State v. Perkins, 23520

Decision Date30 October 1991
Docket NumberNo. 23520,23520
Citation412 S.E.2d 385,306 S.C. 353
CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court
PartiesThe STATE, Respondent, v. William Gregory PERKINS and Deborah Gail Barnette, Appellants. . Heard

James B. King, Anderson, for appellants.

Asst. Sol. David F. Stoddard, Anderson, for respondent.

GREGORY, Chief Justice:

Appellants were convicted in magistrate's court of public disorderly conduct pursuant to S.C.Code Ann. § 16-17-530(a) (1985). The circuit court affirmed the convictions. We reverse.

The record indicates the following facts. Appellants went to the Anderson County Sheriff's Office to obtain an incident report regarding an altercation they had with other individuals earlier that day. They needed the incident report in order to obtain a warrant from the magistrate. An employee at the sheriff's office told appellants the report was not yet available. Appellants then "became upset and raised their voices." They were arrested as they were attempting to leave the sheriff's office.

Section 16-17-530(a) provides:

Any person who shall (a) be found on any highway or at any public place or public gathering in a grossly intoxicated condition or otherwise conducting himself in a disorderly or boisterous manner ... shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor.... (Emphasis added).

Appellants challenge the underscored statutory provision as unconstitutionally overbroad under the First Amendment when applied to them.

"[T]he First Amendment protects a significant amount of verbal criticism and challenge directed at police officers." City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 461, 107 S.Ct. 2502, 2505, 96 L.Ed.2d 398, 412 (1987). The State may not punish a person for voicing an objection to a police officer where no "fighting words" are used. Norwell v. Cincinnati, 414 U.S. 14, 94 S.Ct. 187, 38 L.Ed.2d 170 (1973). To punish only spoken words addressed to a police officer, a statute must be limited in scope to fighting words that "by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace." Hill, 482 U.S. at 461-462, 107 S.Ct. at 2509-10, 96 L.Ed.2d at 412 (quoting Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 94 S.Ct. 970, 39 L.Ed.2d 214 (1974). As further noted by the United States Supreme Court, the "fighting words" exception may require narrow application in cases involving words addressed to a police officer "because a properly trained officer may reasonably be expected to exercise a higher degree of restraint than the average citizen." Hill, 482 U.S. at 462, 107 S.Ct. at 2510, 96 L.Ed.2d at 412. As stated by the high court:

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11 cases
  • Barnett v. Johnson
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York
    • December 10, 1993
    ... ... state, including any borrowing statute, to determine the timeliness of a claim. In re Agent Orange ... ...
  • City of Landrum v. Sarratt
    • United States
    • South Carolina Court of Appeals
    • November 18, 2002
    ...In State v. Perkins, our supreme court concluded a conviction under section 16-17-530 required more than raised voices. 306 S.C. 353, 355, 412 S.E.2d 385, 386 (1991). Without fighting words, the defendants in Perkins could not be convicted. Id. Likewise, in State v. Pittman, this court stat......
  • State v. Bouye, 24577
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • December 4, 1996
    ...particular situation in the case at hand would infringe on some constitutional right held by the actor. See, e.g., State v. Perkins, 306 S.C. 353, 412 S.E.2d 385 (1991) (disorderly conduct statute was unconstitutionally applied to defendant not because he did not engage in conduct prohibite......
  • Jackson v. City of Abbeville
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • December 12, 2005
    ...the level of `fighting words' as required by Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 107 S.Ct. 2502, 96 L.Ed.2d 398 (1987) and State v. Perkins, 306 S.C. 353, 412 S.E.2d 385 (1991)." The resisting arrest charge was also dismissed, apparently on the belief that the dismissal of the underlying charge ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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