State v. Patton
Decision Date | 01 February 2008 |
Docket Number | No. 98,471.,No. 98,470.,98,470.,98,471. |
Citation | 176 P.3d 151 |
Parties | STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. David R. PATTON, Appellant. David R. Patton, Appellant, v. Elizabeth Gillespie, Director, Shawnee County Adult Detention Division, Appellee, and State of Kansas, Intervenor/Appellee. |
Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Ronald F. Evans, of Death Penalty Defense Unit, argued the cause and was on the briefs for appellant.
Robert D. Hecht, district attorney, argued the cause, and Jamie L. Karasek, assistant district attorney, and Paul J. Morrison, attorney general, were with him on the brief for appellee.
This case presents issues of first impression: In an extradition proceeding under K.S.A. 22-2701 et seq., is an alleged fugitive's competency a proper subject of inquiry and, if so, what is the standard for determining competency? We conclude that in order to give meaning to and allow the full exercise of an alleged fugitive's statutory right to counsel and right to raise defenses in an extradition proceeding under K.S.A. 22-2701 et seq., an alleged fugitive may challenge whether he or she possesses a present ability to consult with an attorney with a reasonable degree of rational understanding on the issues of whether he or she (1) is the person named in the request for extradition and (2) is a fugitive.
This case arises out of an attempt by the state of Florida to extradite David R. Patton. Patton is wanted on an arrest warrant out of Florida for two counts of capital murder, burglary to a dwelling, grand theft, and grand theft of a motor vehicle. On September 23, 2006, he was arrested in Shawnee County, Kansas, and charged with being a fugitive from justice from the state of Florida, in violation of the Kansas Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, K.S.A. 22-2701 et seq., K.S.A.2006 Supp. 22-2713.
Patton challenged extradition and filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under K.S.A. 60-1501. In the fugitive case, Patton filed a motion to determine competency. The State opposed the competency motion, arguing there was no authority to support the consideration of competency as part of an extradition proceeding.
On January 10, 2007, the district court held a hearing on the two matters. First, the court denied Patton's motion to determine competency, finding that competency is not an extradition requirement. Next, the court concluded that the State met the requirements of K.S.A. 22-2703 and that Patton was afforded his rights under K.S.A. 22-2710. The court then denied the petition for habeas corpus. At Patton's request, the court stayed its orders to allow Patton to file an appeal concerning the competency issue.
Patton appealed both decisions to the Court of Appeals, and the appeals were consolidated. The State then filed a motion for summary disposition under Kansas Supreme Court Rule 7.041 (2007 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 53), arguing that the holding in Brewer v. Turner, 165 Kan. 330, 194 P.2d 507 (1948), controls. The Court of Appeals agreed and issued an order granting the State's motion.
We granted Patton's petition for review.
Patton argues that an alleged fugitive's present competency is a proper subject of inquiry in an extradition proceeding. He urges this court to adopt a broad approach to this issue by holding that a fugitive in an extradition proceeding must be sufficiently competent to understand the nature of the proceeding and to consult with his or her counsel regarding the proceeding. The State counters that the accused's competency is not among the limited issues to be addressed in such a proceeding and further asserts that Brewer, 165 Kan. 330, 194 P.2d 507, answers the question.
The questions of whether competency is a proper inquiry in an extradition proceeding and, if so, what standard applies, are questions of law. We review legal questions under a de novo standard of review. See State v. Davis, 284 Kan. 728, 731, 163 P.3d 1224 (2007); State v. Bryan, 281 Kan. 157, 159, 130 P.3d 85 (2006).
Proceedings for the interstate extradition of prisoners are controlled by the federal Constitution and federal law. Sanders v. Conine, 506 F.2d 530, 532 (10th Cir.1974); Hill v. Roberts, 359 So.2d 911, 912 (Fla.Dist. App.1978); People ex rel. Dimas v. Skimp, 83 Ill.App.3d 150, 152, 38 Ill.Dec. 519, 403 N.E.2d 750 (1980); Prettyman v. Karnopp, 192 Neb. 451, 455, 222 N.W.2d 362 (1974). More specifically, extraditions are controlled by Article IV, § 2 of the United States Constitution, which provides in part:
"A person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime."
Kansas has implemented the requirements of the federal Extradition Clause by adopting. the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act (UCEA), K.S.A. 22-2701 et seq. The federal counterpart is 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (2000).
In Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 288-89, 99 S.Ct. 530, 58 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978), the United States Supreme Court held: "[T]he courts of an asylum state are bound by Art. IV, § 2, ... by [18 U.S.C.] § 3182, and, where adopted, by the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act." A state may not impose more stringent standards or refuse a demand for extradition on the basis of requirements not articulated by federal law. Dunn v. Hindman, 18 Kan.App.2d 537, 544, 855 P.2d 994, rev. denied 253 Kan. 857 (1993); Breckenridge v. Hindman, 10 Kan.App.2d 50, 53, 691 P.2d 405 (1984), rev. denied 236. Kan. 875 (1985).
In view of the constitutional mandate for extradition, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that extradition proceedings were intended to be limited in scope in order to facilitate a swift and efficient transfer of custody to the demanding state:
Generally a district court's review powers in the asylum state, therefore, are limited. Once a governor has granted extradition, a court considering release on habeas corpus can do no more than decide:
Doran, 439 U.S. at 289, 99 S.Ct. 530.
See Pacileo v. Walker, 446 U.S. 1307, 1309, 100 S.Ct. 1633, 64 L.Ed.2d 221 (1980).
In Kennon v. State, 248 Kan. 515, 521, 809 P.2d 546 (1991), this court discussed Doran and explained that being a "fugitive" means the accused was in the demanding state when the alleged crime was committed. Further, the court distinguished between mandatory extradition under K.S.A. 22-2702, which applies when it is alleged the person was in the demanding state at the time the alleged crime was committed, and discretionary extradition under K.S.A. 22-2706, which applies when it is alleged the person committed an act in Kansas or a third state that intentionally resulted in a crime in the demanding state. 248 Kan. at 522-23, 809 P.2d 546. This court also discussed the fugitive requirement in State v. Smith, 232 Kan. 128, 652 P.2d 703 (1982), where the court concluded that extradition had been appropriately ordered even though Smith disputed his presence in the demanding state on the dates of the alleged crime. Smith admitted to having been in the demanding state around the time of the alleged crime and to being the person identified in the demand.
The Smith decision is illustrative of a long line of Kansas cases in which it has been determined that an extradition proceeding in the asylum state is not the proper forum for considering defenses or resolving the issue of guilt or innocence. Those matters must be raised at trial in the demanding state. See Perry v. Gwartney, 162 Kan. 607, Syl. ¶ 2, 178 P.2d 185 (1947); Dunn, 18 Kan.App.2d at 545, 855 P.2d 994; see also California v. Superior Court of California, 482 U.S. 400, 407-08, 107 S.Ct. 2433, 96 L.Ed.2d 332 (1987); Biddinger v. Commissioner of Police, 245 U.S. 128, 135, 38 S.Ct. 41, 62 L.Ed. 193 (1917); Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U.S. 192, 206, 27 S.Ct. 111, 51 L.Ed. 148 (1906). But Patton does not raise issues regarding his competency at the time of the crime or his competency to stand trial; rather, the focus of this appeal is on his competency during the extradition procedure itself.
The distinct time frames at which competency may be an issue-the time of the offense, the time of extradition, the time of trial, or the time of execution of a sentence— must be considered when applying Brewer, 165 Kan. 330, 194 P.2d 507, the case upon which the Court of Appeals relied in rejecting Patton's contention that he is entitled to a competency inquiry in an extradition proceeding. Brewer was a fugitive from California when he was adjudged to be insane in Oklahoma and was committed to a state hospital. He left the state hospital, but it was not settled whether Brewer escaped or was discharged. Brewer was eventually arrested in Kansas on a warrant issued by the Kansas Governor on the request of California authorities.
Brewer challenged extradition and argued, inter...
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