State v. Nordstrom
| Decision Date | 30 December 1893 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE v. NORDSTROM. [1] |
Appeal from superior court, King county; T. J. Humes, Judge.
Charles W. Nordstrom was convicted of the murder of William Mason sentenced to death, and appeals. Affirmed.
The provision of the state constitution permitting prosecutions for crime by information is not repugnant to the requirement of the federal constitution that criminal prosecutions shall be begun by indictment by the grand jury.
On the evening of the 27th day of November, 1891, William Mason, a young man 21 years of age, living near Cedar Mountain, in King county, Wash., was shot and instantly killed by an assassin firing through the window from the outer darkness. The weapon used was a 45-70 caliber Winchester rifle. It was Thanksgiving night, and, about 6:30 P. M., the deceased, in company with his two brothers, the schoolmaster, and a hired man, was seated at the supper table, deceased nearest the window. A bright light sat on the table, while no curtain hung from the window. The bullet entered about two inches below the point of the left shoulder, and passed through the entire body, death resulting in less than a minute. Suspicion, from the first, pointed towards defendant, Charles W. Nordstrom, as the murderer. The sheriff, upon being informed, hastened to the scene, and, after making a hasty observation of the premises, sought Nordstrom's capture. Footprints on the outside of the house showed the assassin had stood within five feet of the window, and by the turning of the foot in the soft ground indicated the nature of the boot he wore, the size of the boot, and the direction in which he fled. The tracks were pursued for some distance. Then they were lost, and soon tracks made in stocking feet were observed, these last tracks lead to a deserted cabin in the forest, where the rubber boots, corresponding identically with the tracks made near the window, were found. From the deserted cabin, leather-boot tracks of a very peculiar kind were found, pursuing an unfrequented and solitary trail, past another deserted cabin, and over the mountains, in the direction of Gilman. At this second cabin appellant's hat was found; also a portion of a memorandum book. The sheriff pursued the tracks, and the capture resulted in two days. Defendant had in his possession the 45-70 Winchester rifle loaded with the same kind of a peculiar bullet as was found in the body of the deceased. He also wore, at the time of his arrest, a cap which he had taken from the deserted cabin at the time he left his hat. His stockings were muddy, and the boots he wore, by reason of some very peculiar "patches" on the soles, corresponded with the tracks leading from the cabin where the rubber boots were found. The defendant, who had formerly worked in the mines at Gilman, and where money was still due him, evaded the town, and lived on some crackers and cheese in an old cabin in the mountains. The defendant denied all knowledge of the crime, and sought to implicate another.
Jas. Hamilton Lewis, (Arthur E. Griffin and Gill & Keene, of counsel,) for appellant.
John F. Miller, Pros. Atty., Jas. A. Haight, Asst. Atty. Gen., and A. G. McBride, for the State.
1. Again the question is presented here that the appellant, under the federal constitution, is entitled to have the charge against him presented upon an indictment found by a grand jury. In this instance the contention is based upon the language of the enabling act, which provided that the constitution of Washington should be republican in form, and "not repugnant to the constitution of the United States." Much learned investigation and ingenious argument have been expended by counsel in an endeavor to impress this court with the view that inasmuch as the constitution of the United States, in prescribing the method of initiating prosecutions for infamous crimes against federal laws, makes the grand jury a sine qua non, and its indictment the only lawful means of charging an offense, therefore the state constitution must conform to the same method, and any authority to prosecute by information must be repugnant to the supreme federal law, and void. We may, and do, yield assent to all that is thus said, with one exception; and we should be justified in going further than the argument made, and in holding that, if the provisions of the fifth amendment to the federal constitution apply to the matter of prosecutions for crimes against state laws, it would make no difference were there no mention of the federal constitution in the enabling act or the constitution of the state; the constitution of the United States would still be the supreme law of the land, and all provisions of the state constitution or laws which were actually repugnant would be utterly void; nor could any act of congress make any such provision one whit the less void or inoperative. But the difficulty is that the constitution of the United States does not assume or pretend to regulate prosecutions for offenses against state laws, and we see no reason why there should be any departure from the views on this subject expressed in Lybarger v. State, 2 Wash. St. 552, 27 P. 449, 1029. See Spies v. Illinois, 123 U.S. 131, 8 S.Ct. 21.
2. The information was identical with those in State v. Freidrich, 4 Wash. 204, 29 P. 1055, 30 P. 328, and 31 P. 332, and State v. Day, 4 Wash. 104, 29 P. 984.
3. Appellant alleges error because the court below refused to quash the information upon a showing that he had not a preliminary examination; but his real ground for the motion was that, whereas a charge was made against him before Justice Neagle, that charge was not pursued, but was dismissed, and a new charge made before Justice Von Tobel, before whom there was a full examination. No error.
4. The names of certain witnesses were indorsed upon the information before the trial commenced, by special order of the court, as the statute permits. Code Proc. § 1230.
5. Upon filing the information, the prosecuting attorney caused a copy of it, with the names of witnesses indorsed, to be served upon appellant, and appellant complains because he was not furnished another copy when the names of new witnesses were added. The evident purpose of the statute (Code Proc. § 1267) is to apprise the accused, as soon after the information is filed as is reasonably possible, of the charge made against him, and the names of leading witnesses. After that, notice of the addition of new names of witnesses meets every reasonable requirement; and there was notice in this case.
6. The state sought to connect the appellant with the homicide by means of certain boot tracks and tracks of feet wearing only socks, impressed in soft or muddy ground near the scene of the crime, and, in pursuit of its endeavor, called a deputy sheriff to produce the boots and socks of appellant. These articles were taken from appellant's person upon his arrest, and were retained by the sheriff to be used as evidence,-the boots because it was claimed that they fitted the tracks, and the socks because they were muddy. No force whatever seems to have been used by the officers in getting possession of these things, but they were taken from the prisoner in the course of the usual search of his person upon his arrival at the jail. Appellant complains of the admission of the boots and socks in evidence on the ground that they were obtained by an unreasonable search of his person, and that it was a method of compelling him to give evidence against himself; but we cannot sustain his position. It is generally held that an accused person cannot be compelled to exhibit these portions of his body which are usually covered for the purpose of securing his identification, or in other ways affording evidence against him, though that proposition has been reduced, in at least one case, to prohibiting exposure only where decency would be infringed. State v. Ah Chuey, 14 Nev. 79. But it has never been held that personal effects of every kind could not be taken from the person of a prisoner, and used upon his trial for what they may be worth as criminating evidence. State v. Graham, 74 N.C. 646. The same observations apply to the memorandum book taken from appellant's pocket, and exhibited to the jury to show that a leaf found in a cabin in the woods, where it was claimed appellant had been, belonged in his book; and also to the cap which he wore when arrested, and which, it was claimed, had been hanging on a nail in the same cabin until the night of the homicide.
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State v. Parker
...permitting the search of the person of an arrestee dates back more than 100 years under Washington law. See, e.g., State v. Nordstrom, 7 Wash. 506, 510, 35 P. 382 (1893) ("But it has never been held that personal effects of every kind could not be taken from the person of a prisoner and use......
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State v. Salinas
...at the scene of the crime. Brown, 83 Wash. at 106, 145 P. 69. The court had already approved a similar scenario in State v. Nordstrom, 7 Wash. 506, 35 P. 382 (1893), affirmed,164 U.S. 705, 17 S.Ct. 997, 41 L.Ed. 1183 (1896). In Nordstrom, the State sought to connect the defendant with a hom......
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State v. Vinsonhaler, No. 36235-0-II (Wash. App. 8/11/2009), 36235-0-II.
...constitution applied, which provides that the State may prosecute offenses by information or by indictment. See State v. Nordstrom, 7 Wash. 506, 508, 35 P. 382 (1893) (article I, section 25 of the Washington Constitution is not repugnant to clause I of the Fifth Amendment to the United Stat......
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State v. Barry
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