State v. Pettinelli
| Decision Date | 08 September 2014 |
| Docket Number | A13-0714 |
| Parties | State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Christopher Steven Pettinelli, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).
Affirmed
St. Louis County District Court
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, John B. Galus, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Mark Rubin, St. Louis County Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Kirk M. Anderson, Special Assistant Public Defender, Anderson Law Firm, PLLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Cleary, Chief Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and Bjorkman, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant Christopher Steven Pettinelli challenges his conviction and sentence for first-degree operation of a snowmobile while under the influence of alcohol. He argues that the district court made erroneous evidentiary rulings, that there was insufficient evidence presented to support the jury's guilty verdicts and finding of an aggravated-sentencing factor, and that the district court abused its discretion by departing from the presumptive sentence under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines. Appellant also challenges the district court's denial of his petition for postconviction relief, arguing that the result of his warrantless blood test should have been suppressed under Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013), and State v. Brooks, 838 N.W.2d 563 (Minn. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1799 (2014). We affirm.
On March 26, 2011, Dan Starr, an officer with the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources (DNR), and several other DNR and law enforcement officers were patrolling a "water skipping" event in St. Louis County where snowmobilers rode over open water. Approximately 400-500 people had gathered to observe or participate in the event, which had a history of involving property damage, littering, fighting, careless driving, alcohol consumption by minors, and driving while impaired (DWI). At one point, Officer Starr saw three snowmobiles pass under a bridge on open water. The second snowmobile was driven by a person wearing a red and white jacket and carried apassenger who was small in stature and had "large . . . fluffy hair." Office Starr identified the passenger as a female. The third snowmobile was driven by a large person wearing a brown jacket, black helmet, and black backpack. Officer Starr observed the three snowmobiles stopped on a frozen lake near two other snowmobiles, one of which appeared to be stalled. Officer Starr radioed other DNR officers in the area for assistance at approximately 7:15 p.m. While water skipping is not illegal, Officer Starr believed that water skipping with a passenger on a snowmobile constituted careless operation of a snowmobile, which is unlawful, and he requested that an officer detain the driver wearing the red and white jacket.
DNR Officer Brent Speldrich arrived on the scene, approached the group of snowmobilers on his own snowmobile, and began speaking with the driver wearing the red and white jacket, who was identified as C.N. Officer Starr and five other DNR officers approached the group by foot, and all of the officers at the scene were wearing uniforms. Officer Starr recognized appellant from previous contacts. He exchanged a few words with appellant and noted that appellant was wearing a large brown jacket and a black helmet. Officer Starr was certain that appellant was the person that he had seen driving the third snowmobile because appellant "was the only person out there wearing a brown . . . jacket and black helmet." Officer Starr identified C.N.'s female passenger as C.C., who he also knew from previous contacts. Officer Starr then spoke with C.N., who was ultimately arrested for DWI. Meanwhile, Officer Speldrich observed the group of snowmobilers as they talked and tried to fix the stalled snowmobile, and he noted thatappellant had slurred speech and unsteady balance. Officer Speldrich asked Officer Starr whether appellant had been driving a snowmobile, and Officer Starr approached appellant and stated that he "just saw [appellant] operating the snowmobile under the bridge" and that appellant was lying if he was claiming otherwise. Officer Speldrich began to speak with appellant and observed slurred speech, unsteady balance, an odor of alcohol on appellant's breath, and bloodshot, watery, and dilated eyes. These observations led Officer Speldrich to believe that appellant was under the influence of alcohol. Officer Speldrich instructed appellant to step "off to the side away from the group of people" and asked whether appellant had been drinking. Appellant admitted that he had started drinking at about 2:30 p.m. and had consumed "ten beers." Officer Speldrich administered field sobriety tests, concluded that appellant had been operating a snowmobile while under the influence of alcohol, and arrested appellant for DWI.
Officer Speldrich read appellant the implied-consent advisory. Appellant was informed that Minnesota law required him to take a test to determine whether he was under the influence of alcohol, that refusal to take a test was a crime, and that he had the right to consult with an attorney before making the decision about testing. Appellant stated that he understood the advisory and wished to consult with an attorney, and a telephone and telephone books were made available to him. Appellant began to make telephone calls, and, approximately an hour later, he informed Officer Speldrich that he was finished making calls. He agreed to submit to a blood test and was taken to ahospital where a blood sample was drawn at 10:20 p.m. The blood test revealed an alcohol concentration of .12.
Appellant was charged with first-degree operation of a snowmobile while under the influence of alcohol and first-degree driving with an alcohol concentration of more than .08. The state filed a notice that it was seeking an upward departure from the presumed guideline sentence based on the aggravating factor of appellant's unamenability to probation.
Appellant moved for suppression of the evidence against him and dismissal of the complaint, arguing that he was unlawfully seized without reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal behavior when the DNR officers approached and spoke with him on the frozen lake. The district court denied appellant's motion, holding that the officers did not need reasonable, articulable suspicion to approach appellant when he was in a public place and that appellant was not seized until Officer Speldrich had probable cause to believe that appellant had operated a snowmobile while under the influence of alcohol.
A jury trial was held on November 27 and 28, 2012, and the jury found appellant guilty of the two charges. After an aggravated-sentencing hearing, the jury also found appellant unamenable to probation. At sentencing, the state requested that appellant receive the presumptive guideline sentence of 42 months, but asked that he be committed to prison even though the sentencing guidelines presumed a stayed prison sentence. Based on the jury's finding that appellant was unamenable to probation, the district court imposed a 42-month commitment for the offense of first-degree operation of asnowmobile while under the influence of alcohol, and the charge of first-degree driving with an alcohol concentration of more than .08 was dismissed.
Appellant filed a notice of appeal on April 23, 2013. On November 26, 2013, he filed a postconviction petition in district court requesting an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the result of his blood test should be suppressed. He argued that he did not voluntarily consent to the warrantless blood draw and that the blood draw was therefore unconstitutional in light of Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, and State v. Brooks, 838 N.W.2d 563, which were issued on April 17 and October 23, 2013, respectively. This court stayed the direct appeal and remanded the case to the district court for postconviction proceedings. The district court denied appellant's requests for an evidentiary hearing and postconviction relief, holding that appellant waived a challenge to the warrantless blood draw by failing to raise the issue previously, that "nothing contained within the opinions of McNeely or Brooks suggest[s] that the United States Supreme Court or the Minnesota Supreme Court intended their rulings to have retroactive application," and that "the petition and the files and records of the proceedings conclusively show that [appellant] is entitled to no relief." This court then reinstated the direct appeal and permitted appellant to also challenge the postconviction decision.
The district court held that appellant waived a challenge to the warrantless blood draw and that McNeely and Brooks do not apply retroactively to this case. Appellantchallenges these holdings. "When a defendant initially files a direct appeal and then moves for a stay to pursue postconviction relief, we review the postconviction court's decisions using the same standard that we apply on direct appeal." State v. Beecroft, 813 N.W.2d 814, 836 (Minn. 2012).
This court will not reverse a district court's refusal to reopen an omnibus hearing absent an abuse of discretion. See State v. Papadakis, 643 N.W.2d 349, 356-57 (Minn. App. 2002). "A [district] court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record." Riley v. State, 792 N.W.2d 831, 833 (Minn. 2011).
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