State v. Nelson

• Decision Date: 14 January 2010
• Docket Number: No. SC08-2325.,SC08-2325.
• Citation: 26 So.3d 570
• Parties: STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Andrew NELSON, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

26 So.3d 570

STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Andrew NELSON, Respondent.

No. SC08-2325.

Supreme Court of Florida.

January 14, 2010.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Trisha Meggs Pate, Bureau Chief, and Thomas D. Winokur, Assistant Attorneys General, Tallahassee, FL, for Petitioner.

Tammy Forrest of Glantz and Glantz, P.A., Plantation, FL, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Nelson v. State, 993 So.2d 1072 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008), in which the district court certified the following question of great public importance:

Does a motion for continuance made after the expiration of the speedy trial period but before a defendant files a notice of expiration under the rule, which activates the right of recapture period, waive a defendant's speedy trial rights under the rule?

Id. at 1077. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We answer the certified question in the affirmative. When the State is entitled to the recapture period, a continuance that is chargeable to the defense and made after the expiration of the speedy trial period but before a defendant files a notice of expiration waives a defendant's speedy trial rights under the default period of the rule. Accordingly, we quash the decision of the Fourth District and remand for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

I. BACKGROUND

As a juvenile, Andrew Nelson was arrested on May 16, 2007, for armed burglary and carrying a concealed weapon. See Nelson, 993 So.2d at 1074. Both the ninety-day juvenile and 175-day adult speedy-trial periods began to run from the date of Nelson's arrest. See id. In June 2007, before the expiration of either of these speedy-trial periods, the State filed a petition for delinquency that charged Nelson with grand theft and carrying a concealed firearm. See id. However, the case was not scheduled for an adjudicatory hearing before the juvenile speedy-trial period expired. On August 15, 2007, within days of the expiration of the period, the trial court conducted a hearing. See id. During this hearing, the defense requested a continuance to participate in discovery. See id.

Time passed without either the trial court conducting an adjudicatory hearing or Nelson invoking his speedy trial rights. In November 2007, a few days after the adult speedy trial period expired, the State direct-filed an information in felony court that charged Nelson with one count of armed burglary of a dwelling and twelve counts of grand theft of various firearms. See id. Thereafter, the State filed a nolle prosequi of the juvenile petition and filed another felony information charging the same counts as those contained in the juvenile petition. See id.

Later, in early March 2008, Nelson filed motions for discharge in both felony cases. See id. The trial court considered these motions and denied them based on a determination that the defense continuance, which was requested and taken after the expiration of the speedy trial time in the juvenile case but before the filing of a notice of expiration under the rule, waived the speedy trial time for all charges arising from the same criminal episode. See id. After the trial court denied the motions, it attempted to schedule trial dates within the ten-day recapture period. However, Nelson again requested a continuance in both cases, and specifically acknowledged that the continuances constituted a waiver of his speedy trial rights. The trial court granted the continuances, but charged one to the State because it had failed to provide Nelson with discovery.

From the orders denying the motions for discharge, Nelson filed petitions for writ of prohibition in the Fourth District that sought to prevent further prosecution in each felony case. See id. The district court granted both petitions based on its interpretation of the nullity rule, which would deem any request for a continuance after the expiration of the speedy-trial period void and inoperative as a waiver of the right to a speedy trial when the State is otherwise barred from further prosecution. See id. at 1074-75. Specifically, the district court held that a defense continuance taken after the expiration of the default speedy trial period but before the defendant moves for discharge does not affect a defendant's right to demand his speedy trial rights. See id. at 1074. In the view of the district court, the post-expiration request for a continuance in the juvenile proceeding did not operate as a waiver of Nelson's speedy trial rights, and did not toll the running of the speedy-trial period. See id. at 1075.

After determining that the request for a continuance did not operate as a waiver, the Fourth District analyzed the effect of the State filing the adult charges after the expiration of the adult speedy-trial period. In both cases, the district court determined that the State was not entitled to the recapture period, and Nelson was therefore entitled to discharge of all charges. See id.

On rehearing, the State asserted that this Court's decision in State v. Naveira, 873 So.2d 300 (Fla.2004), stood for the principle that any post-expiration continuance requested by a defendant waives all rights under the speedy trial rule. See id. at 1076. In Naveira, we held that a defendant's right to a speedy trial under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191 was not violated where a defendant invoked the speedy trial rule through a notice of expiration, a trial was scheduled as provided in the rule's recapture provisions, and the only reason the trial was not held according to the recapture provision was the defendant's own motion for a continuance. See Naveira, 873 So.2d at 310.

The Fourth District denied the State's motion and issued an amended opinion which included a narrow reading of Naveira. The district court distinguished Naveira because Nelson had not invoked the recapture period through the filing of a notice of expiration. See Nelson, 993 So.2d at 1076. In the view of the district court, Nelson was not unavailable for trial during the term provided by the rule (i.e., the ninety-day juvenile speedy trial term and the recapture period), and had not requested a continuance after invocation of the rule-based speedy trial rights, which would have constituted a waiver under Naveira. See Nelson (citing State v. Gilliam, 884 So.2d 128 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)). Thus, the Fourth District maintained its conclusion that the post-expiration continuance did not waive Nelson's speedy trial rights. See id.

The district court then attempted to harmonize Naveira with Stewart v. State, 491 So.2d 271 (Fla.1986), which held that "when a defendant requests a continuance prior to the expiration of the applicable speedy trial time period for the crime with which he is charged, the defendant waives his speedy trial right as to all charges which emanate from the same criminal episode." Stewart, 491 So.2d at 272. To do so, the Fourth District held that a motion for continuance is a nullity when filed after the speedy trial period has expired but before the notice of expiration invokes the State's right of recapture. See Nelson, 993 So.2d at 1077. In addition, the Fourth District certified the aforementioned question of great public importance to this Court, and the State invoked this Court's discretionary jurisdiction to answer that certified question. See id.

II. ANALYSIS

The certified question presented requires us to determine the effect of a post-expiration defense continuance on the procedural provisions of the speedy trial rule.¹ It involves the interpretation of the rules of procedure with regard to the right to a speedy trial and is therefore a question of law subject to de novo review by this Court. See Saia Motor Freight Line, Inc. v. Reid, 930 So.2d 598, 599 (Fla.2006). We conclude that the decision of the Fourth District misapprehends the procedures under the current speedy trial rule and, in particular, the impact of the State's right to a recapture period on the nullity principle.

The Purpose and Operation of the Speedy Trial Rule

As expressly guaranteed by both the state and federal constitutions and the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, a criminal defendant possesses the right to a speedy and public trial. See U.S. Const. amend VI; art. I, § 16(a), Fla. Const.; Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.191; Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.090. Pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(a), all defendants are entitled to be brought to trial within a specific period prescribed by the rule without demanding the right to speedy trial. The issue before this Court involves the procedures related to the default period in this rule, which is 175 days in adult proceedings and ninety days in juvenile proceedings.

Although all defendants are entitled to the benefit of the default rule, the rule is not self-executing and requires a defendant to take affirmative action to avail him- or herself of the remedies afforded under the rule based on the State's failure to comply with the time limitations. See State v. Clifton, 905 So.2d 172, 175 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (citing State v. Gibson, 783 So.2d 1155, 1158 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)). When a defendant is charged within the speedy trial period, the remedy for a violation of the rule is not an automatic discharge. Rather, the remedy for the State's failure to try a defendant within the specified time is provided for in Florida Rule of Procedure 3.191(p). See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.191(p); see also Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.191 committee notes (1984); Fla. Bar re Amendment to Rules—Criminal Procedure, 462 So.2d 386, 388 (Fla. 1984).

Specifically, at any time after the expiration of the speedy trial period, the defendant may initiate application of the rule by filing and serving on the State a separate pleading entitled "Notice of Expiration of Speedy Trial Time." This pleading invokes the defendant's speedy trial rights and triggers the recapture window,...