State v. Noel

• Decision Date: 11 July 1979
• Docket Number: No. 78-233,78-233
• Citation: 404 A.2d 290,119 N.H. 522
• Parties: The STATE of New Hampshire v. Steven C. NOEL.
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Page 290

404 A.2d 290

119 N.H. 522

The STATE of New Hampshire v. Steven C. NOEL.

No. 78-233.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

July 11, 1979.

Thomas D. Rath, Atty. Gen., Paul W. Hodes, Concord, by brief, for the state.

Glenn G. Geiger, Jr., Penacook, by brief, for defendant.

LAMPRON, Chief Justice.

The defendant was indicted for burglary. RSA 635:1. Trial by jury resulted in a guilty verdict. The defendant excepted to certain rulings of the court during the course of the proceeding and a reserved case was prepared and transferred by DiClerico, J. Specifically, the defendant argues that any statements made after he was given the Miranda warnings were inadmissible because he was mentally unable to understand his rights and incapable of giving a knowing, intelligent, voluntary waiver. The defendant also contends that the trial court erred in failing to direct a verdict in his favor. We overrule defendant's exceptions.

On the morning of September 5, 1976, at about 2:45 a. m., the Concord police were dispatched to the Tap Room, a restaurant on Loudon Road, to investigate a possible burglary. Sergeant Bennett and officers Davis and Reilly arrived at the scene. Sergeant Bennett investigated the back of the premises while the other two officers covered the front. In the back of the restaurant, there was a fenced area that contained an outdoor bar. Sergeant Bennett entered this area with a flashlight and a drawn gun and with a beam of light noticed an arm of a person concealed behind the wooden bar. The sergeant called for the suspect to come out, and after the fourth call a person later identified as the defendant came out. Three tools were found at the place where the defendant was hiding. The tools belonged to the owner of the restaurant and they were kept inside the building.

After the defendant was handcuffed, Bennett patted him down and found only two cents. The other two officers then proceeded to investigate the interior of the building. They gained entry through a window space on a side door. The plexiglass that covered the opening had been removed and was lying nearby. Inside the building, the officers found that the jukebox and the pinball machine had been broken into and that the coin boxes had been removed and were lying on the floor. There was money in the open drawer of a cash register.

At trial the defendant put forth a defense of intoxication. Specifically, he alleged that due to the influence of drugs and alcohol he was incapable of forming the requisite mental state to be found guilty of RSA 635:1 (Burglary). That is, he did not enter with a purpose to commit the crime of theft therein. Id. The defendant testified on his own behalf in part as follows. He had been taking various drugs and alcohol for two days preceding his arrest. On the evening of his arrest, he attended a party where he claimed that he was given a drink in which somebody slipped a hallucinogenic drug, LSD. He left the party and, after hitchhiking, he found himself on Loudon Road across from the Tap Room. A sudden thunderstorm passed through the area and because of the effect of the drugs, he became frightened of the thunder and lightning. To escape the storm, he sought shelter in the restaurant. The defendant further testified that, while inside the restaurant, he broke into the jukebox and the pinball machine to obtain money to play the latter. When he noticed the police, he again became afraid, dove out the side window and hid under the wooden bar where he was later apprehended. A psychiatrist, Dr. Lian O'Brien, testified for the defendant. He stated that the defendant's testimony and description of the events was consistent with those of a person who was hallucinating due to the effect of drugs. Trial by jury resulted in a verdict of guilty.

I. Understanding of Miranda Rights.

When the defendant was apprehended by Sergeant Bennett, he was given his Miranda rights, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and was then asked by the arresting officer if he had anything to say. Without affirmatively acknowledging that he understood his rights, defendant responded by asking how the police knew he was inside the building and if someone had called the station. This statement was introduced at trial through the testimony of the arresting officer. He was then taken to the police station where he was again read his Miranda rights and asked to sign a written waiver form, which he did in fact sign. Another statement was given. This statement, however, was suppressed because the trial court found that too much time had elapsed between the giving of the rights and the making of the statement. This lapse, the trial court concluded, required that the Miranda warnings be given again. The only statement in issue before this court is the statement made at the scene of the arrest before the defendant signed the waiver form. There is no dispute concerning the accuracy of the Miranda warnings as verbally recited by the arresting officer. Rather, the controversy concerns whether the accused was capable of understanding his rights against self-incrimination and the right to have counsel present during any questioning. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

Before the State can introduce a defendant's statement into evidence it must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant understood his Miranda rights. State v. Gullick, 118 N.H. ---, 396 A.2d 554 (1978); State v. Phinney, 117 N.H. 145, 370 A.2d 1153 (1977). Unless an accused understands his rights, there can be no voluntary, intelligent and knowing waiver. See United Sates v. Brown, 535 F.2d 424, 427 (8th Cir. 1976). The defendant argues that the State has not satisfied this burden because he made no affirmative acknowledgment that he actually understood his rights. State v. Vargus, 373 A.2d 150, 154 (R.I.1977), and that his drug intoxication made it impossible for him to understand his rights. Pierce v. Cardwell, 572 F.2d 1339, 1341 (9th Cir. 1978).

One's mental and physical condition are crucial in determining whether a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver occurred. Id. at 1342. At the suppression hearing there was conflicting testimony concerning the defendant's sobriety. The defendant testified that he repeatedly consumed drugs and alcohol on the day of the arrest. Because of the effect of drugs, he stated that he could not remember talking to the police at the scene of the arrest. The arresting officer testified that the defendant appeared to be sober, despite smelling of a trace of alcohol. The officer also testified that even though he didn't remember whether defendant had actually acknowledged an understanding of the rights, the officer, nevertheless, received the clear impression that defendant understood his rights. In addition other officers testified that when the defendant was brought to the station house he appeared to be intelligent and aware of the circumstances of his arrest.

An express written or oral statement of a waiver of the Miranda rights is not invariably required under the United States Constitution. North Carolina v. Butler, --- U.S. ----, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979). Since an express waiver is not always constitutionally required, neither should an explicit statement that an accused actually understands the Miranda rights be required. Whether a person in fact knowingly and voluntarily waived the Miranda rights is to be determined from the totality of the circumstances. North Carolina v. Butler, --- U.S. ----, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 1757, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979); See generally State v. Gullick, 118 N.H. ---, 396 A.2d 554 (1978). Therefore the arresting officer's failure to recall whether defendant affirmatively acknowledged an understanding of the Miranda rights is not determinative. The crucial issue is whether the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that defendant was mentally capable of actually comprehending his rights and voluntarily waived them.

The suppression hearing was heard and decided before our decision in State v. Gullick, 118 N.H. ---, 396 A.2d 554 (1978), in which we required a trial court at a suppression hearing on...