State v. Oltmanns, 18423

Decision Date20 July 1994
Docket NumberNo. 18423,18423
Citation519 N.W.2d 602
PartiesSTATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Brian Lou OLTMANNS, Defendant and Appellee.
CourtSouth Dakota Supreme Court

David R. Nelson, Minnehaha County State's Atty., and Douglas W. Thesenvitz, Minnehaha County Deputy State's Atty., Sioux Falls, for plaintiff and appellant.

Thomas K. Wilka, Hagen, Wilka & Archer, Sioux Falls, for defendant and appellee.

SABERS, Justice.

The trial court held that the State failed to meet its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant's statements were freely and voluntarily given. State appeals. We affirm.

FACTS

On July 30, 1992, a fire occurred in the apartment building at 1818 E. 3rd Street in Sioux Falls, South Dakota. Investigation by the Sioux Falls Police and Fire Departments determined the cause of the fire to be arson. Two residents lost their lives as a result of the fire.

Brian Lou Oltmanns (Oltmanns), a resident of the apartment building, was found unconscious inside the apartment building at the time of the fire. Oltmanns was transported to a local hospital by ambulance and hospitalized for carbon monoxide poisoning, smoke inhalation, and burns. While in the hospital, Oltmanns was interviewed several times by Detective Mark Norlin (Norlin) and Sergeant Mark Moberly (Moberly), both of the Sioux Falls Police Department. These interviews are not before us on appeal.

Oltmanns was discharged from the hospital on August 19, 1992. Norlin contacted Oltmanns at his grandmother's home, where Oltmanns was convalescing, and arranged for a meeting at the Minnehaha County Public Safety Building on August 21. Norlin and Moberly testified that they contacted Oltmanns on August 20 and asked him to come to the Public Safety Building for fingerprinting and further interviewing about the fire and his knowledge of the fire. Jennie Peterson (Peterson), Oltmanns' grandmother, testified however, that Norlin called the morning of August 21 and asked if Oltmanns could come into the police station for fingerprinting. She informed Norlin that Oltmanns was very weak, but Norlin responded that it would only take fifteen minutes.

Oltmanns arrived at the Public Safety Building at approximately 11:00 on August 21. He was accompanied by Peterson. Oltmanns was not placed under arrest, nor was he advised of his Miranda rights. Oltmanns was told that he was free to leave at any time.

After an initial twenty to thirty minute interview, Oltmanns was fingerprinted. The fingerprinting took approximately one hour. Following the fingerprinting, a polygraph examination was conducted. Prior to the polygraph, Oltmanns signed a consent form which stated that he voluntarily, without duress, coercion, promise of reward or immunity, submitted to the polygraph examination. Oltmanns was not advised that he could refuse to take the test, discontinue it at any time, or decline to answer any individual questions.

Norlin and Moberly continued to interview Oltmanns for approximately one hour following the polygraph. Oltmanns was again advised that he was free to leave at any time. Norlin and Moberly testified that they made no threats or promises and everyone's tone of voice was conversational. Oltmanns testified that the officers did not try to make him feel comfortable, were not respectful, and were not polite.

After Oltmanns indicated that he had never lit a match in his life, Norlin and Moberly told Oltmanns that they thought he was lying. Norlin told Oltmanns that there were some things that were left unexplained by the polygraph that needed to be clarified. Norlin also related a story about a person who had been involved in a traffic accident where a person died because of the incident and that this had gnawed away at the person until he finally committed suicide.

During the second interview, Oltmanns stated that he was tired. He got up and walked out of the interview room, then stopped, came back, and stated that he wanted to talk to Norlin. Without reentering the interview room, Oltmanns said that he was sorry about what happened, that it was an accident, and that he did not mean for anyone to get hurt. Norlin went and got Peterson and asked Oltmanns to tell her what had happened. Oltmanns then signed a written statement which stated that "I accidently started the fire with lighter fluild [sic] and match."

After the interview, Oltmanns left with Peterson. Peterson testified that on the way home, Oltmanns told her that he had lied to the officers to get away from them because they made him sick. Oltmanns returned later that day and recanted his statement.

While Norlin testified that Oltmanns did not appear to be ill during the interview, Peterson and Oltmanns testified that Oltmanns was not feeling well generally and that on August 21 he was suffering from diarrhea. Oltmanns was taking Keflex, an antibiotic which, according to testimony by Dr. Brian Hurley (Hurley), can cause fecal incontinence. Oltmanns did fidget in his chair and ask to use the bathroom a few times.

Hurley testified to the residual effects of carbon monoxide poisoning on the body. Neurological residuals include irritability, memory loss, nausea, apathy, headaches, diarrhea and temporary brain dysfunctioning. Hurley was unaware of any psychoneurological damage that existed in Oltmanns but testified that neurological deterioration can occur from a few days to a few weeks after the incident. Sequelae is the medical phrase that is used to describe this delayed reaction to the trauma.

Dr. Michael McGrath, a clinical psychologist, evaluated Oltmanns for vocational rehabilitation and employment purposes in January, 1992, prior to the fire. The results of the evaluation indicated that Oltmanns has an IQ in the dull normal range with some memory impairment which causes sustained comprehension problems. While Oltmanns does not suffer from any mental illness, he is a person with moderate organic mental disorder, borderline intellectual functioning, and cerebral palsy.

Oltmanns was charged by Indictment with two counts of Murder in the First-Degree, two counts of Murder in the Second-Degree and one count of Arson in the First-Degree. Oltmanns entered not guilty pleas to all counts of the Indictment and filed a Motion to Suppress Statements. Oltmanns' Motion to Suppress Statements was denied with respect to the oral and written statements made while in the hospital. His Motion to Suppress Statements was granted, however, with respect to the oral and written statements made on August 21. The State filed a Petition for Permission to Appeal, which was granted.

Whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the State established beyond a reasonable doubt that the August 21 statements were voluntary.

A defendant is deprived of due process of law when involuntarily obtained confessions or statements are used against him. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986); Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 106 S.Ct. 445, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985). Our system is "an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system," and the tactics used to elicit incriminating statements must remain within the constitutional boundaries imposed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-41, 81 S.Ct. 735, 739, 5 L.Ed.2d 760, 766 (1961). "[B]y virtue of the Due Process Clause, 'certain interrogation techniques, either in isolation or as applied to the unique characteristics of a particular suspect, are so offensive to a civilized system of justice that they must be condemned.' " Colorado, 479 U.S. at 163, 107 S.Ct. at 519, 93 L.Ed.2d at 481 (quoting Miller, 474 U.S. at 109, 106 S.Ct. at 449, 88 L.Ed.2d at 410).

The trial court found, in light of the totality of the circumstances, which included the carbon monoxide poisoning, with the attendant delayed sequelae which may follow, the pre-fire performance on the battery of tests administered by Dr. McGrath, the lifetime history of cerebral palsy, the fact that Oltmanns was feeling ill and weak on August 21 as a result of smoke inhalation, burns, and the medication he was taking, the intimidating nature of a police station interrogation which would exist for any person, the use of the polygraph examination without an advisement of rights, the statements made to Oltmanns by the police including the story of the individual who had committed suicide, and Oltmanns' perception of why he came to the Public Safety Building, that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Oltmanns' statements on August 21 were voluntary.

Our standard of review regarding voluntariness of confessions or incriminating statements is well established. The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that such confessions or incriminating statements were freely and voluntarily made. State v. Faehnrich, 359 N.W.2d 895, 898 (S.D.1984); State v. Janis, 356 N.W.2d 916, 918 (S.D.1984). If the trial court finds the confession or incriminating statement was voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt, such finding is binding upon this Court unless we conclude from our review of the record that the finding is clearly erroneous. State v. Albright, 418 N.W.2d 292, 297 (S.D.1988); Faehnrich, at 898, State v. Headrick, 357 N.W.2d 268, 270 (S.D.1984). The trial court must have reviewed the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. Albright, at 297; Faehnrich, at 898. See also, State v. Caffrey, 332 N.W.2d 269 (S.D.1983); State v. Lyons, 269 N.W.2d 124 (S.D.1978). In reviewing the trial court's findings on voluntariness, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding. State v. Volk, 331 N.W.2d 67, 70 (S.D.1983).

State v. Jenner, 451 N.W.2d 710, 716 (S.D.1990) (emphasis added). * See State v. Dickey, 459 N.W.2d 445, 447 (S.D.1990).

The State argues that the trial court erroneously applied a "but for" analysis rather than...

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