State v. Paulick
Decision Date | 23 June 1967 |
Docket Number | No. 40600,40600 |
Citation | 277 Minn. 140,151 N.W.2d 591 |
Parties | STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. James Albert PAULICK, Relator. |
Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. In prosecutions under municipal ordinances as in prosecutions for felonies, the Federal and State Constitutions require that complaints be received and warrants issued by a magistrate rather than by a clerk of court. U.S.Const. Amend. IV; Minn.Const. art. 1, § 10; State ex rel. Duhn v. Tahash, 275 Minn. 377, 147 N.W.2d 382.
2. The adequacy of procedural safeguards cannot be judged on the basis of 3. In misdemeanor prosecutions, the grave consequences to the accused resulting from a wrongful arrest far outweigh the potential harm to the community in requiring something more than the peremptory issuance of a warrant by a clerk untrained in the law.
whether the offense is a misdemeanor or a felony.
4. The functions of hearing complaints and issuing warrants cannot be delegated by the judiciary, since they require both a knowledge of the law and the authority to grant or refuse the request of law-enforcement officers to initiate criminal procedures.
5. Minn.St. 488A.10, subds. 3 and 7, permitting clerks and deputy clerks of Hennepin County Municipal Court to receive complaints and issue warrants, are unconstitutional. U.S.Const. Amend. IV; Minn.Const. art. 1, § 10.
Wolner & Haglund, Wayzata, for relator.
Lawrence D. Cohen, St. Paul, Lynn S. Castner, Minneapolis, amicus curiae.
Carl F. Dever, Minneapolis, for Village of Minnetonka.
C. Paul Jones, Public Defender, George Scott, County Atty., Henry McCarr, J., Asst. County Atty., Minneapolis, Joseph P. Summers, City Atty., Daniel Klas, Asst. City Atty., St. Paul, amicus curiae.
This matter is before the court on a petition for a writ of prohibition alleging that the Municipal Court of Hennepin County does not have jurisdiction over defendant. It seeks to enjoin the prosecution of a traffic violation. The only issue is whether the execution of the complaint before a clerk of the court rather than a magistrate is a denial of defendant's constitutional rights.
The charge against defendant is contained in the following amended complaint:
'STATE OF MINNESOTA
'COUNTY OF HENNEPIN
'MUNICIPAL COURT
'AMENDED COMPLAINT
The original complaint was signed and verified by a police officer before a deputy clerk of Hennepin County Municipal Court, on the basis of which a warrant for defendant's arrest was issued. The village attorney endorsed his approval on both complaints.
In response to the original complaint and warrant, defendant made a special appearance in municipal court to challenge the court's jurisdiction on the ground the complaint and warrant were unconstitutionally executed. Because the allegations in the original complaint were deemed by the court to be inadequate, a new complaint was executed. It is the sufficiency of that complaint which is here for determination.
The trial court heard and denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, incorporating a memorandum as a part of its order setting forth the reasons for the court's ruling. Defendant's petition for a writ of prohibition followed and resulted in a stay of further proceedings pending this court's ruling on the petition.
Subsequent to the trial court's order, our decision in State ex rel. Duhn v. Tahash, 275 Minn. 377, 147 N.W.2d 382, was handed down. The Duhn opinion held that with respect to state felony prosecutions, U.S.Const. Amends. IV and XIV prohibit an arrest made pursuant to a complaint and warrant executed before and issued by a clerk of court. We there expressly reserved decision as to whether the same result would be reached with respect to prosecutions under municipal ordinances. We now hold that as to ordinance violations the rule adopted in the Duhn case is applicable.
The provisions of U.S. Const. Anend. IV and Minn.Const. art. 1, § 10, governing arrests and searches and seizures, are as follows:
'The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.'
As we view the issue now before us, the only question is whether in the prosecution of so-called 'petty' offenses the potential harm to a defendant who is improperly arrested outweighs the inconvenience which results to courts and enforcement agencies in according the accused the safeguards embodied in the State and Federal Constitutions with respect to felonies. The statutes which authorize the issuance of complaints and warrants are somewhat in conflict. Minn.St. 488A.10, subds. 3 and 7, 1 permit clerks of Hennepin County Municipal Court to take complaints and issue warrants. Section 629.42, on the other hand, directs that complainants be examined before a magistrate prior to the issuance of a warrant. 2 Apparently under the statute only a magistrate may authorize the issuance of search warrants. § 626.06.
As we noted in the Duhn case, very early in our state history this court speaking through Mr. Justice Mitchell held valid a statute which permitted a clerk of municipal court to issue warrants. City of St. Paul v. Umstetter, 37 Minn. 15, 33 N.W. 115. However, the court made no mention of the Fourth Amendment in deciding whether a clerk could determine probable cause but simply held it was a proper delegation of judicial authority under the state constitution. A long line of state and Federal decisions has distinguished rights which must be accorded defendants in prosecutions for ordinance violations from those guaranteed in the trial of more serious offenses. Since municipalities originally enforced their ordinances only by the imposition of fines which carried no sanction of imprisonment, they were historically treated as civil matters. 3 The rationale for dealing summarily with such violations seems to have become obscured over a course of time when rather serious criminal consequences began to result from the enforcement of municipal ordinances. Most of the attention in these cases has centered on the right to a jury trial or the right to appointed counsel. Speaking through Mr. Justice Matson, this court noted in State v. Ketterer, 248 Minn. 173, 175, 79 N.W.2d 136, 138, that our precedents have demonstrated a 'happy indifference to consistency' in their discussion of what status prosecutions under ordinances enjoyed. Perhaps the court's attitude has not been better stated than in State v. Olson, 115 Minn. 153, 155, 131 N.W. 1084, 1085:
In State ex rel. Connolly v. Parks, 199 Minn. 622, 625, 273 N.W. 233, 234, which prohibited a municipal court from according a defendant a jury trial for an ordinance violation, we said:
'* * * We do not understand that respondent seriously claims that the punishment of imprisonment for a maximum of 90 days is such a serious punishment as to remove the offense in question from the class of petty offenses for which there is no right to a jury trial.'
In very recent years, however, the Supreme Court of the United States and our own courts have concurrently adopted a more solicious attitute toward the rights of defendants in areas where they have heretofore been given little recognition. It seems likely that a new concept regarding procedural safeguards has developed with the increasing volume of prosecutions for traffic violations where otherwise law-abiding and respectable citizens have suddenly found themselves enmeshed in the criminal processes. Because of exposure to traffic violations, the general public not otherwise affected by law enforcement has apparently become more articulate in requiring attention to procedural due process than was the case a generation ago. Whatever may be the reason, a number of recent cases demonstrate that the court no longer adheres to the view that 90 days in jail is not 'a serious punishment.'
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