State v. Oden

• Decision Date: 19 November 2020
• Docket Number: No. 20190242,20190242
• Parties: STATE of North Dakota BY WORKFORCE SAFETY AND INSURANCE, Plaintiff and Appellee v. Chris ODEN, Defendant and Appellant
• Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

951 N.W.2d 187

STATE of North Dakota BY WORKFORCE SAFETY AND INSURANCE, Plaintiff and Appellee
v.
Chris ODEN, Defendant and Appellant

No. 20190242

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

FILED NOVEMBER 19, 2020

David C. Thompson, Grand Forks, ND, for defendant and appellant.

Jacqueline S. Anderson, Special Assistant Attorney General, Fargo, ND, for plaintiff and appellee.

Jensen, Chief Justice.

¶1] Chris Oden appeals from a judgment entered against him in a collection action after the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the State, through Workforce Safety and Insurance, ("WSI"). We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Oden's motion to dismiss for insufficient service of process and did not err in granting summary judgment to WSI. We affirm.

I

[¶2] In May 2010, Oden was injured in Missouri while employed by Minot Builders Supply Associates as a truck driver. In June 2010, WSI issued a Notice of Decision Accepting Claim and Awarding Benefits for the injuries Oden sustained. In October 2013, WSI issued a Notice of Decision Suspending Benefits under N.D.C.C. § 65-05-05, after Oden applied for benefits under Missouri's workers’ compensation system. In February 2016, while represented by counsel in Missouri, Oden entered into a Stipulation for Compromise Settlement under which Oden received a lump sum payment of $30,000 for his Missouri workers’ compensation claim.

[¶3] On March 8, 2016, WSI issued a Notice of Decision, reversing its earlier decision to award benefits, denying liability for his May 2010 injury, and requiring reimbursement for a total overpayment of $62,452.91. WSI stated its decision was based on N.D.C.C. § 65-05-05, the Missouri workers’ compensation system's acceptance of his claim for the same injury, and Oden's lump-sum settlement for his Missouri compensation claim.

[¶4] On March 21, 2016, Oden's Missouri counsel responded to WSI's decision, requesting reconsideration and challenging WSI's right to seek reimbursement. On April 1, 2016, WSI's claims adjuster sent Oden a letter, with a copy going to his Missouri attorney, advising Oden that his attorney was not licensed in North Dakota and that Oden could either petition for reconsideration of WSI's decision on his own behalf or he could secure the services of a North Dakota attorney to seek reconsideration. WSI did not receive any further request for reconsideration of the March 2016 Notice of Decision either from Oden personally or from an attorney licensed in North Dakota on his behalf.

[¶5] In July 2018, WSI commenced this action against Oden seeking reimbursement from him under N.D.C.C. § 65-05-05 for the alleged overpayment of medical and disability benefits in the amount of $62,452.91. WSI claimed it was entitled to reimbursement because Oden had been approved to receive workers’ compensation benefits through another state's act for the May 2010 injury for which WSI had accepted and paid benefits. In January 2019, WSI moved the district court for summary judgment. Oden responded to WSI's motion in April 2019 by moving the court to dismiss for insufficient service of process on him in Missouri. Oden also opposed

[951 N.W.2d 191

WSI's summary judgment motion and made a cross-motion for summary judgment.

¶6] On May 1, 2019, the district court held a hearing for oral argument on Oden's motion to dismiss and the parties’ competing summary judgment motions. After the hearing, Oden submitted an additional reply brief and affidavits supporting his motions. In its subsequent June 2019 order, the court granted WSI's motion for summary judgment and denied both Oden's motion to dismiss and his cross-motion for summary judgment. The court awarded to WSI the full amount paid out to Oden of $62,452.91, plus accruing interest, and costs and disbursements. Judgment was subsequently entered.

II

[¶7] Oden argues the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss for insufficiency of service of process. He challenges whether the service of process in Missouri was sufficient to commence this action against him when the process server served his adult daughter at a residence that he asserts he subleases to his daughter and her husband and at which he does not reside.

[¶8] Under N.D.R.Civ.P. 3, "[a] civil action is commenced by the service of a summons." Rule 4, N.D.R.Civ.P., governs service of process. "[P]ersonal jurisdiction over a party is acquired by service of process in compliance with N.D.R.Civ.P. 4." Monster Heavy Haulers, LLC v. Goliath Energy Servs., LLC , 2016 ND 176, ¶ 13, 883 N.W.2d 917 (quoting Alliance Pipeline L.P. v. Smith , 2013 ND 117, ¶ 18, 833 N.W.2d 464 ). A party must "strictly comply" with the specific requirements under N.D.R.Civ.P. 4 for service of process. Franciere v. City of Mandan , 2020 ND 143, ¶ 10, 945 N.W.2d 251 (affirming dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction because of inadequate service of process on the city under N.D.R.Civ.P. 4(d)(2)(E) ). "Valid service of process is necessary to assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant." Gessner v. City of Minot , 1998 ND 157, ¶ 5, 583 N.W.2d 90. Without valid service of process, even actual knowledge of the lawsuit's existence is insufficient to obtain personal jurisdiction over a defendant. Monster Heavy Haulers , at ¶ 13 ; see also Olsrud v. Bismarck-Mandan Orchestral Ass'n , 2007 ND 91, ¶ 9, 733 N.W.2d 256.

[¶9] Rule 4(d)(3), N.D.R.Civ.P., provides for service of process outside of North Dakota:

Service on any person subject to the personal jurisdiction of the courts of this state may be made outside the state:

(A) in the same manner as service within this state, with the force and effect as though service had been made within this state;

(B) under the law of the place where service is made for service in that place in an action in any of its courts of general jurisdiction; or

(C) as directed by court order.

Under N.D.R.Civ.P. 4(d)(2)(A)(ii), service of process within North Dakota is authorized "on an individual 14 or more years of age by: ... leaving a copy of the summons at the individual's dwelling or usual place of residence in the presence of a person of suitable age and discretion who resides there." (Emphasis added.) Similarly, personal service of process within Missouri is made "by delivering a copy of the summons and petition personally to the individual or by leaving a copy of the summons and petition at the individual's dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of the individual's family over the age of fifteen years[.]" Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 54.13(b)(1).

[951 N.W.2d 192

[¶10] We have recently reiterated our standard for reviewing a district court's decision on personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a case involving sufficiency of service of process, when the court relies only on pleadings and affidavits:

Analysis of a district court's ruling regarding personal jurisdiction is a question of law, which we consider under the de novo standard of review. If the defendant challenges the court's [exercise of personal] jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving jurisdiction exists. The plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction to defeat a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, and if the court relies only on pleadings and affidavits, the court must look at the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Questions of personal jurisdiction must be decided on a case-by-case basis, depending on the particular facts and circumstances.

Franciere , 2020 ND 143, ¶ 7, 945 N.W.2d 251 (quoting Solid Comfort, Inc. v. Hatchett Hosp. Inc. , 2013 ND 152, ¶ 9, 836 N.W.2d 415 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)). Thus, when a district court relies only on pleadings and affidavits in deciding the motion to dismiss, the court must look at the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party to decide whether the plaintiff has established a prima facie showing of jurisdiction; but "[i]f an evidentiary hearing is held, the burden is on the party asserting jurisdiction." Rodenburg v. Fargo-Moorhead YMCA , 2001 ND 139, ¶ 17 n.2, 632 N.W.2d 407.

¶11] Here, the district court decided Oden's motion to dismiss for insufficient service of process on the pleadings and affidavits after holding a hearing for the parties’ oral arguments on the motions. The court determined that WSI made a prima facie showing with the process server's return of service, in addition to the process server's subsequent affidavit responding to Oden's motion to dismiss supported by his affidavit. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to WSI, including affidavits from the process server, Oden, and Oden's daughter, the court concluded Oden failed to rebut WSI's prima facie showing of proper service and denied Oden's motion to dismiss. In denying the motion, the court did not allow Oden his alternative request for additional discovery to depose the process server if the court did not rule in his favor. Both WSI and Oden had alternatively requested further jurisdictional discovery if the court did not rule in their respective favors.

[¶12] Oden argues the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss for insufficient service because the "overwhelming weight" of the evidence in the record on service is clearly on his side. Oden asserts his sworn affidavit confirms he did not reside at the Missouri address where service was attempted and his daughter's affidavit similarly states that he did not live at the address...