State v. People's Ice Company

• Decision Date: 09 January 1914
• Docket Number: 18,514,18,515 - (15,16)
• Parties: STATE v. PEOPLE'S ICE COMPANY
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

144 N.W. 962

124 Minn. 307

STATE v. PEOPLE'S ICE COMPANY

Nos. 18,514, 18,515 - (15, 16)

Supreme Court of Minnesota

January 9, 1914

Six complaints were made to the municipal court of St. Paul against defendant for violation of the weight and measure law. Defendant voluntarily came into court and pleaded not guilty. Four of the complaints were tried before Finehout J., who found defendant guilty and sentenced it to pay a fine of $100 in each case. The other two complaints were tried by Hanft, J., who found defendant guilty and imposed the same fine in each case. From the judgments entered pursuant to the sentence, defendant appealed in each case. Affirmed.

SYLLABUS

Act constitutional.

1. Chapter 156, Laws 1911, establishing a department of weights and measures, does not violate the constitutional provision that "no law shall embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title."

Weights and measures -- evidence of intent excluded.

2. This statute is a police regulation and changes the prior law so that intent to defraud or commit wrong is not an element of the offense of selling or exposing for sale less than the quantity represented, and the exclusion of evidence tending to show absence of such intent was not error.

J. F Fitzpatrick and R. G. O'Malley, for appellant.

Lyndon A. Smith, Attorney General, O. H. O'Neill, Corporation Attorney of City of St. Paul, John A. Burns and T. W. McMeekin, Assistant Corporation Attorneys of City of St. Paul, for respondent.

OPINION

TAYLOR, C.

Defendant was convicted in the municipal court of the city of St. Paul of giving short weight in the sale of ice. Six different offenses were charged against it which by agreement were all tried together, but a separate judgment was rendered as to each offense. Defendant appealed therefrom, and the proceedings in all six cases are presented to this court upon one record. The questions presented are substantially the same in each case.

1. The prosecution is brought under chapter 156, page 197, Laws of 1911. [G.S. 1913, §§ 4611-4623.] Defendant contends that the title of this act is not broad enough to cover the penal provision upon which the prosecution is based, and that the act is unconstitutional for that reason. Section 27, article 4, of the Constitution is: "No law shall embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title." This provision has frequently been under consideration and the rules governing its application are well established. The purpose of this provision is to prevent combining in one act, for logrolling or other improper purposes, matters pertaining to diverse and unconnected subjects; to provide for apprising the legislature and the public through the title of the act, of the general subject matter with which it deals; and to secure a separate consideration of each distinct legislative measure. State v. Cassidy, 22 Minn. 312, 21 Am. Rep. 765; Johnson v. Harrison, 47 Minn. 575, 50 N.W. 923, 28 Am. St. 382; Winters v. City of Duluth, 82 Minn. 127, 84 N.W. 788; Ek v. St. Paul Permanent Loan Co. 84 Minn. 245, 87 N.W. 844; Atwell v. Parker, 93 Minn. 462, 101 N.W. 946. This constitutional provision is to be construed liberally and all doubts resolved in favor of the sufficiency of the title of an act adopted by the legislature. State v. Gut, 13 Minn. 315 (341); State v. Cassidy, 22 Minn. 312, 21 Am. Rep. 765; Boyle v. Vanderhoof, 45 Minn. 31, 47 N.W. 396; Putnam v. City of St. Paul, 75 Minn. 514, 78 N.W. 90; Johnson v. Harrison, 47 Minn. 575, 50 N.W. 923, 28 Am. St. 382; State v. Board of Control, 85 Minn. 165, 88 N.W. 533; Merchants Nat. Bank v. City of East Grand Forks, 94 Minn. 246, 102 N.W. 703; State v. Bridgeman & Russell Co. 117 Minn. 186, 134 N.W. 496, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 41. "The title to a statute is sufficient if it is not used as a cloak for legislating upon dissimilar matters and the subjects embraced in the enacting clause are naturally connected with the subject expressed in its title." Winters v. City of Duluth, 82 Minn. 127, 84 N.W. 788. "The insertion in a law of matters which may not be verbally indicated by the title, if suggested by it, or connected with, or proper to the more full accomplishment of, the object so indicated, is held to be in accordance with its spirit." State v. Kinsella, 14 Minn. 395 (524). "To constitute duplicity of subject, an act must embrace two or more dissimilar and discordant subjects that by no fair intendment can be considered as having any legitimate connection with or relation to each other. All that is necessary is that the act should embrace some one general subject; and by this is meant, merely, that all matters treated of should fall under some one general idea, be so connected with or related to each other, either logically or in popular understanding, as to be parts of, or germane to, one general subject." Johnson v. Harrison, 47 Minn. 575, 50 N.W. 923, 28 Am. St. 382.

To the same general effect are the following:

State v. Board of Control, 85 Minn. 165, 88 N.W. 533, in which numerous authorities are cited; First Nat. Bank v. How, 65 Minn. 187, 67 N.W. 994; State v. Board of Co. Commrs. of Red Lake County, 67 Minn. 352, 69 N.W. 1083; Ek v. St. Paul Permanent Loan Co. 84 Minn. 245, 87 N.W. 844; Lien v. Board of Co. Commrs. of Norman County, 80 Minn. 58, 82 N.W. 1094; Gaare v. Board of Co. Commrs. of Clay County, 90 Minn. 530, 97 N.W. 422; State v. Leland, 91 Minn. 321, 98 N.W. 92; State v. Boehm, 92 Minn. 374, 100 N.W. 95; Atwell v. Parker, 93 Minn. 462, 101 N.W. 946; State v. Bridgeman & Russell Co. 117 Minn. 186, 134 N.W. 496, Ann. Cas. 1913 D, 41; City of Crookston v. Board of Co. Commrs. of Polk County, 79 Minn. 283, 82 N.W. 586, 79 Am. St. 453; City of Duluth v. Abrahamson, 96 Minn. 39, 104 N.W. 682; State v. Sharp, 121 Minn. 381, 141 N.W. 526.

In Tuttle v. Strout, 7 Minn. 374 (465), 82 Am. Dec. 108, the title, "An act for a homestead exemption" was held sufficiently suggestive to satisfy the constitutional requirement, although the act also embraced exemptions of personal property.

In Boyle v. Vanderhoof, 45 Minn. 31, 47 N.W. 396, the title, "An act to fix the amount of wages of laborers exempt from process of attachments, garnishments, or execution," was held sufficient to sustain an act exempting a specified amount of the wages of any person from such process.

In Putnam v. City of St. Paul, 75 Minn. 514, 78 N.W. 90, an act reorganizing the school system of the city of St. Paul and establishing the city as an independent school district took the power of levying taxes for school purposes from the school officers and conferred it upon the city council, without making any reference thereto in the title. The court held that raising money for school purposes was germane to the subject of the act, and the method by which it was accomplished was a mere detail.

In Winters v. City of Duluth, 82 Minn. 127, 84 N.W. 788, the expression, "for damages to persons injured on streets and other public grounds," in the title of an act relating to actions against municipalities, was held broad enough to apply to an injury received in the machinery of the pumping station.

In Board of Supervisors of Ramsey County v. Heenan, 2 Minn. 281 (330), the title, "A bill for an act to provide for township organizations," was held sufficient, although the act also provided the manner in which counties should be governed. The court saying: "It is true that this act, in the technical sense, does embrace more than one subject, and but one is expressed in its title; yet so intimately blended are they in the popular understanding, and so inseparable by general custom and adoption, that although the technical sense may bring it within the letter of the Constitution, it leaves it entirely without the spirit. There is no attempt at fraud, or the interpolation of matter foreign to the subject expressed in the title, but an honest effort to create a system of town, and through the town, county government, similar to that of other states. What is not within the spirit of a law, is not within the law, although within the letter of it."

In Gillitt v. McCarthy, 34 Minn. 318, 25 N.W. 637, "An act to regulate the foreclosure of real estate," was held sufficient to include the matter of redeeming from execution sales.

In First Nat. Bank of Shakopee v. How, 65 Minn. 187, 67 N.W. 994, under the title, "to provide for incorporation and regulation of co-operative or assessment life, endowment and casualty insurance associations," a provision exempting the money to be paid to beneficiaries from seizure by execution or other process for debt was held proper.

In State v. Board of Commrs. of Red Lake County, 67 Minn. 352, 69 N.W. 1083, under the title, "An act to provide for the creation and organization of new counties and government of the same," provisions for the organization of towns and school districts, and for the division of existing indebtedness between the old and new counties was held proper.

In State v. Board of Control, 85 Minn. 165, 88 N.W. 533, under the title, "An act to create a state board of control, and to provide for the management and control of the charitable, reformatory and penal institutions of the state," it was held proper to include the state normal schools.

In Gaare v. Board of Co. Commrs. of Clay County, 90 Minn. 530, 97 N.W. 422, under the title, "An act to create a board of state drainage commissioners and prescribe its duties," it was held proper to require the board of county commissioners to make repairs upon the ditches established by the drainage board and to pay therefor out of the county funds.

In State v. Leland, 91 Minn. 321, 98 N.W. 92, the expression, "relating to receiving deposits in insolvent banks,"...