State v. One `95 Silver Jeep Grand Cherokee

• Citation: 2006 SD 29,712 N.W.2d 646
• Decision Date: 29 March 2006
• Docket Number: No. 23735.,23735.
• Parties: STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ONE 1995 SILVER JEEP GRAND CHEROKEE, VIN # 1J4GZ78Y4SC548019 and $497 In American Currency, Defendant and Appellee.
• Court: Supreme Court of South Dakota

Page 646

712 N.W.2d 646

2006 SD 29

STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ONE 1995 SILVER JEEP GRAND CHEROKEE, VIN # 1J4GZ78Y4SC548019 and $497 In American Currency, Defendant and Appellee.

No. 23735.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

Considered on Briefs January 9, 2006.

Decided March 29, 2006.

Lawrence E. Long, Attorney General, Jeffery J. Tronvold, Assistant Attorney General, Pierre, SD, for plaintiff and appellant.

Julie A. Hofer, Sioux Falls, SD, for defendant and appellee.

GILBERTSON, Chief Justice.

[¶ 1.] The State of South Dakota (State) appeals the circuit court's order determining forfeiture of one 1995 Silver Jeep Grand Cherokee, vin # 1J4GZ78Y4SC548019, was grossly disproportionate in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article VI, Section 23 of the South Dakota Constitution. We reverse.

FACTS

[¶ 2.] On October 9, 2003, a complaint was filed by the State against the defendant vehicle for forfeiture pursuant to SDCL chapter 34-20B. The record owner of the vehicle was Adam Kroupa. The complaint alleged that:

said vehicle transported, possessed, concealed, used or was intended for use, to transport or in any manner facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession or concealment of certain controlled drugs or substances or marijuana or was used for or acquired or derived from the unlawful purchase, attempted purchase, distribution or attempted distribution of any controlled drug or substance or marijuana.

The parties entered into a stipulation of facts which was the basis for the circuit court's determination in this matter. Those stipulated facts provided in relevant part:

Adam Kroupa, the Claimant in this matter, is the sole owner of the Defendant Vehicle[].

On October 7, 2003, Adam Kroupa possessed methamphetamine.

On or about October 7, 2003, Adam Kroupa placed the methamphetamine in the Defendant Vehicle.

Kroupa drove the Defendant Vehicle to 5801 West Christopher Place, in Sioux Falls, Minnehaha County, South Dakota, and transported the methamphetamine in the Defendant Vehicle.

Upon arrival at 5801 West Christopher Place, Adam Kroupa and Jennifer Collins rang the bell to apartment 302, where law enforcement officers were executing a search warrant for narcotics.

A subsequent search of apartment 302 revealed 6 tablets of methylene-dioxymethamphetamine, commonly called "ecstasy," a controlled substance, with a street value of approximately $150, as well as a coffee grinder with what appeared to the officers to be pseudoephedrine, a component in the manufacture of methamphetamine.

Adam Kroupa is on federal parole for possession with intent to distribute controlled substances, and therefore the officers asked whether he was required to submit to a search of his vehicle.

Trooper Koltz was called and his drug dog alerted and indicated the presence of the odor of illegal narcotics in the Defendant Vehicle.

Detective Mathews and Trooper Koltz searched the vehicle and found the methamphetamine Kroupa had placed within the Defendant Vehicle.

Kroupa admitted the methamphetamine belonged to him.

The Defendant Vehicle was seized at the scene.

The approximate retail value of the Defendant Vehicle is $7400.

According to the detectives, the approximate street value of the methamphetamine seized from the Defendant Vehicle is $50.

Kroupa was arrested at the scene for possession of a controlled substance, and eventually entered a plea of guilty in that criminal case to Ingesting a Substance, in violation of SDCL 22-42-15.

Based on these stipulated facts, Kroupa asserted that forfeiture of the vehicle was unconstitutionally disproportionate as an excessive fine in violation of the United States and South Dakota Constitutions. The circuit court agreed and dismissed the complaint. State appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶ 3.] "[W]hen an asserted error implicates an infringement of a constitutional right, we employ a de novo standard of review." State v. Krahwinkel, 2002 SD 160, ¶ 13, 656 N.W.2d 451, 458 (citing State v. Dillon, 2001 SD 97, ¶ 12, 632 N.W.2d 37, 43). Thus, no deference is given to the circuit court's determination, and the decision is fully reviewable by this Court. Thieman v. Bohman, 2002 SD 52, ¶ 10, 645 N.W.2d 260, 262.

ANALYSIS

ISSUE

[¶ 4.] Whether the circuit court erred in determining forfeiture was grossly disproportionate in violation of the United States and South Dakota Constitutions.

[¶ 5.] This civil forfeiture action was predicated upon SDCL 34-20B-70, which is based on the federal forfeiture statutes. That statute provides:

The following are subject to forfeiture and no property right exists in them:

* * *

(4) All conveyances including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which transport, possess or conceal, or which are used, or intended for use, to transport, or in any manner facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession or concealment of marijuana in excess of one-half pound or any quantity of any other property described in subdivision (1) or (2), except as provided in §§ 34-20B-71 to 34-20B-73, inclusive. This subdivision includes those instances in which a conveyance transports, possesses or conceals marijuana or a controlled substance as described herein without the necessity of showing that the conveyance is specifically being used to transport, possess or conceal or facilitate the transportation, possession or concealment of marijuana or a controlled substance in aid of any other offense[.]

SDCL 34-20B-70. This Court has held that "[p]ossession, transportation or concealment of any amount of methamphetamine subjects the vehicle to forfeiture under SDCL 34-20B-70." State v. One 1983 Black Toyota Pickup, 415 N.W.2d 511, 513 (S.D.1987). Moreover, forfeiture is not dependent upon a criminal conviction related to the substance. State v. One 1966 Pontiac Auto., Etc., 270 N.W.2d 362, 364 (S.D.1978). Forfeiture proceedings are civil actions against the property seized, and the standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence. SDCL 34-20B-80.

[¶ 6.] This Court has not addressed the limits imposed by the Eighth Amendment and its South Dakota counterpart, Article VI, Section 23, to the forfeiture of a vehicle. Our only analogous case on this issue is Krahwinkel, which addressed a gross disproportionality claim on a civil penalty for an overweight truck violation. 2002 SD 160, ¶ 38, 656 N.W.2d at 464-65. In that case, we recognized:

The Eighth Amendment provides that `excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.' This guarantee protects against fines that are grossly disproportionate to the offense. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 113 S.Ct. 2801, 125 L.Ed.2d 488 (1993). The constitutional inquiry regarding excessive fines is proportionality: the amount of the fine must bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense that it is designed to punish. Id. at 622-23, 113 S.Ct. at 2812, 125 L.Ed.2d at 488; U.S. v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 283, 116 S.Ct. 2135, 2145, 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996). Furthermore, the Eighth Amendment proscription against excessive fines applies to fines imposed by the government in civil actions. Austin, 509 U.S. at 610, 113 S.Ct. at 2806, 125 L.Ed.2d at 488.

Id. In Austin, a case involving forfeiture based on a violation of South Dakota's drug laws, the United States Supreme Court explained:

The Excessive Fines Clause limits the government's power to extract payments, whether in cash or in kind, as punishment for some offense. The notion of punishment, as we commonly understand it, cuts across the division between the civil and the criminal law. It is commonly understood that civil proceedings may advance punitive as well as remedial goals, and, conversely, that both punitive and remedial goals may be served by criminal penalties.¹

509 U.S. at 609-10, 113 S.Ct. at 2805-06, 125 L.Ed.2d at 488 (internal citations omitted). As a result, the United States Supreme Court has held that the Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause applies to civil forfeiture proceedings. Id. See also $100 and A Black Cadillac v. Indiana, 822 N.E.2d 1001, 1010 (Ind.App. 2005) (holding Indiana forfeiture statute subject to Excessive Fines Clause).

[¶ 7.] "The touchstone of the constitutional inquiry under the Excessive Fines Clause is the principle of proportionality: The amount of the forfeiture must bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense that it is designed to punish." United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334, 118 S.Ct. 2028, 2036, 141 L.Ed.2d 314 (1998). As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized, "[t]hough the Supreme Court has held that `a punitive forfeiture violates the Excessive Fines Clause if it is grossly disproportional to the gravity of a defendant's offense,' the Court has expressly declined to enunciate a test of gross disproportionality." United States v. Dodge Caravan Grand SE, 387 F.3d 758, 763 (8th Cir.2004). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has articulated a two-pronged approach to assess any such challenge: First, the claimant must "make a prima facie showing of gross disproportionality;" and, second, if the claimant can make such a showing, "the court considers whether the disproportionality reaches such a level of excessiveness that in justice the punishment is more criminal than the crime." Id.

[¶ 8.] The assessment of gross disproportionality requires particular attention to a number of factors surrounding the forfeiture. As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has instructed:

To determine whether the facts indicate gross disproportionality, the district court must consider multiple factors, including the extent and duration of the criminal conduct, the gravity of the offense weighed against the severity of the criminal sanction, and the value of the property forfeited. We have also identified other helpful inquiries such as an assessment of the personal benefit reaped by ...