State v. Estes

• Decision Date: 26 May 1923
• Docket Number: (No. 468.)
• Citation: 117 S.E. 581
• Parties: STATE v. ESTES.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

117 S.E. 581

STATE

v.ESTES.

(No. 468.)

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

May 26, 1923.

[Ed. Note.—For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Interfere—Interference.]

Appeal from Superior Court, Caldwell County; Ray, Judge.

W. T. Estes was convicted of obstructing a health officer in discharge of his duty, and appeals. New trial.

Criminal action tried before Ray, J., and a jury at the November term, 1922, of Caldwell county. In the indictment it was charged that the defendant unlawfully and willfully did resist, hinder, delay, obstruct, and interfere with W. S. Chapel, an officer of the North Carolina state board of health, in the discharge of his duty as such officer.

Chapel testified that he was a sanitary inspector employed by the state board of health; that on October 2, 1922, he went to the defendant's store in Granite Falls, shook hands with him, and said, "I find you have not complied with the law with regard to your toilet;" that the defendant cursed him and replied, "I don't want you to follow me another inch;" that the witness rejoined. "It is the law, and we have but two courses to pursue, one to pursuade you, and another not so pleasant;" that defendant again cursed him, and the witness asked whether the defendant meant to obstruct him as a public officer, and the defendant said that was exactly what he meant; that the witness then started out, and the defendant used obscene language. The witness further testified:

"I went on out. Later he [defendant] asked me to take up the warrant, and I told him he had treated me dirty that afternoon and I had taken up a warrant last year. Defendant at no time rose from his desk and did not strike or offer to strike me. He made no demonstration of violence whatever. The conversation occurred in the store. The toilets that we were talking about were located at his house and on another lot."

There was no other evidence. Defendant's motion for judgment of nonsuit was denied. Thereupon the court charged the jury as to the presumption of innocence of the defendant and that the burden was on the state to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; if there was no reasonable doubt as to thetruth of the evidence, to convict the defendant, and, if there was any doubt about it, to acquit. The defendant excepted to the charge. There was a verdict of guilty on which judgment was pronounced. The defendant excepted and appealed.

Mark Squires, of Lenoir, for appellant.

James S. Manning, Atty. Gen., and Frank Nash, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

ADAMS. J. Section 7139 of the Consolidated Statutes provides that for the faithful execution of various laws relating to the public health (chapter 118, art. 8) the state board of health shall organize and maintain a bureau of sanitary engineering and inspection which shall be charged with the performance of specified duties; and by virtue of section 7140 the sanitary inspectors appointed to assist in the enforcement of the article referred to are authorized and empowered to enter upon any premises and into any buildings or institutions for purposes of inspection, as provided by law, or by regulations of the state board of health pursuant to law. W. S. Chapel was a sanitary inspector, and on October 2, 1922, he went to the defendant's place of business ostensibly for the purpose of enforcing certain statutory requirements in regard to the public health, and at the meeting on that occasion of the witness and the defendant the circumstances related in the evidence took place.'

His honor instructed the jury to convict the defendant if they had no reasonable doubt as to the truth of the evidence; and the appeal presents the question whether the evidence, if true, necessarily establishes the defendant's guilt. The statute is as follows:

"Any person or persons who willfully interfere with or obstruct the officers of the state board of health in the discharge of any of the aforementioned duties shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and subject to a fine of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than one thousand dollars, or imprisoned at the discretion of the court."

It is a recognized principle that the trial judge is not justified in directing a verdict of guilty In a criminal action, a concrete application of the principle appearing in Dixon's Case, in which the presiding judge said, "I shall tell the jury to return a verdict of manslaughter." State v. Dixon, 75 N. C. 275; State v. Boyd, 175 N. C. 791, 95 S. E. 161; State v. Singleton, 183 N. C. 738, 110 S. E. 846. But where as an inference of law the uncontradicted evidence, if accepted as true, establishes the defendant's guilt, it is permissible for the court to instruct the jury to return a verdict of guilty if they find the evidence to be true beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Vines, 93 N. C. 493, 53 Am. Rep. 466; State v. "Winchester, 113 N. C. 642, 18 S. E. 657; State v. Riley, 113 N. C. 648, 18 S. E. 168: State v. Woolard 119 N. C. 779, 25 S. E. 719. In the Instant case his honor no doubt had this principle in mind, and the soundness of the instruction is dependent on the ultimate question whether the mere use of words unattended by any force or demonstration of...