State v. Niles, Appellate Case No. 2012–213592.

• Decision Date: 10 June 2015
• Docket Number: No. 27510.,Appellate Case No. 2012–213592.,27510.
• Citation: 412 S.C. 515,772 S.E.2d 877
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: The STATE, Petitioner, v. Richard Bill NILES, Jr., Respondent.

412 S.C. 515

772 S.E.2d 877

The STATE, Petitioner

v.Richard Bill NILES, Jr., Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2012–213592.

No. 27510.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard June 25, 2014.

Refiled June 10, 2015.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, and Assistant Attorney General Brendan Jackson McDonald, all of Columbia, and Solicitor Jimmy A. Richardson II, of Conway, for Petitioner.

Chief Appellate Defender Robert Michael Dudek, of Columbia, and Reid T. Sherard, of Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP, of Greenville, for Respondent.

Opinion

Chief Justice TOAL.

Richard Bill Niles, Jr. was convicted of murder, armed robbery, and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. The court of appeals reversed Respondent's murder conviction and remanded for a new trial, finding the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter. State v. Niles, 400 S.C. 527, 735 S.E.2d 240 (Ct.App.2012).¹ We reverse.

Facts /Procedural Background

This case arises from the shooting death of James Salter (the victim) in a Best Buy parking lot in Myrtle Beach. It is undisputed that Niles, his fiancé, Mokeia Hammond, and Ervin Moore met the victim at the parking lot to purchase marijuana from him.² Niles and Moore testified at trial,³ and Niles's version of events matched Moore's version, except as to whose idea it was to rob the victim and whether Niles or the victim fired the first shots.⁴ Thus, the evidence at trial focused on whether Niles was the aggressor in the deadly encounter.

On the afternoon of April 9, 2007, Niles and Hammond encountered Moore at a convenience store in Trio, South Carolina, and invited Moore to accompany them to Myrtle Beach. Niles and Moore were acquaintances, having known each other through various family members. On the way to Myrtle Beach, the trio smoked all of the marijuana that they had brought with them.

Therefore, Niles contacted the victim⁵ via telephone and arranged to meet him at the Best Buy parking lot to purchase marijuana. Niles testified that his conversation with the victim had a dual purpose. Not only was he meeting with the victim so that Moore could purchase a pound of marijuana from him, but he claimed that the victim owed him $5,000 as payment for other drug transactions. According to Moore, however, Niles subsequently decided to rob the victim instead.⁶

Once in Myrtle Beach, the trio made several stops at various motels so that Niles could sell crack cocaine before meeting the victim at the designated meeting spot at approximately 7:00 p.m. Hammond was driving Niles's rental vehicle, with Niles riding in the front passenger's seat and Moore riding in the back seat. Hammond parked the rental vehicle next to the victim's vehicle. Moore testified that his role in the robbery was “to identify the weed” for Niles. Therefore, Moore approached the victim's vehicle first. Moore joined the victim in the victim's vehicle, and the victim produced the bag of marijuana for Moore to inspect.

Moore testified that as he returned to Niles's vehicle, Niles had already exited his vehicle, and Moore told Niles that the victim had the drugs. Moore testified that as he returned to his place in Niles's vehicle, Niles was leaning inside the passenger-side door of the victim's vehicle and was speaking to the victim.⁷

Moore testified he heard two shots and saw Niles leap into the back seat of his vehicle behind Hammond.⁸ Moore then heard the victim fire a weapon in response. Niles and the victim shot back and forth multiple times. Niles had the drugs with him that Niles had stolen from the victim.

In contrast, Niles testified that Moore acted alone. Niles stated he merely set up the meeting, but Moore went over to the victim's vehicle to purchase the drugs while Niles and Hammond sat in the car and discussed their upcoming wedding. Niles said he then saw Moore and the victim fighting in the victim's vehicle, and realized that Moore was robbing the victim. Niles testified that Moore exited the victim's vehicle with the stolen drugs, and as Moore dove back into Niles's vehicle, Niles saw the victim draw his gun and shoot at them, knocking out the rear windows of Niles's vehicle. Therefore, Niles grabbed his gun, and returned fire. According to Niles, he was concerned with stopping the shooter and for Hammond's safety:

So, while he was shooting in the car ... I grabbed my pistol and that's when I shot two times. My eyes were closed. I wasn't even looking. I shot two times. I went pow, pow. I wasn't trying to hit nobody ... I was just trying to get him to stop shooting. That's all I was trying to do. I didn't know if my fiancé got shot or nothing. That's the first thing that came to my head, you know.

After the shooting, Niles instructed Hammond to drive away from the scene, and the trio abandoned the vehicle at a nearby trailer park. Niles then called a taxicab to transport him and Hammond to a local motel. At that point, he and Hammond parted ways with Moore, and Moore kept the marijuana. The victim died at the scene from a gunshot wound

.

On these facts, the trial court instructed the jury on the law of murder and self-defense, but refused Niles's request to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter, reasoning that the evidence showed Niles was either guilty of murder or he was not guilty of any crime based on his claim of self-defense.

The court of appeals reversed Niles's murder conviction and remanded the case for a new trial, finding the evidence compelled a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter. Niles, 400 S.C. at 534, 735 S.E.2d at 244. Specifically, the court of appeals found there was evidence of sufficient legal provocation based on Niles's testimony that he shot at the victim only after the victim began shooting first. Id. at 535, 735 S.E.2d at 244. Further, the court of appeals found that there was evidence that Niles acted in a sudden heat of passion based on Niles's testimony that he took Moore to meet the victim to buy marijuana; that Moore, without warning, decided to rob the victim; and that Niles did not fire his gun until after Moore perpetrated the robbery and the victim shot first. Id. at 536, 735 S.E.2d at 245. Therefore, the court of appeals concluded that there was evidence that Niles did not have an opportunity for cool reflection, and as such, there was evidence Niles acted in a sudden heat of passion. Id.

We granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to consider the State's argument that the court of appeals erred in determining Niles was entitled to a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter because there was no evidence at trial that Niles acted in the sudden heat of passion.⁹

Standard of Review

In criminal cases, the appellate court sits to review errors of law only. State v. Baccus, 367 S.C. 41, 48, 625 S.E.2d 216, 220 (2006). Thus, this Court is bound by the trial court's factual findings unless the appellant can demonstrate that the trial court's conclusions either lack evidentiary support or are controlled by an error of law. State v. Laney, 367 S.C. 639, 644, 627 S.E.2d 726, 729 (2006). “The refusal to grant a requested jury charge that states a sound principle of law applicable to the case at hand is an error of law.” State v. Pittman, 373 S.C. 527, 570, 647 S.E.2d 144, 167 (2007).

Analysis

The State maintains the trial court did not err in refusing Niles's request for an instruction on voluntary manslaughter because Niles failed to present evidence that he acted in the sudden heat of passion. We agree with the State that there was no evidence that Niles acted within a sudden heat of passion upon sufficient legal provocation, and therefore the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter.

“The law to be charged to the jury is determined by the evidence presented at trial.” State v. Hill, 315 S.C. 260, 262, 433 S.E.2d 848, 849 (1993). The trial court is required to charge a jury on a lesser-included offense if there is evidence from which it could be inferred that the defendant committed the lesser, rather than the greater, offense. State v. Drafts, 288 S.C. 30, 340 S.E.2d 784 (1986) ; Dempsey v. State, 363 S.C. 365, 610 S.E.2d 812 (2005). When determining whether the evidence requires a charge on voluntary manslaughter, the court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the defendant. Pittman, 373 S.C. at 572–73, 647 S.E.2d at 168.

“Voluntary manslaughter is the intentional and unlawful killing of a human being in sudden heat of passion upon sufficient legal provocation.” State v. Smith, 391 S.C. 408, 412–13, 706 S.E.2d 12, 14 (2011). To receive a voluntary manslaughter charge, there must be evidence of sufficient legal provocation and sudden heat of passion. State v. Cole, 338 S.C. 97, 101, 525 S.E.2d 511, 513 (2000).

The sudden heat of passion, upon sufficient legal provocation, which mitigates a felonious killing to manslaughter, while it need not dethrone reason entirely, or shut out knowledge and volition, must be such as would naturally disturb the sway of reason, and render the mind of an ordinary person incapable of cool reflection, and produce what, according to human experience, may be called an uncontrollable impulse to do violence.

State v. Walker, 324 S.C. 257, 260, 478 S.E.2d 280, 281 (1996). Whether or not the facts constitute a sudden heat of passion is an appropriate question for the court. State v. Hernandez, 386 S.C. 655, 662, 690 S.E.2d 582, 586 (Ct.App.2010) (citation omitted).

Niles's own testimony does not establish that he was overtaken by a sudden heat of passion such that he had an uncontrollable impulse to do violence. Rather, Niles testified that he did not want to hurt the victim; that he shot with his eyes closed; that he was merely attempting to stop the...