State v. Patterson

Citation552 S.E.2d 246,146 NC App. 113
Decision Date18 September 2001
Docket NumberNo. COA00-484.,COA00-484.
PartiesSTATE of North Carolina v. Maechel Shawn PATTERSON.
CourtNorth Carolina Court of Appeals

Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by Special Deputy Attorney General Francis W. Crawley, for the State.

McCotter, McAfee & Ashton, PLLC, by Rudolph A. Ashton, III, and Kirby H. Smith, III, New Bern, for defendant-appellant.

CAMPBELL, Judge.

Defendant, Maechel Shawn Patterson, was indicted for first degree murder on 7 December 1998 in the death of Bobby Wayne Andrews, Jr. ("the victim"). Defendant was tried non-capitally and found guilty of first degree murder on the basis of premeditation and deliberation and under the felony murder rule. On 28 October 1999, the trial court sentenced defendant to life in prison.

The State introduced into evidence defendant's confession, which tended to show that defendant and the victim had been involved in a homosexual relationship for several years prior to the victim's death. On the afternoon of 30 September 1998, defendant visited the victim's residence on the corner of Wharton Street, in Washington, North Carolina. The victim had told defendant he was welcome to stop by at anytime. When defendant arrived at the victim's residence, the victim was eating a sandwich. Defendant did not join him, because defendant had been using crack cocaine that day and was not hungry. Defendant left the victim's house between 5:00 and 6:00 p.m. with plants that the victim had given him.

After leaving the victim's house, defendant drove by the home of Chris Elks ("Elks"). Elks was not home, so defendant went to visit John and Denise Tufte ("the Tuftes"), to whom defendant was trying to sell an insurance policy. Defendant ate supper with the Tuftes, the Tuftes purchased and signed for an insurance policy from defendant, and defendant left around 10:30 p.m. Defendant then went back to Elks' house, where defendant claims the two of them shared one-sixteenth of an ounce of crack cocaine. Elks denied sharing crack cocaine with defendant on 30 September 1998, but corroborated that defendant had visited him on that night.

Defendant left Elks' house and returned home between 1:00 and 2:00 a.m. Defendant lay down for an hour-and-a-half, but was unable to sleep. Defendant left his house and returned to the victim's house between 4:00 and 4:30 a.m. Defendant knocked on the front door, the victim let him in, and the two of them went back to the victim's bedroom. The victim got back into bed, while defendant sat on the floor and smoked some marijuana that belonged to the victim.

Around 5:00 a.m., the victim's alarm went off and both men reached up to cut it off. The victim then lay back down. Defendant, knowing the victim had to be at work at Lowe's at around 6:00 a.m., grabbed a cane from the corner of the bedroom and began poking the victim in the back and telling him to wake up. Defendant was aware that the cane he had grabbed contained a sword on the inside. As defendant poked the victim, the cover came off the end of the cane and defendant stuck the sword into the victim's back. Realizing he had stuck the sword through the victim's body, defendant immediately pulled it out. The victim sat up, faced defendant, and asked, "What the f—k are you doing?" Defendant, realizing the victim was going to die, stabbed him again, this time in the chest. The victim fell back onto the bed, making noises but unable to speak.

Defendant then picked up a towel and wiped down the cane and the sword to remove his fingerprints. Defendant also wiped down the front doorknob and anything else he thought he had touched while in the house. He then laid the sword and the cane on the floor at the foot of the bed. After removing his fingerprints from everything he had touched, defendant took the the box of marijuana and smoking pipe he had been using, both of which belonged to the victim, and returned to his own home around 5:30 a.m. Defendant did not call EMS or try to help the victim in any way prior to leaving the victim's house.

The State also introduced the following evidence which tended to corroborate defendant's confession: Evelyn Respess ("Respess"), who had known the victim for ten years and was being paid to clean his house once each month, called the victim's house several times on the evening of 30 September 1998 and the morning of 1 October 1998. The victim's phone line was continuously busy, which worried Respess, because she knew the victim had telephone call-waiting. Respess drove to the victim's house on the morning of 1 October 1998, knocked on the door and rang the doorbell, but received no answer. Respess then let herself in, walked back to the victim's bedroom, and discovered the victim's dead body. The telephone was off the hook and a sharp object lay at the foot of the bed. Respess called 911 from her car phone and the police responded. Respess further testified that she knew defendant and that she also knew that the victim was a homosexual.

J.T. Sheppard ("Sheppard") testified that while visiting Ronald Dando, who lived next door to the victim, on 30 September 1998 between 5:00 and 5:30 p.m., he observed defendant carrying plants from the victim's house and placing them in his white pickup truck, which Sheppard had seen parked at the victim's house on several occasions. Sheppard also saw defendant's truck at the victim's house late that evening, but testified that it was not there at 7:00 a.m. on the morning of 1 October 1998.

Ronald Dando ("Dando") testified that he saw defendant's truck parked at the victim's house when he returned home late on 30 September 1998. Dando also testified that he observed the headlights of a vehicle backing out of the victim's driveway between 4:30 and 5:00 a.m. on 1 October 1998. A vehicle returned a short time later, but did not stay very long.

Denise Tufte testified that defendant came to her house around 9:15 p.m. on 30 September 1998, stayed for dinner, and sold the Tuftes an insurance policy. Defendant did not appear unusual or act like he was under the influence of anything that evening. Before leaving around 10:15 p.m., defendant told the Tuftes that he was not selling much insurance and the lack of income was causing stress in his marriage. According to Mr. Tufte, defendant returned a week or two later trying to sell some coins and mentioned that he was the suspect in a murder case. Defendant also told the Tuftes that he had a cocaine problem and that he needed treatment.

Chris Elks testified that defendant was at his house until 11:30 or 12:00 on the night of 30 September 1998, but that the two of them did not use cocaine. Elks also testified that defendant was at his house on 2 October 1998 when a news report about the victim's death was shown on the television. Defendant stated, "I was just at the guy's [victim's] house." Defendant also told Elks that the victim had given him some plants and had promised to give him an entertainment center.

Dr. Thomas Clark, III, associate chief medical examiner for the State of North Carolina and a forensic pathologist, performed the autopsy on the victim, which revealed a shallow stab wound to the left side of the victim's chest and a deeper stab wound to the left side of the victim's back. This wound to the back, which Dr. Clark determined to be the cause of death, ran through the victim's left lung and aorta, under his right lung, and into his liver. Dr. Clark testified that the sword found in the victim's bedroom could have caused the victim's wounds, and that the wounds could have been inflicted by someone seated on the floor. Dr. Clark's autopsy also revealed a hairline fracture of the seventh rib, which Dr. Clark believed could have occurred near the time of death. In Dr. Clark's opinion, the victim's wounds were intentionally inflicted. Additional evidence will be set forth hereinafter where pertinent.

At the close of the State's evidence, defendant moved to dismiss the first degree murder charge. This motion was denied. Defendant chose not to introduce any evidence, and renewed his motion to dismiss, which was again denied.

On appeal to this Court, defendant makes several arguments. After reviewing the record, transcript, briefs, and oral arguments of counsel, we conclude that defendant received a fair trial, free from prejudicial error.

I.

Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements he made to State Bureau of Investigation ("SBI") Special Agents Kelly Moser ("Moser") and Phil Brinkley ("Brinkley") (collectively, "the agents") at the Pitt County Mental Health Center on 9 October 1998. Defendant also assigns error to the admission of a drawing he made in connection with his statements to the agents. An evidentiary hearing on defendant's motion to suppress was held during a recess in jury selection on 25 October 1999. The next day, in open court, the trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress. On appeal, defendant argues that his statements should have been excluded from evidence because they were made while defendant was subjected to custodial interrogation and had not been advised of his Miranda rights. Defendant also contends the statements were not voluntary.

Following the evidentiary hearing, the trial court made detailed findings of fact with regard to defendant's interview with Agents Moser and Brinkley, which we summarize: At approximately 7:00 p.m. on 9 October 1998, Agents Moser and Brinkley went to the Pitt County Mental Health Detox Facility looking for defendant. Upon arrival, the agents saw defendant sitting outside, smoking and talking with other patients. The agents went inside the facility, identified themselves, and learned from the supervisor on duty that defendant was there by voluntary commitment. The supervisor advised defendant that the agents were there to talk with him, and defendant agreed to speak with the agents. The agents and defendant entered a small...

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    ...custody when told he was not under arrest and was free to leave, and did in fact freely leave the interview); State v. Patterson, 146 N.C.App. 113, 552 S.E.2d 246, 252-54 (2001) (holding that accused was not in custody when asked to "give his side of the story" and then left the station Min......
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