State v. Oliver

• Decision Date: 30 March 2012
• Docket Number: No. 10–1751.,10–1751.
• Citation: 812 N.W.2d 636
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Charles James David OLIVER, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

812 N.W.2d 636

STATE of Iowa, Appellee,

v.Charles James David OLIVER, Appellant.

No. 10–1751.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

March 30, 2012.

Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Rachel C. Regenold, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Elisabeth S. Reynoldson, Assistant Attorney General, Mary L. Benton, County Attorney, and Becky S. Goettsch, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

ZAGER, Justice.

Charles Oliver was convicted a second time of third-degree sexual abuse in violation of Iowa Code sections 709.1 and 709.4(2)( b ) (2009). Oliver stipulated that he had a prior conviction for third-degree sexual abuse under sections 709.1 and 709.4. Because of his prior conviction, Oliver was guilty of a class “A” felony under the enhanced sentencing provisions of section 902.14(1), and the district court accordingly sentenced Oliver to life in prison without the possibility of parole. SeeIowa Code § 902.1 (requiring life without parole for class “A” felonies). Oliver appealed, claiming the sentence of life without parole constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution. Oliver claims the statute is unconstitutional both on its face and as applied to him. We retained jurisdiction, and we now affirm Oliver's sentence.

I. Factual Background and Procedural History.

On October 27, 2009, R.A., a thirteen-year-old girl, had an argument with her mother. R.A. called a close family friend, Bryan Conley, who lived nearby to ask if she could spend the night. R.A. did not have contact with her father, and according to Conley, R.A., and her mother, Conley was a father figure to R.A. Conley and R.A.'s mother agreed that R.A. could spend the night at Conley's residence. Conley's long-time friend, Charles Oliver, who was thirty-three years old at the time, had been picked up earlier in the evening and spent the night at the same house as Conley and R.A.¹ The next morning, Conley and his fiancée left the house, leaving Oliver and R.A. alone. While the two were alone, R.A. told Oliver that she liked him. They went to the basement and had sex on Conley's bed one or two times. R.A. then fell asleep. Prior to his leaving, Oliver gave R.A. his cell phone number.

Around December 17, R.A.'s mother went through R.A.'s cell-phone records and found several text messages between R.A. and Oliver. R.A.'s mother confronted Oliver about these calls and messages and Oliver said, “I'm just her friend like Bryan [Conley].” R.A.'s mother reminded Oliver that R.A. was thirteen and he was thirty-three. Shortly thereafter, R.A. told her mother about having sex with Oliver. R.A.'s mother then called the West Des Moines Police Department and reported that Oliver was attempting to contact R.A. and may have sexually abused her.

Oliver was in the Polk County jail on an unrelated charge on January 8, 2010. While there, Oliver's wife confronted him with the voicemails R.A. had left for Oliver on his cell phone. During this telephone conversation, Oliver admitted having sex with R.A.² On April 8, a warrant was issued for Oliver's arrest, and he was placed in the Guthrie County jail.

Oliver was charged by trial information with two counts of third-degree sexual abuse in violation of Iowa Code sections 709.1(3) and 709.4(2)( b ). The State subsequently dismissed one count of the indictment. Trial commenced on September 8. At trial, Oliver denied having sex with R.A. On September 10, 2010, the jury found Oliver guilty of sexual abuse in the third degree. Following the guilty verdict, Oliver stipulated that he had a prior conviction for third-degree sexual abuse in 2000. Based upon this admission, the court entered its judgment order finding Oliver guilty of the enhanced class “A” felony under section 902.14.

The sentencing hearing was conducted on October 18. According to the presentence investigation report (PSI), Oliver claimed that his prior conviction was for consensual sex with a fifteen-year-old victim. However, the record reflects that the victim in the first case was fourteen, and Oliver's attorney stated this at sentencing. At the time of this conviction, Oliver would have been twenty-four years of age. Oliver claimed that the earlier victim had a fake ID and that he was residing with her. Oliver's PSI also revealed an extensive criminal history in addition to the sexual abuse convictions, including convictions for theft, burglary, terrorism, supplying alcohol to a minor, criminal mischief, driving while barred, domestic abuse assault, OWI first offense, harassment of a public officer, and violation of the sex offender residency law. In the PSI, Oliver was entitled to provide his version of events. According to Oliver, “the punishment really should be shared. Everyone involved knows right from wrong.”

At sentencing, the State made a record to support its contention that life without parole was an appropriate sentence for Oliver and was not cruel and unusual punishment. The State pointed out Oliver's substantial prior criminal record, his failure to successfully complete his probation resulting in revocation and imprisonment, and his failure to complete court-ordered sex-offender treatment. As part of the sentencing record, R.A. and her mother gave victim impact statements. R.A. noted she had been in residential treatment for eight months as a result of the incident and was continuing in therapy. She stated that Oliver molested her and made her believe he loved her. She stated, “I was a 13–year–old little girl and he took my life away....” R.A.'s mother also provided an impact statement expressing how this had affected R.A.

At sentencing, Oliver's attorney minimized the offenses in the record and claimed life without parole was “completely out of proportion” to Oliver's offense based on the facts of this case and his record. He argued the statute was designed “to capture sexual predators who are constantly preying on children or rapists who can't stop raping.” During his allocution, Oliver stated that he did not think life in prison was appropriate because he “didn't put a gun to anyone's head.” The district court sentenced Oliver to life without parole pursuant to section 902.14. Oliver appealed.

On appeal, Oliver makes both a facial and as-applied challenge to his sentence. He claims the sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution.

II. Standard of Review and Preservation of Error.

Oliver claims his sentence violates the State and Federal Constitutions and is therefore illegal. We have held that “[a] defendant may challenge an illegal sentence at any time.” State v. Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862, 869 (Iowa 2009); see alsoIowa R.Crim. P. 2.24(5)( a ). Regarding our standard of review, “[t]his court reviews constitutional claims de novo.” Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d at 869.

Under section 902.14(1), “[a] person commits a class ‘A’ felony if the person commits a second or subsequent offense involving any combination of” second-degree sexual abuse, third-degree sexual abuse, or lascivious acts with a child. Iowa Code § 902.14(1) A class “A” felon faces a life sentence without the possibility of parole “unless the governor commutes the sentence to a term of years.” Id.§ 902.1. Oliver claims that section 902.14 is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him. Though Oliver cites to both the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution, he explicitly limits his challenge to the Iowa Constitution, claiming that the Federal Constitution does not afford any additional protection. See Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d at 886 n. 9. However, since Bruegger was decided, the United States Supreme Court decided Graham v. Florida, ––– U.S. ––––, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010), a case which sheds new light on the federal framework for the cruel and unusual punishment analysis. In light of the recently clarified framework, we will analyze Oliver's claim under both the state and federal constitutional provisions that prohibit cruel and unusual punishment.

III. The Current State of Federal Cruel and Unusual Punishment Jurisprudence.

It is important to clarify the terminology of cruel and unusual punishment jurisprudence. Following Graham, unlike other areas of constitutional law, the federal lexicon for Eighth Amendment analysis no longer includes the terms “facial challenge”and “as-applied challenge.” Instead, the defendant must challenge his sentence under the “categorical” approach or make a “gross proportionality challenge to [the] particular defendant's sentence.” See Graham, ––– U.S. at ––––, 130 S.Ct. at 2022, 176 L.Ed.2d at 837.

Oliver claims section 902.14 is “unconstitutional on its face.” To support this claim, Oliver proceeds through a three-step analysis. Step one requires us to compare the severity of the punishment to the gravity of the crime to determine if the sentence leads to an inference of gross disproportionality. Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d at 873. If this threshold step is satisfied, steps two and three require the court to engage in an intrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional analysis to determine whether the sentence is in fact grossly disproportionate and therefore a violation of the Eighth Amendment. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 22, 30, 123 S.Ct. 1179, 1186, 1190, 155 L.Ed.2d 108, 118, 123 (2003); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1005, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 2707, 115 L.Ed.2d 836, 871 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (“A better reading of our cases leads to the conclusion that intrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional analyses are appropriate only in the rare case in which a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an...