State v. Ohnemus, 58999
Decision Date | 25 May 1977 |
Docket Number | No. 58999,58999 |
Citation | 254 N.W.2d 524 |
Parties | STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. David OHNEMUS, Appellant. |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Robert H. Laden, Hyland & Laden, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., Jim P. Robbins, Asst. Atty. Gen., John W. Criswell, County Atty., for appellee.
Heard by MOORE, C. J., and RAWLINGS, REES, REYNOLDSON, and HARRIS, JJ.
Trial court accepted defendant's guilty plea to charge of entering a dwelling in the nighttime with intent to commit a public offense. He appeals from judgment attendantly entered. We reverse.
The instantly involved events allegedly occurred January 1, 1975, at the Jim Tyler mobile home in Warren County. Other relevant facts will be set forth as they relate to issues here presented.
In support of a reversal defendant, David Ohnemus, contends his guilty plea was fatally deficient because trial court failed to (1) understandably advise him regarding the offense charged or to explain the nature thereof and (2) adequately determine existence of a factual basis for the plea. These assignments will be considered in the order presented.
I. We are satisfied defendant's first contention has merit.
At least twice in the plea proceedings trial court made it clear the charge involved was the "included offense of entering a dwelling house in the nighttime with intent to commit a public offense".
But the record clearly reveals no inquiry was at any time made by trial court as to the essential "intent" element of the stated offense. See State v. Fetters, 202 N.W.2d 84, 91 (Iowa 1972).
Further in this regard, our review also discloses Ohnemus never made any statement which even minimally manifested his alleged entry was effected with the intent to then and there perpetrate a public offense. Conversely, in the course of a colloquy between trial judge and defendant, the latter stated: This alone should have alerted trial court to the need for further exploration and explanation of the vital "intent" factor. Surely defendant's statement, supra, was as much a part of his plea as uttering the word "guilty".
In light of the foregoing, this apt statement in Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 646, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 2258, 49 L.Ed.2d 108 (1976) is initially brought into play:
Then too, as noted in United States ex rel. Crosby v. Brierley, 404 F.2d 790, 801 (3d Cir. 1968):
Manifestly, trial court did not so advise defendant that he possessed an understanding of the law in relation to the facts. See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466-467, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 1171, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969); Hoskins v. State, 246 N.W.2d 266, 267 (Iowa 1976); State v. Buhr, 243 N.W.2d 546, 549-550 (Iowa 1976), and citations; State v. Greene, 226 N.W.2d 829, 831 (Iowa 1975); A. Bishop, Guilty Pleas in the Northern Midwest, 25 Drake L.Rev. 360, 376 (1975). Therefore, it cannot be said defendant's guilty plea was voluntarily and intelligently entered. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-244, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1711-1713, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969).
Trial court erred in accepting and entering judgment upon defendant's guilty plea. This alone mandates a reversal.
II. Closely related to the foregoing, however, is defendant's second assignment regarding absence of a shown factual basis for the controverted guilty plea. See Brainard v. State, 222 N.W.2d 711, 713 (Iowa 1974), and citations.
As explained in Brainard, at 713-714, the State v. Sisco, 169 N.W.2d 542 (Iowa 1969) guidelines have two fundamental purposes. One of those significantly relates to the need for guilty plea proceedings to be made of record so there may be appropriate appellate review.
During the presently involved proceedings, trial court and defendant engaged in this interchange:
Noticeably, the above italicized verbiage constituted a resort by trial court to assumptions not of record. That in turn means we are left to speculate regarding undisclosed testimonial facts relied on below. See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. at 467-472, 89 S.Ct. at 1171-1174.
This does not mean the instantly involved proceedings should have been cluttered with a verbatim recitation of defendant's testimony in the separate Halterman case. But the salient portions thereof might better have been summarized of record followed by appropriate inquiry directed to defendant as to the accuracy or inaccuracy thereof.
In any event, trial court would have been well advised to solicit from defendant a...
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