State v. Palmer, 09-0888.

• Citation: 791 N.W.2d 840
• Decision Date: 23 December 2010
• Docket Number: No. 09-0888.,09-0888.
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Colby Alan PALMER, Appellant.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Iowa

791 N.W.2d 840

STATE of Iowa, Appellee,

v.Colby Alan PALMER, Appellant.

No. 09-0888.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Dec. 23, 2010.

Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Patricia A. Reynolds, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Thomas S. Tauber, Assistant Attorney General, Ricki L. Osborn, County Attorney, and Timothy N. Schott, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.

WIGGINS, Justice.

In this appeal, the defendant claims the district court erred in failing to grant his motion to suppress the incriminating statements he made in a second interview with the authorities. He also claims his trial counsel was ineffective. We hold the district court was correct in overruling the defendant's motion to suppress because the State scrupulously honored the invocation of his right to remain silent under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution at the first interview and the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to remain silent prior to the initiation of the second interview. We also find defendant's trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance by failing to object to an internally inconsistent marshalling instruction. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

On August 7, 2007, Colby Alan Palmer was an inmate under the custody and control of the department of corrections and incarcerated at the Fort Dodge Correctional Facility. At approximately 9:05 a.m., correctional officers Richard Sorensen and Matthew Kent transported Palmer from his cell to a recreation pen for an hour of recreation and exercise time. The transfer occurred without incident.

Approximately an hour later, Sorensen and Kent returned to the recreation pen toremove Palmer and transport him back to his cell. While preparing to transport Palmer, Palmer kicked Sorensen directly on the front of the left knee with the back of his left foot. Palmer then looked over his shoulder and said, "There's your f* * * * * * Iowa City trip."

After the kick, Kent quickly shut the recreation-pen door, locking Palmer back inside the recreation pen. Sorensen then fell against the exit door. Kent assisted Sorensen back inside the control room, placed him in a wheel chair, and transported him to health services. The kick caused Sorensen to hyperextend his knee. As a result of the kick, Sorensen received medical treatment and missed approximately one week of work.

Eventually, officers removed Palmer from the recreation pen and transferred him back to his cell. Shortly thereafter, on the same day, correctional captain and investigator Kelly Holder approached Palmer at his cell in an attempt to interview him about the assault. Holder read Palmer the Miranda warning while Palmer read along from a written Miranda waiver form. Palmer, orally and in writing, acknowledged he understood his rights. Next, Holder asked Palmer if he wished to waive his rights and talk to her. Palmer stated that he wanted to talk about his property, not the assault, and refused to waive his rights or sign the waiver form. Holder terminated the interview.

The next day, Palmer told a correctional officer that he wanted to talk to someone about his property and "about the stuff that was going on." Palmer claims he never asked to speak to anyone about the assault that occurred the day before. Palmer's request was relayed to Holder, who then met with Palmer for a second time in a no-contact room where the prisoner and visitor are separated by a pane of glass. Holder only knew Palmer wanted to talk to her; she did not know what topics he wanted to discuss.

Before initiating the interview, Holder again read Palmer the Miranda warning while Palmer read along from a written Miranda waiver form. Palmer, orally and in writing, again acknowledged that he understood his rights. Holder then asked Palmer whether he wished to speak with her. Palmer said yes and signed the waiver form, indicating he agreed to waive his rights and speak with Holder. Palmer understood that when he signed the waiver form, Holder was going to talk to him about the assault. He also understood Holder was recording the interview and the authorities could use anything he said during the interview in a future proceeding. With these understandings, Palmer agreed to the second interview.

During the interview, Palmer complained about how he received his property and food. Later in the interview, they discussed how things were going, why he was upset, and why he kicked Sorensen. Palmer explained he was mad at the officers in general due to a medical situation, he snapped, and Sorensen just happened to be there.

The State charged Palmer with: (1) interference with the official acts of a correctional officer, inflicting or attempting to inflict bodily injury in violation of Iowa Code section 719.1(2) (2007), a class "D" felony; and (2) assault on a correctional officer, causing bodily injury in violation of Iowa Code section 708.3A(3), an aggravated misdemeanor. Palmer pled not guilty to the charges.

Palmer filed a motion to suppress the incriminating statements he made to Holder in the second interview. Palmer argued Holder violated his constitutional rights by failing to honor his request to remain silent and interviewing him for a second time after he had previously stated he didnot want to make any statements. Thus, Palmer claimed, he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his right to remain silent and his statements to Holder were involuntary.

During the suppression hearing, Palmer admitted to his prior experiences with the criminal justice system. The record established that Palmer was first arrested shortly after he turned eighteen, is experienced with the criminal justice system, and can remember being read the Miranda warning on at least three separate prior occasions.

The district court denied Palmer's motion to suppress the incriminating statements he had made to Holder. The case proceeded to trial, and the jury returned a verdict finding Palmer guilty of both interference with an official act of a correctional officer, inflicting or attempting to inflict bodily injury and assault on a correctional officer, causing bodily injury. After the district court entered its judgment and sentence, Palmer filed his notice of appeal.

II. Issues.

This case presents two issues: (1) whether the district court erred by refusing to suppress Palmer's statements to an investigating correctional officer regarding an alleged assault, and (2) whether Palmer's trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to an internally inconsistent marshalling instruction.

III. Suppression of Statements Palmer Made to the Correctional Officer.

A. Scope of Review. We review a district court's refusal to suppress statements allegedly made in violation of constitutional guarantees de novo. State v. Ortiz, 766 N.W.2d 244, 249 (Iowa 2009); State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 606 (Iowa 2001). Under this standard of review, we make " 'an independent evaluation of the totality of the circumstances as shown by the entire record.' " Turner, 630 N.W.2d at 606 (quoting State v. Howard, 509 N.W.2d 764, 767 (Iowa 1993)). "We give deference to the district court's fact findings due to its opportunity to assess the credibility of witnesses, but we are not bound by those findings." Id. We consider both the evidence introduced at the suppression hearing as well as the evidence introduced at trial. State v. Countryman, 572 N.W.2d 553, 557 (Iowa 1997).

B. General Constitutional Principles. Palmer argues his incriminating statements were not voluntary and were obtained in violation of his rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. In the district court and on appeal, Palmer's counsel failed to raise the admissibility of the statements under the Iowa Constitution. See State v. Effler, 769 N.W.2d 880, 894-95 (Iowa 2009) (Appel, J., specially concurring) (discussing why counsel should raise and brief an independent analysis of a constitutional issue under the Iowa Constitution). Consequently, we will limit our analysis regarding the admissibility of the statements to the Federal Constitution.

The Supreme Court requires the authorities to advise suspects of their Miranda rights under the United States Constitution before beginning a custodial interrogation. Ortiz, 766 N.W.2d at 250-51. The Miranda warnings protect a suspect's privilege against self-incrimination embodied in the Fifth Amendment by informing the suspect of his or her right to remain silent and right to the presence of counsel during questioning. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 706-07 (1966). These safeguards are more than a "mere procedural nicety or legal technicality." Ortiz, 766 N.W.2d at 251.

Any statements made by a suspect in response to a custodial interrogation areinadmissible unless there has been an adequate recitation of the Miranda warning and a valid waiver by the suspect of his or her rights. Id.;State v. Harris, 741 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Iowa 2007). A suspect can waive his or her Miranda rights as long as the suspect has done so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Ortiz, 766 N.W.2d at 251.

The State must prove two facts to establish a suspect has waived his or her Miranda rights knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1140-41, 89 L.Ed.2d 410, 421 (1986). First, for a suspect to knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the waiver was made " 'with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.' " Ortiz, 766 N.W.2d at 251 (quoting Moran, 475 U.S. at 421, 106 S.Ct. at 1141, 89 L.Ed.2d at 421). Second, for a waiver to be made voluntarily, the State must prove by a...