State v. Noland
| Decision Date | 08 March 1933 |
| Docket Number | 585. |
| Citation | 168 S.E. 412,204 N.C. 329 |
| Parties | STATE v. NOLAND. |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Superior Court, Buncombe County; Clement, Judge.
Wylie B. Noland was convicted of offering a bribe to a qualified juror serving in a criminal action entitled State v. W. B Davis and Others, and he appeals.
No error.
Affidavit made by witness in another proceeding held competent in corroboration of present testimony.
Marcus Erwin, of Asheville, and Grover C. Davis, of Waynesville, for appellant.
Dennis G. Brummitt, Atty. Gen., A. A. F. Seawell, and Walter D Siler, Asst. Attys. Gen., and Gertrude M. Upchurch, of Raleigh, for the State.
Hurst Justice, the juror, H. L. Justice, his father, and W. B Noland, the defendant, are residents of Haywood county. The state's evidence tends to show that, while the criminal action against Davis and his codefendants was being tried in Asheville, the defendant, Noland, went to the home of H. L. Justice and told him that, if he could ascertain how Hurst Justice stood with respect to the trial, and if he stood for acquittal, H. L. Justice and the defendant could each get $500 for learning how the juror stood, and the juror himself could get $1,000 "for standing that way"; also that the defendant said, "I am not expecting to bribe him; if he is against us I don't want to change him; but if he is for us I would love to get the money." There is evidence that he requested H. L. Justice to communicate the proposition to the juror's wife, that the defendant with H. L. Justice and the latter's wife went to the home of the juror, who was in Asheville, and that H. L. Justice informed his daughter-in-law of the offer after the defendant had gone on to the dwelling of Brownlow Snider, another member of the jury. It is in evidence also that the juror's wife went to Asheville during the trial and told her husband all that the defendant had said. It is obvious, then, that whatever message the juror received from the defendant through these intermediaries was communicated to him in Buncombe county. There, if anywhere, the corrupt offer was made to him, and there the proper venue was laid. "In the prosecution of all offenses it shall be deemed and taken as true that the offense was committed in the county in which by the indictment it is alleged to have taken place, unless the defendant shall deny the same by plea in abatement." C. S. § 4606; State v. Outerbridge, 82 N.C. 618; State v. Lytle, 117 N.C. 799, 23 S.E. 476; State v. Long, 143 N.C. 671, 57 S.E. 349; State v. Oliver, 186 N.C. 329, 119 S.E. 370; State v. Mitchell, 202 N.C. 439, 163 S.E. 581. The defendant was therefore not entitled to a change of venue, and his motion for removal of the case to Haywood county was properly denied.
The defendant demurred to the first count in the indictment for the alleged reason that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute the crime of bribing a juror as defined in C. S. § 4375, and does not charge that the juror received any fee or other compensation as a reward for his misconduct or that he acted corruptly.
Bribery, as defined by Blackstone, was committed when a judge or other person concerned in the administration of justice took any undue reward to influence his behavior in his office. 4 Bl. 139. Russell, in his work on Crimes, extends the definition to all cases where any undue reward is received by or offered to any person whose ordinary business relates to the administration of public justice in order to influence his behavior in office and incline him to disregard the known rules of honesty and integrity. 2 Russell, Crimes, 122. Wharton says, "Bribery is corruptly tendering or receiving a price for official action." 3 Crim. Law (12th Ed.) § 2234.
With respect to juries, our statute (C. S. § 4375) provides in part that, if any juror either directly or indirectly shall take anything from any defendant in a state prosecution or from any other person to give his verdict, the juror receiving and the person giving the reward shall be guilty of a felony; and another statute declares that any person who offers a bribe, whether it be accepted or not, shall be guilty of a like crime. C. S. § 4373. The several statutes pertaining to the subject recognize the distinction between bribery and an offer to bribe. C. S. § 4372 et seq.
Under the earlier indictments the offer or tender of a bribe was usually characterized as "corrupt," but the law prescribes no exclusive formula for stating the corrupt intent, no technical words in which the charge of corruption shall be made. Wharton's Criminal Law (12th Ed.) § 1903. If the bill is sufficient to enable the court to proceed to judgment, the prosecution should not be stayed for any informality or refinement. C. S. § 4623. Assuming, however, that the indictment must set out the evil intent, we observe in the first count an averment that the defendant unlawfully, willfully, and feloniously offered a bribe to an acting juror with intent to influence the verdict and to procure the acquittal of the defendants. This is a sufficient charge of the corrupt purpose.
The defendant's objection to the examination of H. L. Justice, a witness for the state, is without substantial merit. The witness had made an affidavit as to facts which were material, and upon his examination in this case was hesitant and evasive in his answers to questions asked him by the solicitor. The court gave the prosecuting officer leave to call the attention of the witness directly to the contents of his affidavit. The examination was not intended as an impeachment of the witness, but as an effort to refresh his memory by reference to statements he had previously made and to prevent confusion or equivocation in his testimony. The trial court in the exercise of its discretion may under such circumstances permit a party to propound leading questions to his own witness. State v. Buck, 191 N.C. 528, 132 S.E. 151; Howell v. Solomon, 167 N.C. 588, 83 S.E. 609; State v. Cobb, 164 N.C. 419, 79 S.E. 419.
The testimony of this witness in reference to the receipt of a letter written him by the juror's wife corroborated her testimony and was competent at least for this purpose. State v. Brodie, 190 N.C. 554, 130 S.E. 205. The order in which the evidence should be introduced was a matter for the court. American Steel & Wire Co. v Copeland, 159 N.C. 556, 75 S.E. 1002. Mrs. Justice's testimony was admissible likewise, not only in corroboration of H. L. Justice, but as evidence of an indirect communication of the defendant to the juror, who was her husband. The exception rests upon the contention that ...
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