State v. Nichols

• Decision Date: 30 July 2013
• Docket Number: Docket No. SRP–12–350.
• Citation: 2013 ME 71,72 A.3d 503
• Parties: STATE of Maine v. Brian NICHOLS.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

72 A.3d 503

2013 ME 71

STATE of Maine

v.Brian NICHOLS.

Docket No. SRP–12–350.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued: May 16, 2013.

Decided: July 30, 2013.

Adam P. Sherman, Esq. (orally), Paradie, Sherman & Worden, P.A., Lewiston, for appellant Brian Nichols.

Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Lauren F. LaRochelle, Asst. Atty. Gen. (orally), Office of Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee State of Maine.

Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, JJ.

MEAD, J.

[¶ 1] Brian Nichols appeals from the sentence imposed on him following a judgment of conviction entered in the trial court ( Clifford, J.) after he pleaded guilty to the intentional or knowing murder of his wife. See17–A M.R.S. § 201(1)(A) (2012). Nichols challenges the sentencing court's application of the first step of the sentencing analysis required by 17–A M.R.S. § 1252–C(1) (2012), arguing that the court failed to (1) adequately compare his conduct to prior comparable cases in setting the basic period of incarceration, and (2) accurately place his conduct on a continuum of seriousness of possible ways that the crime of murder could be committed. He also argues that the unavailability of basic sentence information implicates all criminal defendants' equal protection and due process rights. We affirm Nichols's sentence and reject his constitutional arguments.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶ 2] The following facts are established in the record. In May 2010, Brian Nichols murdered his wife, Jane Tetreault, by shooting her in the head with a .30–30 rifle while she lay in the couple's bed. After shooting his wife, Nichols called the police to report what he had done. The couple's older son, then sixteen years old, was in a nearby room during the murder and heard his mother scream. When he heard the police sirens he got up, discovered his mother's body, and “saw blood everywhere.”

[¶ 3] Nichols had a long history of domestic violence toward Tetreault. For at least the year or two before the killing, Nichols “perseverated” on his erroneous belief that Tetreault was having an affair. He grew increasingly suspicious in the weeks and months before her murder, causing frequent arguments for the couple, including one in which Nichols broke their television. Tetreault, fearing that Nichols would kill her, slept at her office and in her older son's room with the door locked. Concerned about Nichols' increasingly erratic behavior, Tetreault made plans to commit him involuntarily the night of her murder, but for unknown reasons did not follow through with her plan.

[¶ 4] In the days prior to Tetreault's murder, Nichols asked the couple's younger son, then fifteen years old, whether he would mind if Nichols killed his mother. Nichols also repaired a broken .30–30 rifle, which had been stored in his basement. He skipped work and had trouble sleeping.

[¶ 5] The day of the murder, Nichols smoked more marijuana than usual and went to work. That evening, Nichols dropped his younger son off at a friend's house while he unsuccessfully searched for Tetreault. He later returned to the house where his son was staying and had a beer with the friend's father. Afterward, he searched for Tetreault again, driving by her mother's house and her workplaces, eventually finding her at an office where she worked. After speaking with Tetreault, Nichols left the office, drove by the house where his son was staying, and returned home, where he found Tetreault's car. That night, Nichols murdered her in their home.

[¶ 6] Nichols was indicted for his wife's murder pursuant to 17–A M.R.S. § 201(1)(A). He entered a plea of not guilty, later changing his plea to not criminally responsible by reason of insanity. Nichols ultimately pleaded guilty pursuant to an agreement with the State that it would not seek a sentence greater than forty-two years' imprisonment.

[¶ 7] The State and Nichols each submitted memoranda in aid of sentencing. The State's memorandum identified the facts and basic sentences in four Maine cases involving domestic violence homicides. In the first, where a defendant severely beat his girlfriend and left her to die, the court set his basic sentence at forty-five years because of the unprovoked, depraved, and brutal nature of the crime. In the second, where a defendant strangled and beat his estranged wife with a board, the court set his basic sentence at thirty-five to forty years because of the crime's brutality, rage, and victim suffering. In the third, where a defendant repeatedly stabbed his girlfriend after she broke up with him, the court set the basic sentence at fifty to sixty years. Finally, where a defendant repeatedly stabbed his wife after learning of an affair, the court set the basic sentence at forty to fifty years.

[¶ 8] At Nichols's sentencing hearing, the State argued for a basic sentence of thirty-five to forty years, identifying for the court the objective facts of the murder relevant to the court's task of setting a basic sentence: Nichols used a firearm, he shot Tetreault at close range in or near her mouth, the murder was premeditated, it was born of jealousy and rage, and it was committed in close proximity to the couple's son.

[¶ 9] Nichols argued for a basic sentence of thirty to thirty-five years. He attached an extensive list of final murder sentences in Maine cases to his sentencing memorandum, identifying the basic sentences imposed in two of them. In the first, the court set the basic sentence at thirty years when a defendant beat the victim severely and killed her with a blow to the head with a hammer. In the second, the court set the basic sentence at thirty years when a defendant strangled his girlfriend after an argument. Despite an extensive search for basic sentences that included talking with other defense attorneys and looking at files in three different courthouses, Nichols asserted that he was unable to obtain data about other defendants' basic sentences in comparable cases.

[¶ 10] The sentencing court correctly noted that the determination of a basic term of imprisonment, as required by the first step of the statutory sentencing analysis, 17–A M.R.S. § 1252–C(1), involves considering the particular nature and seriousness of the offense as committed by the offender. The court noted that the sentencing memoranda submitted by the parties, with their descriptions of other murder sentences, were “very helpful.” The court then cited the facts of the murder that it considered in determining the basic period of Nichols's incarceration: (1) Nichols used a firearm to directly cause Tetreault's death; (2) her death was violent and premeditated; (3) one of the couple's sons was in the home; (4) her murder was an act of domestic violence; and (5) although Tetreault did not have any prolonged suffering in her death, “she was put in great fear immediately prior to ... the homicide.” The court set Nichols's basic sentence at thirty-five to forty years. The court next considered, pursuant to step two of the sentencing analysis, 17–A M.R.S. § 1252–C(2) (2012), the aggravating and mitigating circumstances applicable to Nichols, ultimately imposing a final sentence of forty years in prison.

[¶ 11] Nichols filed a motion for findings of fact, which the court granted. In its order, the court restated the standard for determining the basic period of incarceration. It also explained that it “generally accepted the position of the State, for the reasons advanced by the State, that the basic period of incarceration was thirty-five to forty years,” and cited the facts of the murder it considered, including that it was “planned and premeditated, committed with a rifle in the near presence of a son, ... [and] was the culmination of a long history of domestic violence abuse....” Pursuant to M.R.App. P. 20 and 15 M.R.S. § 2151 (2012), we granted Nichols leave to appeal the forty-year sentence imposed.

II. DISCUSSION

[¶ 12] We first articulated the three-step process that a sentencing court is required to follow in State v. Hewey, 622 A.2d 1151 (Me.1993). The sentencing analysis discussed in Hewey was later codified by the Legislature. P.L.1995, ch. 69, § 1 (effective Sept. 29, 1995) (codified at 17–A M.R.S. § 1252–C (2012)). The statute provides that

the court shall employ the following 3–step process:

1. The court shall first determine a basic term of imprisonment by considering the particular nature and seriousness of the offense as committed by the offender.

2. The court shall next determine the maximum period of imprisonment to be imposed by considering all other relevant sentencing factors, both aggravating and mitigating, appropriate to that case. These sentencing factors include, but are not limited to, the character of the offender and the offender's criminal history, the effect of the offense on the victim and the protection of the public interest.

3. The court shall finally determine what portion, if any, of the maximum period of imprisonment should be suspended and, if a suspension order is to be entered, determine the appropriate period of probation to accompany that suspension.

17–A M.R.S. § 1252–C. In sentencing a defendant convicted of murder, the third step does not apply. See17–A M.R.S. § 1201(1)(A) (2012); State v. Waterman, 2010 ME 45, ¶ 25 n. 1, 995 A.2d 243. In murder cases, the court must first determine a basic period of incarceration and then evaluate the mitigating and aggravating factors to determine the final sentence. Nichols's arguments focus solely on the first step, the court's determination of his basic sentence “by considering the particular nature and seriousness of the offense as committed by the offender.” See17–A M.R.S. § 1252–C(1).

[¶ 13] We review the sentencing court's determination of the basic period of incarceration for misapplication of sentencing principles. State v. Ardolino, 1997 ME 141, ¶ 24, 697 A.2d 73. “[A] basic sentence will survive appellate scrutiny unless it appears to err in...