State v. Papadakis
| Decision Date | 07 May 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. C1-01-961.,C1-01-961. |
| Citation | 643 N.W.2d 349 |
| Parties | STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. George Kostas PAPADAKIS, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
Mike Hatch, Attorney General, St. Paul, MN; and Thomas J. Harbinson, Scott County Attorney, Eva L. Cheney, Assistant Scott County Attorney, Shakopee, MN, (for respondent).
Barry V. Voss, Minneapolis, MN, (for appellant).
Considered and decided by RANDALL, Presiding Judge, LANSING, Judge, and KLAPHAKE, Judge.
After a bench trial, the district court found appellant guilty of second-degree controlled-substance possession in violation of Minn.Stat. § 152.022, subds. 2(1), 3(a) (2000). The district court took seven counts of fifth-degree controlled-substance-possession under advisement and found appellant guilty of all counts. See Minn.Stat. § 152.025, subds. 2(1), 3(a). Appellant alleges (1) there is insufficient evidence to convict him of second-degree and fifth-degree controlled-substance possession; (2) there is not a substantial basis to conclude that the search warrant was based on probable cause; (3) the district court abused its discretion in refusing to consider appellant's motion to reconsider; and (4) appellant's seven fifth-degree controlled-substance convictions are based on the same criminal act and should be vacated.
(1) Appellant's actual knowledge of the amount of the controlled substance possessed is not an essential element; (2) the district court had a substantial basis to issue the search warrant; (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing a motion to reconsider; (4) the seven fifth-degree controlled-substance convictions were part of a single behavioral incident but were not the same criminal act. Affirmed.
In May 1999, an individual contacted the Savage Police Department stating that he personally saw a large amount of short-term traffic at a Savage residence. The informant left his name, address and telephone number. Detective Steve Bolluyt, an Eagan police detective assigned to the South Metro Drug Task Force, telephoned the informant to confirm the information. The informant gave Bolluyt the appellant's and his wife's names identifying them as the individuals residing at the address. To verify the information, Bolluyt checked Savage Police Department records and telephone records. He discovered that police had last contacted appellant in January 1999. Bolluyt also learned that appellant was previously arrested in 1996 at the same address. The telephone company records verified appellant and his wife as residing at the Savage address.
Within 72 hours before applying for the search warrant, Bolluyt went to the Savage address, saw garbage cans at the curb, and contacted the refuse hauler to obtain the refuse from the address. During a search of the garbage, Bolluyt discovered correspondence addressed to appellant and his wife, a spoon with burn marks on the bottom, and plastic bags with drug residue later identified as cocaine.
Based on this information, a search warrant was issued on June 28, 1999, for the Savage address. On July 1, Bolluyt and other officers executed the search warrant. At that time, appellant was not at home, but appellant's wife was. Detective McCormick found bottles, syringes, vials, and packages later identified as steroids in appellant's bedroom. Bolluyt was responsible for cataloging evidence and he listed the items on the search warrant inventory and return.
Detective Grant discovered a lock box in the garage, which contained two scales, a baggie with a white powdery substance, a credit card in appellant's name, a brown chunk-like substance, and $3,885 in cash. Grant photographed the items and gave the box and contents to Detective King, who gave them to Bolluyt. Bolluyt listed the items as "lock box and its contents" on search warrant inventory and return.
Bolluyt then brought all items to the South Metro Drug Task Force where he divided and separately packaged the items from the lock box, labeled them, placed them in the evidence locker, and retained the key. After securing the evidence, Bolluyt drove to appellant's place of employment to find him. Appellant was not there, so Bolluyt called appellant's home and left a voice mail message. Appellant returned the call, went to the police station that day, and met with Bolluyt. During the interview, appellant admitted that the cocaine was his, he identified the items from the lock box, and he admitted the steroids were his.
On July 2, 1999, Bolluyt brought the seized evidence to Rebecca Carlson, a chemist at the Minneapolis Public Health Department, for testing. Carlson determined that the white powdery substance was approximately 11.58 grams of cocaine and the brown chunk was hashish, and there were six different types of steroids.
I. Was there sufficient evidence to convict appellant of second-degree and fifth-degree controlled-substance possession?
II. Was there a substantial basis for concluding that the search warrant application established probable cause?
III. Did the district court abuse its discretion in refusing to consider appellant's motion to reconsider?
IV. Was appellant properly convicted on seven counts of fifth-degree controlled-substance offense?
Appellant alleges there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction because the state did not prove that he knew the quantity of the controlled substance he possessed. The state argues that knowledge of the amount of the drugs possessed is not an essential element and it need only prove that appellant had knowledge of the substance possessed.
When the sufficiency of evidence is challenged, an appellate court's review is limited to analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction, is sufficient to allow the fact-finder to reach the verdict that it did. State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn.1989). The same standard of review is applied to bench trials and to jury trials. State v. Cox, 278 N.W.2d 62, 65 (Minn.1979). The district court's findings will be upheld if the appellant could reasonably have been found guilty of the charged crimes. Webb, 440 N.W.2d at 430. To sustain a conviction, the state must prove all essential elements of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Ewing, 250 Minn. 436, 441, 84 N.W.2d 904, 909 (1957).
Minn. Stat § 152.022, subd. 2(1) (2000) provides:
For a second-degree controlled-substance possession conviction the state must prove:
10A Minnesota Practice, Crim Jig 20.14 (1999).
Therefore, the elements of a crime of possession are: (1) knowledge; (2) possession of the requisite weight and substance; and (3) the act took place at the time and place set forth in the complaint. All three elements must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt for a defendant to be found guilty.
We conclude that possession of a controlled substance and knowledge of the nature of the substance are essential elements, but that the state does not have to prove, in addition to all other elements, that appellant knew the precise weight or quantity of the controlled-substance.
To satisfy the knowledge element, the state must prove that appellant "had actual knowledge of the nature of the substance." State v. Florine, 303 Minn. 103, 104, 226 N.W.2d 609, 610 (1975). The Minnesota courts have rejected the contention that the state must prove that appellant knew the quantity of the amount of controlled substance. This court, in State v. Aviles-Alvarez, stated, "[w]hile the amount is an essential element of the crime, the defendant's knowledge of the amount is not an essential element." State v. Aviles-Alvarez, 561 N.W.2d 523, 526 (Minn.App.1997). For a second-degree controlled-substance conviction, the state must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that appellant possessed cocaine of more than six grams in weight, but not that appellant knew the actual weight of the contraband.1 To support the fifth-degree controlled-substance conviction, the state must prove that appellant possessed hashish and steroids. As to the hashish and steroid fifth-degree controlled-substance counts, possession, but not weight was the issue.
There was sufficient evidence that appellant was aware that he possessed cocaine, hashish, and steroids and that he possessed the statutory amount. First, appellant admitted possessing the cocaine and told Bolluyt that the drugs in the garage were his. Second, Detective Bolluyt testified that appellant admitted that there was cocaine in the garage and that the cocaine was his. Third, Rebecca J. Carlson, a chemist at the Minneapolis Public Health Laboratory testified that she performed a GC mass spectrometer analysis on the white powdery substance and evidence and determined that it was approximately 11.58 grams of cocaine. Carlson identified the brown chunk-like substance as hashish, and also identified six different types of steroids. Appellant's statement to the police that the cocaine and drugs in his garage were his, coupled with the chemical tests and Carlson's testimony was sufficient to establish that appellant knew that the substances he possessed were cocaine, hashish, and steroids. Carlson's testimony as to the weight and quantity of the contraband is sufficient to prove that appellant possessed the statutorily required amount of drugs. Viewing the evidence in the light most...
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