State v. Palmer

• Decision Date: 14 May 2003
• Docket Number: No. 27170.,27170.
• Citation: 71 P.3d 1078,138 Idaho 931
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. David A. PALMER, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals

71 P.3d 1078

138 Idaho 931

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. David A. PALMER, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 27170.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

May 14, 2003.

Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender; Paul S. Sonenberg, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Paul S. Sonenberg argued.

Hon. Alan G. Lance, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued.

PERRY, Judge.

David A. Palmer appeals from his judgment of conviction for trafficking in methamphetamine.¹ We vacate and remand.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURE

In June 1998, the Shoshone County sheriff's department began working with an informant who had previously expressed concern about the methamphetamine problem in the county. Shortly thereafter, officers received a phone call from the informant. The informant reported that Palmer and another individual had requested that the informant allow them to set up a methamphetamine laboratory on property occupied by the informant and owned by the informant's parents. Officers suggested that the informant allow the two individuals to do so and advised the informant that law enforcement officers would visit the property. A search warrant was issued. At approximately 1:30 the next morning, officers executed the warrant and found evidence of methamphetamine manufacturing, including several containers of liquid with detectable amounts of methamphetamine. Palmer was arrested.

Initially, Palmer was charged with conspiracy to traffic in methamphetamine. The district court denied Palmer's motion to suppress the evidence against him. A jury subsequently found Palmer guilty of a different charge, trafficking in methamphetamine, and found that Palmer possessed or manufactured in excess of 400 grams. I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(3)(C) (1997). Recognizing that it had submitted to the jury a crime that was never charged, the district court ordered a new trial. The state amended the charge to trafficking in methamphetamine, and a preliminary hearing on the new charge was held.

During the second trial, the state again amended the information, changing the amount of methamphetamine or substance containing methamphetamine from 28 grams or more to an amount exceeding 400 grams. That trial ended when the district court declared a mistrial because of juror misconduct.

Palmer was tried a third time and was found guilty. The district court sentenced Palmer to a fifteen-year term of imprisonment, with ten years fixed, and imposed a fine of $25,000. Palmer subsequently moved for a new trial, claiming that the prosecution had withheld exculpatory evidence. The district court denied Palmer's motion.

On appeal, Palmer raises numerous issues. Palmer argues that the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence. Additionally, Palmer asserts that the district court's failure to hold a preliminary hearing between the second and third trials deprived the district court of jurisdiction, that the informations failed to properly advise Palmer of the charges against him, that the district court improperly instructed the jury, that the evidence was insufficient for the jury to find Palmer guilty of trafficking in excess of 400 grams of methamphetamine, and that the accumulation of errors in his case warrants a new trial.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Motion to Suppress

Palmer argues that the district court improperly ruled that Palmer lacked standing to bring an objection to the search. Palmer asserts that he had standing because he was a possessor, a renter, or an overnight guest on the informant's property.

The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's findings of fact which are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct.App.1996).

In this case, the parties dispute whether Palmer had standing to challenge the search warrant. Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which may not be vicariously asserted. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34, 99 S.Ct. 421, 424-25, 58 L.Ed.2d 387, 394-95 (1978). A search may be challenged when a personal interest under the Fourth Amendment is asserted and a legitimate expectation of privacy is shown to exist in the area searched or the items seized. State v. Brown, 113 Idaho 480, 483-84, 745 P.2d 1101, 1104-05 (Ct.App.1987). In determining whether an individual has standing to challenge a search, the question is whether governmental officials violated any legitimate expectation of privacy held by that individual. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 106, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 2562, 65 L.Ed.2d 633, 642 (1980)

. The defendant bears the burden of proving a legitimate privacy interest. Id. at 104, 100 S.Ct. at 2561, 65 L.Ed.2d at 641.

In this case, Palmer asserts that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy akin to that of a renter or an overnight guest. The United States Supreme Court has held that in some circumstances a person may have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the house of another. See Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990)

; see also State v. Vasquez, 129 Idaho 129, 922 P.2d 426 (Ct.App.1996). In Olson, the Court held that an overnight guest in the house of another carried an expectation of privacy that is protected by the Fourth Amendment. The Court concluded that an overnight guest stays in another's home because it provides privacy and security, where the guest and his possessions will not be disturbed by anyone except those the host allows inside. The Court further noted that people are most vulnerable when they are asleep because they cannot monitor their own safety nor the security of their belongings. For those reasons, the Court indicated, people seek another private place to sleep when they cannot sleep in their own homes.

On the other hand, the Supreme Court has held that one who is merely present with the consent of the householder may not claim the protections of the Fourth Amendment. See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 119 S.Ct. 469, 142 L.Ed.2d 373 (1998)

. In Carter, police looked through a closed blind inside an apartment window and observed three individuals placing white powder into baggies. Two of the three individuals were visiting from a distant city, and the other individual leased and occupied the apartment. With the lessee's permission, the two visitors had been in the apartment for approximately two and one-half hours packaging cocaine. In return, the lessee was to receive some of the drug. After leaving the apartment, the two visitors were arrested and charged with committing drug crimes. Both moved to suppress the evidence, claiming that the initial police observation of their packaging activities constituted an unreasonable search. On appeal, the Supreme Court again recognized that overnight guests may claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment. However, the Court noted that the defendants were in the apartment essentially for a business transaction, had no other purpose for being there, had no previous relationship with the lessee, and were there for only a matter of hours. The Court held that the defendants were not overnight guests, lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment and, therefore, could not successfully assert a Fourth Amendment challenge to the police search.

The facts of this case are similar to the circumstances in Carter. Before Palmer's arrest, Palmer had a limited relationship with the informant. He had only known the informant for approximately one week, and their association centered on methamphetamine. Within a day or two after first meeting, Palmer manufactured methamphetamine on the informant's property. The informant testified that he had called Palmer by telephone on several occasions during the week to further his work with the sheriff's department. This also appears to be the reason Palmer was allowed to visit the informant's house on other occasions during the week they had known each other.

On the evening prior to the arrest, Palmer and another individual went to the informant's house and requested that they be allowed to set up a methamphetamine laboratory on the informant's property. In return, the informant was to receive some of the methamphetamine. After receiving permission to set up the lab, Palmer left to gather the equipment and materials he needed to manufacture the drug. While Palmer was away, the informant called the sheriff's department to report Palmer's plans. Later, during Palmer's manufacturing activities on the informant's property, law enforcement officers conducted a search. Palmer was arrested.

These facts show that Palmer's purpose for being at the informant's property was to manufacture drugs. This conclusion is further supported by testimony from the informant that Palmer did not ask to stay the night; did not bring bedding, clothing, or toiletries; was never offered a place to sleep; and was only expected to stay a few hours. The record does not indicate that Palmer intended to sleep at the informant's house or do anything other than manufacture methamphetamine. Palmer's own testimony showed that he had no intent to stay overnight, let alone sleep overnight at the informant's property. On cross-examination, Palmer testified that if the police had not arrived around 1:30 a.m., he would have been home by 2:00 a.m. or earlier. Under these circumstances, Palmer was not an overnight guest, nor does the evidence indicate that the parties intended any "rental" arrangement. Therefore, Palmer did not meet his burden to prove a legitimate expectation of privacy, and the district court correctly found he lacked standing to challenge the search under the Fourth Amendment.

Palmer also contends that, even if he did not have standing to...