State v. Orr

• Decision Date: 02 May 2001
• Docket Number: No. 00-408.,00-408.
• Parties: THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. ORR, APPELLANT. THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. SMITH, APPELLANT.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

91 Ohio St.3d 389

745 NE 2d 1036

THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. ORR, APPELLANT.

THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. SMITH, APPELLANT.

No. 00-408.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted January 10, 2001.

Decided May 2, 2001.

Julia L. McNeil, Dayton Director of Law, John J. Scaccia, Chief Administrative Counsel, and Deirdre Logan, Acting Chief Prosecutor, for appellee.

Carl G. Goraleski and Anthony R. Cicero, Assistant Public Defenders, for appellants.

Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, David M. Gormley, Associate Solicitor, and David V. Patton, Assistant Solicitor, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Attorney General of Ohio.

Barry M. Byron, Stephen L. Byron and John Gotherman, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Municipal Attorneys Association.

Flanagan, Lieberman, Hoffman & Swaim and Richard Hempfling, urging reversal for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio Foundation.

FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, SR., J.

From June 8, 1998 through June 20, 1998, the city of Dayton operated a system of driver's license checkpoints designed to identify and remove unlicensed drivers and drivers with suspended licenses from the roads. The checkpoints were set up at various locations in Dayton, including major thoroughfares and "target enforcement areas" —districts characterized by problems of traffic and crime. Upon arrival at a checkpoint site, the police would set up reflective signs that warned drivers of the upcoming checkpoint. The checkpoints were staffed by anywhere between eleven and thirteen officers. Several police cruisers were also present at the checkpoints.

As cars entered the checkpoints, they would be stopped according to some pattern that varied according to the amount of traffic on the road. If traffic was particularly light, every car would be stopped. Drivers who were stopped at these checkpoints were immediately advised of the purpose of the checkpoint and were asked to produce their driver's licenses. Drivers who produced a valid license would have their licenses returned to them along with a pamphlet explaining the checkpoint program and thanking them for their cooperation. The length of detention for those possessing a valid driver's license was usually about forty-five seconds.

Drivers who were unable to produce a valid driver's license had their names, dates of birth, and Social Security numbers entered into the officers' computers to check whether they possessed a valid license. If the computer showed that a driver was properly licensed and was not wanted by the police for any reason, the driver would be given the pamphlet, thanked, and released back into traffic. This entire process would take an additional two minutes or so to complete. Drivers without a valid license were cited for the violation, which added approximately ten minutes to the overall length of detention.

On June 17, 1998, appellant Magus Orr was stopped at a driver's license checkpoint and cited for driving without a license in violation of R.C. 4507.02(A)(1). That same night, appellant Andre Smith was stopped at a driver's license checkpoint at another location. Smith was cited for driving without a license in violation of R.C. 4507.02(A)(1), operating a motorcycle without the required endorsement in violation of R.C. 4507.02(A)(3), driving with expired license plates in violation of R.C. 4503.21, and operating a motorcycle without a helmet—required for novice riders—in violation of R.C. 4511.53. Both of the appellants pleaded not guilty. Each appellant also filed a motion to suppress, claiming that his seizure was unconstitutional under the Ohio and United States Constitutions and that all evidence obtained as a result of his seizure should be suppressed. The trial court granted appellants' motions to suppress. The court concluded that because the state had offered no evidence to suggest that the driver's license checkpoints were a necessary or effective means of promoting roadway safety, they constituted an unreasonable search and seizure under the Ohio and United States Constitutions. The state appealed the trial court's decisions to the Second District Court of Appeals. In a consolidated case, the court of appeals reversed the trial court, concluding that driver's license checkpoints are a reasonable method by which to deal with the public danger posed by unlicensed drivers. Orr and Smith filed a joint notice of appeal. The cause is now before this court upon our allowance of a discretionary appeal.

We are asked to decide whether Dayton's driver's license checkpoint program violated the search and seizure provisions of the Ohio and United States Constitutions. For the reasons that follow, we sustain the program's constitutionality.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides, "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, which contains language nearly identical to its federal counterpart, also prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures.¹ Because Section 14, Article I and the Fourth Amendment contain virtually identical language, we have interpreted the two provisions as affording the same protection. See State v. Robinette (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 234, 238, 685 N.E.2d 762, 766-767. The search and seizure provisions of the Ohio and United States Constitutions are implicated in this case because a vehicle stop at a highway checkpoint constitutes a "seizure" within the meaning of the Ohio and United States Constitutions even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention brief. Delaware v. Prouse (1979), 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L.Ed.2d 660, 667.

A number of federal and state courts have upheld the seizure of motorists at driver's license checkpoints. See, e.g., United States v. McFayden (C.A.D.C. 1989), 865 F.2d 1306; United States v. Prichard (C.A.10, 1981), 645 F.2d 854; LaFontaine v. State (1998), 269 Ga. 251, 497 S.E.2d 367; State v. Cloukey (Me.1985), 486 A.2d 143; State v. Grooms (1997), 126 N.C.App. 88, 483 S.E.2d 445. Although the United States Supreme Court has never fully considered the constitutionality of a driver's license checkpoint, it has repeatedly suggested in dicta that it would uphold properly administered driver's license checkpoints. For instance, in Prouse, the United States Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment prohibits a police officer from arbitrarily stopping an automobile for the sole purpose of checking the driver's license and registration. The court stressed, however, that this holding did not preclude states from developing methods for spot checks, including the "[q]uestioning of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops." Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663,99 S.Ct. at 1401,59 L.Ed.2d at 673-674. Similarly, in Indianapolis v. Edmond (2000), 531 U.S. 32,—, 121 S.Ct. 447, 457, 148 L.Ed.2d 333, 347, the Supreme Court invalidated drug interdiction checkpoints implemented primarily to uncover evidence of criminal wrongdoing but cautioned that its decision did nothing to alter the constitutional status of driver's license checkpoints.

The United States Supreme Court's cases generally accord more Fourth Amendment protection to persons who are subjected to roving-patrol stops than to those who are stopped at roadblock, or checkpoint-type, stops like that involved in the case at bar. The different treatment of checkpoint and rovingpatrol stops makes sense, given the essential purpose underlying the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment "impose[s] a standard of `reasonableness' upon the exercise of discretion by government officials, including law enforcement agents, in order `"to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions."'" (Footnote omitted.) Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653-654, 99 S.Ct. at 1396, 59 L.Ed.2d at 667, quoting Camara v. Mun. Court of San Francisco (1967), 387 U.S. 523, 528, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1730, 18 L.Ed.2d 930, 935. The crucial distinction between roving-patrol stops and checkpoint stops is the degree to which they intrude upon motorists' privacy and sense of security. "[T]he subjective intrusion—the generating of concern or even fright on the part of lawful travelers—is appreciably less in the case of a checkpoint stop." United States v. Martinez-Fuerte (1976), 428 U.S. 543, 558, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 3083, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116, 1128. "At traffic checkpoints the motorist can see that other vehicles are being stopped, he can see visible signs of the officers' authority, and he is much less likely to be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion." United States v. Ortiz (1975), 422 U.S. 891, 894-895, 95 S.Ct. 2585, 2588, 45 L.Ed.2d 623, 628. Many motorists accept checkpoint stops as incidental to highway use. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 561, 96 S.Ct. at 3084, 49 L.Ed.2d at 1130, fn. 14.

In determining the constitutionality of a police checkpoint, courts evaluate the following three factors: (1) the particular checkpoint's intrusion on privacy, (2) the state's interest in maintaining the checkpoint, and (3) the extent to which the checkpoint advances the state interest. Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz (1990), 496 U.S. 444, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 110 L.Ed.2d 412. The United States Supreme Court has relied upon this analysis in upholding sobriety checkpoints— roadblocks at which drivers are checked for being under the influence of alcohol or mind-altering drugs—and roadblocks designed to intercept illegal immigrants. See id. (sobriety checkpoints); Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543,96 S.Ct. 3074,49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (immigration checkpoints). The courts of several jurisdictions have extended the analysis to cases...