State v. Orozco
Decision Date | 15 November 1972 |
Docket Number | No. 55238,55238 |
Citation | 202 N.W.2d 344 |
Parties | STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Stephanie OROZCO, Appellant. |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Robert H. Shepard and D. Bradley Kiesey, Mason City, for appellant.
Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., and Fred Haskins, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Heard before MOORE, C.J., and MASON, RAWLINGS, LeGRAND and REES, JJ.
Defendant, Stephanie Orozco, was charged with perjury in three counts, tried and accordingly found guilty. She appeals from judgment entered on each count. We affirm.
The charges against defendant originated in the robbery trial and conviction of her husband, Anthony Allen Orozco. See State v. Orozco, 190 N.W.2d 830 (Iowa 1971).
Testifying as an alibi witness for her spouse, the accused stated she was employed, worked a regular shift the day of the aforesaid robbery, that Anthony had provided transportation to and from her place of employment, and they spent the entire evening together. That testimony later proved to be false.
At time of arrest defendant had no attorney so the presiding trial judge appointed James E. Coonley, Jr. to represent accused at arraignment only. By affidavit Coonley asserts he discussed with Stephanie neither facts of the case nor merits of her defense, ascertaining only the course of action she wished to take at arraignment. Defendant thereupon stated she wanted to be represented by a designated attorney and desired a continuance, immediately requested by Coonley and granted.
Prior to trial of the case Richard Allbee, Coonley's office associate, was elected county attorney. He appointed Coonley an assistant.
At start of trial Allbee and Coonley appeared for the State. Defense counsel promptly moved they be required to withdraw. That motion was overruled. Prior, however, to empaneling of the jury the two prosecutors withdrew from courtroom participation and were replaced by an assistant attorney general.
Issues raised on appeal are, trial court erred in (1) permitting Allbee and Coonley to engage in any prosecutorial activities, (2) refusing to instruct the jury that if it found admittedly incorrect testimony was given in a good faith belief it was true, defendant must be acquitted, (3) imposing excessive punishment.
I. In support of her assignment regarding participation by Allbee and Coonley in the instant prosecution defendant leans heavily on the confidential nature of an attorney-client relationship. She cites The Code 1971, Section 610.14; Court Rule 119; ABA Canons of Professional Ethics 6, 37; Informal Opinion 885, ABA Standing Committee on Professional Ethics (November 2, 1965).
It is at once self-evident we deal here not with a technical error, but rather with a delicate subject relating to conduct of the bar, the administration of justice, and basic rights of an accused.
It is generally understood an attorney may not participate in the prosecution of a criminal case if, by reason of personal relations with an accused, he has acquired knowledge of facts on which the prosecution is based or which are closely interwoven therewith, or has formally appeared for defendant though no fee has been agreed on or requested, and despite the gratuity of services rendered or to be performed. 436, 433 P.2d 289, 292--293 (1967); 436, 433 P.2d 289, 292--293 (1967); State v. Leigh, 178 Kan. 549, 289 P.2d 774, 777 (1955); State v. Miner, 128 Vt. 55, 258 A.2d 815, 819 (1969); 7 Am.Jur.2d, Attorneys at Law, § 154; 27 C.J.S. District & Pros. Attys. § 12(6) c.
More specifically, as the court said in State v. Leigh, Supra: 'An attorney cannot be permitted to participate in the prosecution of a criminal case If, by reason of his professional relations with the accused, he has acquired knowledge of facts upon which the prosecution is predicated or which are closely interwoven therewith.' (Emphasis supplied).
It instantly appears the only information conveyed by defendant to Coonley because of the aforesaid limited appointment was that accused desired benefit of other counsel and for that purpose wanted a continuance. This is a far cry from knowledge of facts upon which the prosecution was foundationed.
Stated otherwise, Coonley could not have been called upon, in the prosecution of this case, to have used information obtained as a result of prior professional association with defendant.
Pursuing the matter one more step it appears Coonley was but 'nominally employed' to act on defendant's behalf, i.e., to represent Mrs. Orozco for purpose of arraignment only. Counsel made no attendant investigation of accused's defense and developed no confidential status as a result of any consultation. See State v. Lewis, 96 Iowa 286, 295--296, 65 N.W. 295 (1895). See also State v. Howard, 118 Mo. 127, 24 S.W. 41, 43 (1893); State v. Brazile, 231 La. 90, 90 So.2d 789, 790 (1956); Yancey v. State, 41 Okl.Cr. 197, 271 P. 170, 171 (1928); Autry v. State, 430 S.W.2d 808, 809 (Tenn.Cr.App.1967); Kizzee v. State, 166 Tex.Cr. 191, 312 S.W.2d 661, 663--664 (1958); Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 953, at 968--973.
Prosecuting attorneys ought always, however, he above suspicion and the conduct of Coonley and Allbee cannot, in this case, be looked upon with favor. On the other hand, no prejudice to defendant resulted therefrom.
We find in the subject assignment no cause for reversal.
II. By instructions 7, 9 and 10 the trial jury was told, with regard to each of the three counts here involved:
'Before the defendant can be convicted of the crime of perjury as charged in Count I (II, III), of the Information, the burden is upon the State to prove by the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt each and all of the following propositions:
But defense counsel contends trial court erred in refusing to give two instructions requested.
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...475 A.2d 1087 (1984); Thompson v. State, 246 So.2d 760 (Fla.1971); Surrette v. State, 251 So.2d 149 (Fla.Dist.App.1971); State v. Orozco, 202 N.W.2d 344 (Iowa 1972); State v. Bell, 346 So.2d 1090 (La.1977); State v. Brown, 274 So.2d 381 (La.1973); Young v. State, 297 Md. 286, 465 A.2d 1149 ......
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