supreme Court of Mississippi

May 9, 1938

Division A

1. INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION.

An indictment charging that defendant, well knowing that another had with malice aforethought murdered a third party, did unlawfully and feloniously aid and assist the other in escaping and avoiding trial, conviction, and punishment for crime of murder was sufficient to charge the crime of accessory after the fact to the crime of murder notwithstanding it did not allege specific acts committed by defendant (Code 1930, section 901 et seq.; Const. 1890 section 26).

2. INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION.

Constitutional provision entitling defendant to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him only secures to the defendant the right to be advised of the nature of the charge against him, and not the right to have set forth in the indictment the facts relied on to sustain the charge (Const. 1890 section 26).

3. INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION.

Generally, a charge is sufficient if it adopts and follows the language of the statute or is in language substantially equivalent thereto, and the court is enabled to see therefrom on what statute the charge is founded.

4. INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION.

The rule that a charge is sufficient if it adopts and follows the language of the statute does not apply where an act is not in itself necessarily unlawful but becomes so by its circumstances, in which case all matters necessary to show its illegality must be stated in the indictment.

5. INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION.

An indictment charging defendant as an accessory after the fact is sufficient if it charges defendant willfully aided and assisted a felon to escape after knowing that he had committed the felony; allegation of specific acts which constituted the aiding and assisting being unnecessary (Code 1930, section 901 et seq; Const. 1890, section 26).

HON. WM. A. ALCORN, JR., Judge.

APPEAL from the circuit court of Bolivar county, HON. WM. A. ALCORN, JR., Judge.

Charles Needham was indicted as an accessory after the fact to the crime of murder, and, from a judgment sustaining a demurrer to the indictment, the State of Mississippi appeals. Judgment reversed, and the cause remanded.

Reversed and remanded.

Greek L. Rice, Attorney-General, and W. D. Conn, Jr., Assistant Attorney-General, for the State.

Roberts & Smith, of Cleveland, for appellee.

Briefs and records not found.

OPINION

McGehee, J.

The State appeals from the judgment of the trial court sustaining a demurrer to an indictment against appellee, Charles Needham, wherein he was charged as an accessory after the fact to the crime of murder. In the material part of the indictment it was charged, in substance, that the appellee, "well knowing that one Daisey Howard had committed a felony, to-wit: that the said Daisey Howard had theretofore wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and of her malice aforethought killed and murdered one Carrie McWilliams and one Carrie Floyd, . . . did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously aid and assist the said Daisey Howard in escaping and avoiding trial, conviction and punishment for her said crime of murder, against the peace and dignity of the State of Mississippi."

It will be observed that no specific acts are alleged to have been committed by appellee as constituting the aid and assistance rendered Daisey Howard in making her escape and avoiding trial, conviction, and punishment. It is for the want of such allegation that the sufficiency of the indictment is challenged. No decision of our court has been called to our attention which declares the necessity for such an allegation in the indictment of an accessory after the fact of any crime; but it is contended by the appellee that such requirement follows from the holding of the court in the case of Crosby v. State, 179 Miss. 149, 175 So. 180, where the defendant was convicted of being an accessory after the fact of the crime of murder, and wherein the court said: "In order to convict the appellant, the State must prove (1) that Williams feloniously killed Lizzie Marsh, and (2) thereafter the appellant, with knowledge thereof, committed specific acts with intent thereby to enable Williams to escape," etc. But we do not think that such a conclusion necessarily follows. For instance, it is likewise true that where a defendant is charged with having killed and murdered a human being it is necessary that the State prove specific acts in order to convict, but it would not be contended that the indictment must allege the specific acts or means by which the crime was accomplished. Neither is the allegation in the indictment here under consideration, to the effect that the appellee in the case at bar" aided and assisted Daisey Howard in making her escape," to be deemed a mere conclusion of the pleader any more than is the allegation in the usual indictment for murder a mere conclusion when it is simply alleged that the accused killed and "murdered" the deceased.

Upon a consideration of the adjudicated cases from some of the other jurisdictions, we find that the Maine court, in the case of State v. Neddo, 92 Me. 71, 42 A. 253, 255, had this precise question before it, and adopted what was said by Mr. Bishop on this question in 2 Bishop Crim. Proc., paragraph 8, as follows: "It is in no case necessary to set forth the means by which the accessory before the fact incited the principal to commit the felony, or the accessory after received, concealed, or comforted him; for it is perfectly immaterial in what way the purpose of one was effected, or the harboring of the other secured; and, as the means are frequently of a complicated nature, it would lead to great inconvenience and perplexity if they were always to be described upon the record."

Likewise in the case of Terry v. State, 149 Ark. 462, 233 S.W. 673, the court held that the words "did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously harbor, protect, and conceal said crime as aforesaid" were sufficient to charge a crime, under a statute, Crawford & Moses' Dig., section 2310, similar to ours which defined an accessory after the fact as one "who, after a full knowledge that a crime has been committed, conceals it from the magistrate, or harbors and protects the person charged with or found guilty of the crime." To the same effect are the three Texas cases of Gann v. State, 42 Tex. Crim. 133, 57 S.W. 837; Woods v. State, Tex. Cr. App., 60 S.W. 244, and Harrison v. State, 69 Tex. Crim. 291, 153 S.W. 139. Contra, it was held in Ex parte Goldman, 88 P. 819, that the specific acts which constituted the aiding, harboring, and concealing...