State v. Parmar
| Citation | 639 N.W.2d 105,263 Neb. 213 |
| Decision Date | 15 February 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. S-00-1327.,S-00-1327. |
| Parties | STATE of Nebraska, Appellee, v. LeRoy J. PARMAR, Appellant. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Nebraska |
Steven E. Achelpohl, Omaha, for appellant.
Don Stenberg, Attorney General, and J. Kirk Brown, Lincoln, for appellee.
LeRoy J. Parmar appeals from an order of the district court for Douglas County denying his motion for postconviction relief. For reasons different from those articulated by the district court, we affirm its judgment.
This is Parmar's fourth request for postconviction relief since his conviction was affirmed by this court on direct appeal. State v. Parmar, 231 Neb. 687, 437 N.W.2d 503 (1989) (Parmar I). Two of the three previous postconviction proceedings were subjects of appeals decided by this court: State v. Parmar, 249 Neb. 462, 544 N.W.2d 102 (1996) (Parmar II), and State v. Parmar, 255 Neb. 356, 586 N.W.2d 279 (1998) (Parmar III). Where cases are interwoven and interdependent and the controversy involved has already been considered and decided by the court in a former proceeding involving one of the parties now before it, the court has the right to examine its own records and take judicial notice of its own proceedings and judgments in the former action. State v. Hess, 261 Neb. 368, 622 N.W.2d 891 (2001); State v. Suggs, 259 Neb. 733, 613 N.W.2d 8 (2000). A reviewing court considering a motion for postconviction relief may take judicial notice of the record in the direct appeal. State v. Bennett, 256 Neb. 747, 591 N.W.2d 779 (1999). The record in this case and those from Parmar's direct appeal and prior postconviction proceedings disclose the following history.
On May 7, 1987, Parmar was charged by information with the first degree murder of Frederick Cox. On March 17, 1988, a jury found Parmar guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. A detailed description of the facts leading to Parmar's conviction may be found in Parmar I. On June 7, Parmar filed notice of his intent to appeal his conviction and was appointed different counsel. On direct appeal, Parmar's appellate counsel raised a single assignment of error, arguing that the district court committed reversible error by failing to suppress a pump action BB gun that was illegally seized from Parmar's residence, which evidence was used against him at his trial. In affirming the conviction and sentence, this court held that the district court erred in failing to suppress the BB gun but that the admission of such evidence was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. Parmar I.
On January 13, 1992, Parmar filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief in the district court. For unknown reasons, and before the district court had ruled on his January 13 motion, Parmar filed an identical pro se motion on June 26. In that motion, Parmar alleged that the district court erred in giving instruction No. 20 at trial, that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to this instruction, and that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to assign and argue these two purported errors. Parmar prayed that his conviction be vacated. On July 7, the district court held that Parmar had not pled facts amounting to a constitutional violation and dismissed his motion without an evidentiary hearing. Parmar did not appeal this ruling. The record reflects no request by Parmar for appointment of postconviction counsel or for leave to amend the postconviction motion.
On February 27, 1995, Parmar filed his second motion for postconviction relief. In that motion, Parmar alleged that "the [trial] judge gave jury instructions that were confusing and misleading," that "the judge gave oral instructions to the jury and failed to put the instructions in writing," and that "defendant's attorney failed to object to [all of the] jury instructions." Parmar alleged that his constitutional rights had been violated because of these errors and requested an evidentiary hearing. On March 7, the district court held that Parmar had pled only conclusions and dismissed his motion without an evidentiary hearing.
On March 23, 1995, Parmar filed notice of his intent to appeal the district court's March 7 ruling. On March 31, the district court appointed counsel to represent Parmar in his postconviction appeal. In his brief, Parmar repeated the errors he had stated in his motion and also argued that the district court erred in refusing to appoint counsel to help him prepare his motion before he submitted it to the district court. We affirmed the postconviction court's judgment because "Parmar's motion for postconviction relief [did] not allege facts entitling him to relief and because he did not request appointment of counsel to assist him with his postconviction relief motion." Parmar II, 249 Neb. at 463,544 N.W.2d at 104.
On July 24, 1997, Parmar filed his third motion for postconviction relief. In that motion, Parmar again alleged that the district court erred in giving instruction No. 20, that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to that instruction, and that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to assign and argue the above two errors. In addition, Parmar alleged that appellate counsel was ineffective for not arguing that all of the evidence seized at Parmar's residence should have been suppressed and for failing to argue that a conflict of interest at the Douglas County public defender's office prejudiced his right to a fair trial. Parmar prayed for an evidentiary hearing and an order vacating his conviction and sentence. On July 30, the district court summarily dismissed his motion and denied his request for an evidentiary hearing, but appointed counsel to represent Parmar on appeal from the denial of postconviction relief.
On August 29, 1997, Parmar's court-appointed counsel filed a notice of appeal in the district court but did not file a separate motion to proceed in forma pauperis or tender a docket fee. Instead, the notice of appeal requested that Parmar be granted in forma pauperis status based on the district court's July 30 determination that Parmar was indigent. On appeal, we held that Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-1912 (Reissue 1995) required that a poverty affidavit be received in the office of the clerk of the district court no more than 30 days after rendition of the judgment and that the district court's July 30 indigency determination could not substitute for the poverty affidavit. Consequently, we dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Parmar III.
On October 25, 1999, Parmar filed his fourth motion for postconviction relief. In that motion, Parmar again alleged that the district court erred in giving instruction No. 20, that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to that instruction, and that counsel on direct appeal was ineffective for failing to assign and argue the above two errors. Parmar also argued, for the second time, that his counsel on direct appeal failed to assign as error the district court's failure to suppress all of the evidence seized from his residence and to argue that the alleged conflict of interest at the Douglas County public defender's office prejudiced his right to a fair trial. Parmar prayed that he be granted an evidentiary hearing for the purpose of setting aside his conviction and sentence. On November 1, the district court dismissed his motion without an evidentiary hearing.
On November 23, 1999, the district court vacated its November 1 order and gave Parmar and his court-appointed attorney 30 days to amend his motion. On December 30, postconviction counsel filed an amended motion for postconviction relief. The record does not indicate that any action was taken on that motion, and postconviction counsel filed another amended motion on September 18, 2000. The September 18 motion stated the following seven claims for relief: (1) the district court erred in giving and/or failing to correct instruction No. 20; (2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to instruction No. 20; (3) direct appeal counsel was ineffective for failing to assign and argue that the district court erred in giving and/or failing to correct instruction No. 20; (4) postconviction counsel was ineffective for failing to properly research Parmar's claims and for not requesting leave to amend Parmar's motion for postconviction relief; (5) trial counsel failed to object to a jury instruction that wrongly advised the jury that intent to kill was an element of felony murder, and direct appeal counsel failed to assign the same on appeal; (6) direct appeal counsel failed to assign as error the district court's failure to suppress all of the evidence seized from Parmar's residence; and (7) Parmar's due process rights were violated by a conflict of interest in the Douglas County public defender's office. Parmar prayed for an evidentiary hearing and an order vacating his conviction and sentence. We note that both the original and amended motions for postconviction relief filed in this proceeding refer to the previous motions filed by Parmar in 1995 and 1997, Parmar II and Parmar III, but make no reference to Parmar's first postconviction motion filed in 1992.
On September 12, 2000, Parmar appeared before the district court for an evidentiary hearing on his fourth motion for postconviction relief. Parmar offered, and the court took judicial notice of, nine different exhibits, which included the bill of exceptions from Parmar's trial and the transcripts from his three previous appeals. The State offered no evidence. In an order entered on November 20, the district court noted that Parmar had "filed two prior motions for post conviction [sic] relief, which were dismissed by the Supreme Court on...
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