State v. Ohta

• Decision Date: 16 March 1977
• Docket Number: No. 3631,3631
• Citation: 562 P.2d 369,114 Ariz. 489
• Parties: STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Brenda (Lee) OHTA, Appellant.
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Page 369

562 P.2d 369

114 Ariz. 489

STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Brenda (Lee) OHTA, Appellant.

No. 3631.

Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc.

March 16, 1977.

Bruce E. Babbitt, Atty. Gen. by William J. Schafer, III, Chief Counsel, Georgia Butcher Ellexson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee.

Ross P. Lee, Maricopa County Public Defender by Terry J. Adams, Deputy Public Defender, Phoenix, for appellant.

STRUCKMEYER, Vice Chief Justice.

In conformance with a plea agreement, Brenda Lee Ohta pled guilty to a charge of second degree burglary and was sentenced to not less than four and one-half years to not more than five years in the Arizona State Prison. She appeals. Affirmed.

On October 5, 1975, appellant and another person entered a store known as Rings & Things in Phoenix, Arizona, with the intention of taking the salesclerk's purse. Appellant's role was to keep the clerk busy while her companion took the purse. Appellant was arrested in an automobile in which several purses, including the one belonging to the salesclerk of Rings & Things, were found.

Appellant's first claim is that the trial court did not adequately determine that a factual basis existed for her guilty plea and did not properly inform her of the nature of the charge against her.

After the trial judge was informed that Ohta intended to plead guilty to second degree burglary, he developed these facts concerning the commission of the offense:

'THE COURT: Mr. Sullivan, what would the State's evidence show?

MR. SULLIVAN: The State's evidence would show that Mrs. Ohta, along with suspect--

THE COURT: I can't hear you, sir. Mrs. Ohta along with--

MR. SULLIVAN: Mrs. Ohta, along with a suspect entered the store with the intent to steal the purse and contents thereof from behind the clerk's counter; * * * keeping the clerk busy while the other individual talked at the clerk's counter and then they split.

THE COURT: By 'split' you mean departed?

MR. SULLIVAN: Departed the store. Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Was this purse merchandize or was it a personal property of the clerk?

MR. SULLIVAN: Personal, personal property of the clerk at the store with the clerk at the counter.

THE COURT: Did they take the purse out of the store?

MR. SULLIVAN: Yes, they did, Your Honor.

THE COURT: With its contents?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Is that what happened, Mrs. Ohta?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, that about sums it up.

THE COURT: That was kind of a dumb thing to do.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, it was very dumb.

THE COURT: Mr. Green (defense counsel), would you agree that's what the State's evidence would reveal?

MR. GREEN: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Sullivan, is there any question in your mind as to whether there is a sufficient factual basis for the Court to accept the plea of guilty?

MR. SULLIVAN: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Green, is there any question in your mind as to whether there is a sufficient factual basis for the Court to accept a plea of guilty?

MR. GREEN: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you have any questions you want to ask Mr. Green or Mr. Sullivan or me at this time?

THE DEFENDANT: No.

THE COURT: Do you think you fully understand what is happening here?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.'

We hold that the transcript as a whole shows that the appellant acknowledged her participation in the crime of burglary. A court is not required to advise a defendant of each specific element of the offense to which he is pleading guilty, absent the special circumstances as found in Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 49 L.Ed.2d 108 (1976). State v. Howell, 109 Ariz. 165, 506 P.2d 1059 (1973); State v. Anderson, 109 Ariz. 158, 506 P.2d 1052 (1973); State v. Reynolds, 25 Ariz.App. 409, 544 P.2d 233 (1976).

Since appellant admitted complicity in the physical acts constituting the elements of the offense charged when she was questioned by the court, and it clearly appears that she entered the store intending to engage in a theft, a factual basis existed for the guilty plea. The plea was intelligently made as required by Rule 17.2, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, and .boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). State v. Ferrell, 108 Ariz. 394, 499 P.2d 109 (1972).

Appellant urges that the trial judge abused his discretion when he refused upon the request of appellant's counsel to grant a motion to continue sentencing in order to file a Rule 11 motion. Rule 11.1 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

'A person shall not be tried, convicted, sentenced or punished for a public offense while, as a result of a mental illness or defect, he is unable to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense.'

Appellant's counsel at one time requested a pre-sentence hearing but thereafter withdrew his request. At the time of sentencing when appellant requested imprisonment rather than probation, her counsel made a motion for continuance of the sentencing. Counsel did not suggest that there was any evidence of appellant's incompetency other than that stemming from her request for imprisonment. He said that he did not think her request was 'the product of a rational mind.' In this Court he points to Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975), as authority that it is the best practice for the trial court to grant a defense motion for a continuance to determine the defendant's competence. Drope is not authority here for two reasons. First, Drope does not hold that a court must accept an attorney's personal convictions concerning his client's mental capacity. Id. at 177 n. 13, 95 S.Ct. at 906, 43 L.Ed.2d at 116. The trial court here knew of the facts which caused defense counsel to feel appellant was not rational. Second, in Drope there was a request for a continuance prior to trial. The Court approved of the motion to continue because the resolution of the defendant's competence could be made at an early date. Id. Here, the request by defense counsel did not come until the court had commenced the sentencing procedures. dures.

Basically, the real issue is whether a Rule 11 hearing should have been granted to determine if the appellant was competent. As to this, we have held that a court must order a mental examination pursuant to Rules 11.1 and 11.3 to determine if a defendant understands the proceedings or can assist in his defense 'if reasonable grounds for the need of such an examination exist.' State v. Verdugo, 112 Ariz. 288, 541 P.2d 388 (1975). It is the established rule that the trial court has broad discretion in determining if reasonable grounds exist, and unless there has been manifest abuse in this discretion, the trial court will be upheld. State v. Verdugo, supra; See State v. Bradley, 102 Ariz. 482, 433 P.2d 273 (1967).

A motion for a continuance is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Quintana, 92 Ariz. 308, 376 P.2d 773 (1962). We cannot say that the sentencing judge abused his discretion when he determined there were no reasonable grounds for a competency hearing and, therefore, no grounds for a continuance.

At the time when appellant informed the court that she preferred to go to the Arizona State Prison instead of being on probation, the judge questioned her:

'THE COURT: Why is it that you would prefer to go to Prison rather than be in jail and be on probation?

THE DEFENDANT: I figure by the time they start digging up things that have happened in the last six months I'll end up there...