State v. Penny
Decision Date | 17 February 2016 |
Docket Number | Unpublished Opinion No. 2016-UP-065,Appellate Case No. 2013-001554 |
Parties | The State, Respondent, v. Dennis M. Penny, II, Appellant. |
Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
Appeal From Chesterfield County
Paul M. Burch, Circuit Court Judge
AFFIRMED
Appellate Defender Laura Ruth Baer, of Columbia, for Appellant.
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Interim Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General John Benjamin Aplin, Assistant Attorney General Mark Reynolds Farthing, and Assistant Attorney General Mary Williams Leddon, all of Columbia; and Solicitor William Benjamin Rogers, Jr., of Bennettsville, for Respondent.
Dennis M. Penny, II appeals his conviction for burglary in the second degree, arguing (1) the trial court should have directed a verdict of acquittal because the State did not present evidence that Penny entered the victim's dwelling without the victim's consent, (2) the trial court should have directed a verdict of acquittal because the State failed to present evidence that Penny intended to commit a crime within the victim's dwelling, and (3) the trial court should have suppressed evidence of Penny's flight following the issuance of an Amber Alert. We affirm.
1. We disagree with Penny's argument that the State failed to present evidence that he entered the victim's home without the victim's consent. Although the victim testified Penny would have been allowed to enter the residence if he had knocked on the door instead of forcing his way inside, this circumstance did not amount to unlimited consent. See State v. Singley, 392 S.C. 270, 276, 709 S.E.2d 603, 606 (2011) (); State v. Coffin, 331 S.C. 129, 132, 502 S.E.2d 98, 99 (1998) ( ); id. at 131, 502 S.E.2d at 99 ( ).
2. Penny further argues the trial court should have directed a verdict in his favor because the State did not offer either direct or circumstantial evidence of any crime that he intended to commit once inside the residence. We disagree. Penny correctly asserts a conviction for burglary in the second degree requires evidence that the defendant entered a dwelling with the intent to commit a crime therein. See S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-312(A) (2003) (); cf. State v. Pinckney, 339 S.C. 346, 349, 529 S.E.2d 526, 527 (2000) (). However, contrary to Penny's contention that there was no evidence presented of any specific criminal act that he intended to commit while inside the residence, Penny's forcible entry into the victim's residence, which resulted in damage to both the storm door and the inside metal door, gave rise to an inference of his intent to commit a crime once he gained entry to the home. See McMillian v.State, 383 S.C. 480, 487, 680 S.E.2d 905, 908 (2009) ( ); id. (); Pinckney v. State, 368 S.C. 502, 505, 629 S.E.2d 367, 369 (2006) () ; State v. Tuckness, 257 S.C. 295, 299, 185 S.E.2d 607, 608 (1971) (...
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