State v. Norstrom

• Decision Date: 14 January 1993
• Docket Number: No. 78568,78568
• Citation: 613 So.2d 437
• Parties: 18 Fla. L. Week. S57 STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Eric C. NORSTROM, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 437

613 So.2d 437

18 Fla. L. Week. S57

STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Eric C. NORSTROM, Respondent.

No. 78568.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Jan. 14, 1993.

Rehearing Denied March 4, 1993.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen. and Joan Fowler, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for petitioner.

Michael Salnick of Salnick & Krischer, West Palm Beach, for respondent.

OVERTON, Justice.

We have for review Norstrom v. State, 587 So.2d 1148 (Fla. 4th DCA1991), in which the district court held that statements made by Norstrom, after he was informed of his Miranda ¹ rights and signed a waiver form, were not admissible because the statements were made during the accident investigation phase of the incident and were, therefore, privileged under section 316.066, Florida Statutes (Supp.1988). The district court certified the following to be a question of great public importance:

WHETHER STATEMENTS MADE IN THE COURSE OF A POST ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BY AN INDIVIDUAL IN POLICE CUSTODY ARE PRIVILEGED UNDER Sec. 316.066, FLORIDA STATUTES, WHERE MIRANDA WARNINGS HAVE BEEN GIVEN AND THE INDIVIDUAL IS NOT TOLD THAT HE OR SHE IS REQUIRED TO ANSWER THE QUESTIONS.

Id. 587 So.2d at 1153. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, Sec. 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We find that, since Norstrom voluntarily made the statements after Miranda warnings had been given, there is no evidence that Norstrom's Fifth Amendment rights were violated. Accordingly, we find that his statements were admissible and answer the question in the negative.

The relevant facts, as set forth in the district court's opinion, are as follows:

According to a statement made by the 16-year-old [Norstrom], on the night of March 25, 1988, he drove to a party attended by fellow high school students. He drank about four eight-ounce cups of beer while there. After the party, the students gathered at the end of High Ridge Road, parking their cars along the side of the road and standing around near them and in the road at the end of the dead-end street. There were no street lights in the area.

Sometime before midnight, [Norstrom] left the High Ridge Road party to take a friend home. He then headed back to pick up another friend. He had difficulty finding the party again. He drove down the street at what he estimated to be seventy to seventy-five miles per hour. By the time he saw the people at the end of the street, it was too late to stop. He slammed on the brakes and lost control of his car. The car struck seven persons, killing one and seriously injuring two others. Several cars were also struck.

Following the accident, [Norstrom] told his friend to find a police officer. The friend found Officer Oliphant who testified that his sergeant had requested him to pick up somebody involved in a traffic accident with injuries. The officer also testified that he could not be certain that he handcuffed [Norstrom], but told him he was under arrest, and believed he told him it was for a traffic accident with injuries. He did not advise [Norstrom] of his rights.

Officer Thomas, who was with Officer Oliphant, subsequently testified that [Norstrom] was not handcuffed, and that he (Thomas) was not aware that [Norstrom] was under arrest. However, he conceded that it was possible that Officer Oliphant told [Norstrom] he was under arrest. The officers took [Norstrom] and his friend to the police station, and (although he did not smell any alcohol), Officer Oliphant later took [Norstrom] to Bethesda Hospital for a blood alcohol test.

Marie Lavoie, the officer in charge of the investigation, spoke with [Norstrom] at the police station, and later testified that he was not under arrest at that time. She testified that he was not in custody and that he gave a taped statement which was part of the accident investigation. Officer Lavoie read Miranda warnings to [Norstrom] prior to questioning him. Officer Lavoie also told him:

What I need to do here Eric so you understand is read you what we have the rights card here. Anytime we talk to anybody involving an investigation like we are doing it is important that you understand what your rights are. It doesn't mean anything other than that it is important to us that you understand what your rights are. Do you understand that? Okay, this is one of those things is a big deal and I want to make sure we're understanding each other. Okay?

After [Norstrom] told Officer Lavoie and Detective Bean what he could recall about the accident and the events of that night, Officer Lavoie stated:

Alright, Eric, I'm going to let you know at this point that we're gonna kinda change hats here, ok? It's an accident with serious injuries and we do have a fatality so pending on the results of the blood test that was taken from you at the hospital, if it comes back that you were under the influence of alcohol at the time then proper charges will be filed. I have to let you know that so I'm just going to ask you a few questions that would cover that aspect as far as the DUI charge, driving under the influence charge. Do you understand? ....

The officer then asked [Norstrom] some questions regarding his drinking that night. She later acknowledged that she made the "changing hats" remark as a way to signify to [Norstrom] that she was going from the accident portion of the investigation into the criminal portion of the investigation.

The record does not reflect that the officer ever told [Norstrom] that he was required to answer any questions or otherwise referred to his obligation under the accident investigation statute....

The blood alcohol test, approximately two and a half hours after the accident, revealed that [Norstrom's] blood alcohol content was .00.

587 So.2d at 1149-50.

The statements made by Norstrom after he had been read his Miranda rights related to what occurred prior to, during, and after the accident. The statements included an admission that he had been traveling "about seventy" miles per hour and had consumed some alcohol during the evening. The taped statements were played to the jury and included his acknowledgment that he understood his Miranda rights.

The issue presented by the certified question is whether Norstrom's statements were privileged under section 316.066 in circumstances where: (1) the statements were made after Norstrom had been read his Miranda warnings and had signed a waiver form; (2) Norstrom had not been advised that, pursuant to section 316.066, he must answer questions pertaining to the accident; and (3) Norstrom's statements were made while the investigating officer was proceeding in the accident investigation phase of the incident, as distinguished from the criminal investigation of the incident.

The district court held that the Miranda warnings alone did not change the nature of the investigation from accident to criminal to allow for the admission of Norstrom's statements. Id., 587 So.2d at 1151. More importantly, the district court held that another warning, in addition to the standard Miranda warning, is required before a voluntary statement by a defendant can be admitted without violating section 316.066. The district court stated that, " 'unless a defendant has been apprised by police that the questions being asked are part of a criminal investigation, the statements made in response to those questions will be deemed privileged pursuant to Sec. 316.066(4).' " Id. 587 So.2d at 1152 (quoting West v. State, 553 So.2d 254, 256 (Fla. 4th DCA1989)). The district court concluded that the "statements [Norstrom] made while at the police station prior to the point at which Officer Lavoie 'changed hats,' even though informed of his Miranda rights, fell within the accident investigation privilege." Id. 587 So.2d at 1151.

The pertinent part of section 316.066, which sets forth the statutory privilege, reads as follows:

(4) Each accident report made by a person involved in an accident...