State v. Olaiz
Decision Date | 28 March 1990 |
Citation | 100 Or.App. 380,786 P.2d 734 |
Parties | STATE of Oregon, Respondent, v. Jesus Valdez OLAIZ, Appellant. 88-01-30523; CA A49378. |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Brian P. Conry, Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for appellant.
Michael Livingston, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Dave Frohnmayer Atty. Gen., and Virginia L. Linder, Sol. Gen., Salem.
Before BUTTLER, P.J., and WARREN and ROSSMAN, JJ.
Defendant appeals his conviction for delivery of a controlled substance, ORS 475.992, assigning as error the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. He challenges the validity of the traffic stop that led to seizure of the evidence on the grounds that it was not authorized under ORS 810.410 and that it was a "pretext stop," in violation of Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution and the Fourth Amendment. We affirm.
We take the facts from the trial court's findings. Ball v. Gladden, 250 Or. 485, 487-88, 443 P.2d 621 (1968). While police narcotics officers Anderson and Gray were conducting surveillance of a Portland motel room associated with drug dealing, they saw defendant and a passenger drive up and look in its window. When the two men drove away, the officers followed them, hoping to be led to the dealers who had been selling narcotics out of the room.
Defendant was driving. He entered I-84, driving 10 to 15 miles over the speed limit much of the time. Leaving the freeway, he proceeded to a Gresham apartment, where he and his passenger spent about ten minutes, then came outside and drove away. Still following, the officers asked Multnomah County Sheriff's Department uniformed officers to stop defendant for speeding so that they could identify him and his passenger and gather information.
Before the uniformed officers could make the stop, defendant and his passenger drove about two more miles to an apartment complex, parked and began to get out of their car. Stopping about ten feet behind them, Anderson and Gray also got out of their car, displaying their badges. Approaching defendant, Anderson identified himself as a police officer and said, "Hold on, we'd like to talk to you for a second." Anderson testified that he asked defendant for his driver's license and "told him he was going a little fast." Defendant stated that he had no license and presented several traffic tickets to Anderson. At that point, Gray informed Anderson that defendant's passenger was smoking marijuana.
Anderson asked defendant if he had any marijuana. Defendant replied that he had none and offered to let Anderson search the car. Anderson told Gray that they had permission to search the car and then conducted a pat down search of defendant for weapons, during which defendant reached into his pocket and handed him a baggie of marijuana. A search of the car produced approximately 2 1/2 grams of tar heroin, and Anderson arrested defendant for drug crimes.
Defendant first argues that the stop was not authorized by ORS 810.410, which provides, in pertinent part:
He asserts that ORS 810.410(2) permits officers who act outside their own jurisdictions to make traffic stops only when infractions have been committed in their presence. Reasoning that, by requiring the infraction to be committed in the officer's "presence", the legislature contemplated that an officer would respond immediately, he argues that Anderson and Gray violated the intent of the statute when they waited fifteen minutes after witnessing the speeding infraction to stop defendant.
We can discern no basis for that conclusion. ORS 810.410(2) does not contain a limitation on the time within which an officer must cite an offending driver. Defendant committed a traffic infraction in the officers' presence. Therefore, they were authorized to "stop and detain" him under ORS 810.410.
Defendant also argues that the stop violated ORS 810.410(3)(b), because the officers did not stop him "for the purposes of investigation reasonably related to the traffic infraction," but rather for purposes of gathering information on drug dealing activities. However, the trial court found that the officer asked defendant for his driver's license. Anderson also testified that he told defendant that he was driving too fast. Although Anderson may have had additional purposes for the stop, his actions were consistent with the acts of an officer investigating a traffic infraction. The statutory requirements for a traffic stop were satisfied.
Defendant's second argument is that, because the officers had only one real motive for stopping the car--to investigate drug activity--the stop for the traffic violation was a pretext. He urges that, in testing the validity of pretext stops under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, section 9, we should adopt a standard of objective reasonableness. That is, we should ask whether a reasonable officer would have made the stop in the absence of an "improper" purpose. Because a reasonable officer in Anderson and Gray's position would not have stopped defendant in the absence of a desire to gather drug intelligence, he argues, the stop violated Article I, section 9, and the Fourth Amendment.
The United States Supreme Court has not decided the validity of so-called "pretext stops" under the Fourth Amendment, and Oregon never before has considered the issue exclusively under Article I, section 9. 1 However, in considering defendant's argument under the Fourth Amendment, the Oregon Supreme Court has rejected it as unworkable and undesirable.
In State v. Tucker, supra n. 1, officers saw two bicyclists, one riding with an almost flat tire and carrying a laundry basket covered by a blanket. The bicyclists noticed the patrol car and changed direction; the officers stopped them after they ran a stop sign. Although the officers gave as their reason for the stop that there was something "out of the ordinary" about the bicyclists' appearance and behavior, the trial court found that their purpose had been to cite or arrest them for the traffic violation. 286 Or. at 488, 595 P.2d 1364.
The Supreme Court held that a traffic stop is not invalid under the Fourth Amendment "simply because, in addition to probable cause to arrest for a specific offense (or to stop for purposes of issuing a citation), the officer also has a suspicion which contributes to the decision to make the stop." 286 Or. at 493, 595 P.2d 1364. It explained:
286 Or. at 493, 495, 595 P.2d 1364.
In State v. Carter/Dawson, supra n. 1, the court went further. That case presented an issue identical to the one before us: "whether a policeman who wants to get a closer look at a car or its occupants may follow it and, if the driver commits a traffic violation while the officer is following, may then stop it." 287 Or. at 485, 600 P.2d 873. The court first noted that police officers have the right to keep persons of whom they are suspicious under surveillance in public places, regardless of their reasons. It then stated:
See also State v. Zimmerlee, 45 Or.App. 107, 607 P.2d 782, rev. den. 289 Or. 71 (1980).
That reasoning is as sound under Article I, section 9, as it is under the Fourth Amendment. Anderson and Gray may have had more than one reason for wanting to stop defendant and his passenger. Although the primary reasons may have been to gather information and to identify them, they also wanted to cite them for speeding. Anderson explained:
Whether the officers would have stopped defendant for speeding (or for a more serious infraction, had one occurred) without their desire to know more about the car's occupants is irrelevant. They were doing proper police work in a place that they had a right to be and were present when defendant committed a traffic infraction. The fact that they were already suspicious of defendant could not prevent them from issuing him a citation for...
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