State v. Peterson

• Decision Date: 16 May 2016
• Docket Number: A15-1782
• Parties: State of Minnesota, Appellant, v. Coleen Joy Peterson, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals

State of Minnesota, Appellant, v. Coleen Joy Peterson, Respondent.

A15-1782

STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS

May 16, 2016

This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).

Reversed and remanded

Larkin, Judge

Concurring specially, Rodenberg, Judge

Clearwater County District Court

File No. 15-CR-14-379

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Richard C. Mollin, Clearwater County Attorney, Jason P. Steck, Assistant County Attorney, Bagley, Minnesota (for appellant)

Mark D. Nyvold, Fridley, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Hooten, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Rodenberg, Judge.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

LARKIN, Judge

In this pretrial appeal, the state challenges the district court's exclusion of a confidential reliable informant's testimony as a sanction for discovery violations. Because the sanction is based on the erroneous conclusion that the state failed to preserve evidence and inappropriate consideration of the prosecution's alleged discovery violations in unrelated cases, we reverse and remand.

FACTS

In September 2014, appellant State of Minnesota charged respondent Coleen Joy Peterson with fourth-degree controlled-substance crime after she sold methamphetamine to a confidential reliable informant (CRI) during a controlled buy. Peterson made a discovery request seeking information regarding the identity of the CRI, the CRI's communications with law enforcement, and any agreements between the CRI and law enforcement regarding promises or consideration for the CRI's participation in the controlled buys.

Over the course of approximately six months, the discovery process revealed the CRI's identity, as well as the following information.¹ The CRI had previously cooperated with the Paul Bunyan Drug Task Force (task force). Prior to the controlled buys in this case, the CRI was arrested and charged with second-degree driving while impaired (DWI), while on felony-level probation. While the CRI was in jail following the DWI arrest, sheasked to speak with a narcotics agent. Officer Ryan Solee met with the CRI in jail, and the CRI offered to cooperate with the task force in exchange for leniency in her pending criminal cases. On March 4, 2014, the CRI's probation officer authored a report recommending that the CRI's probation be revoked and her sentence be executed if she were to be convicted of the new DWI offense. On March 12, the CRI pleaded guilty to the DWI charge, and, pursuant to the joint recommendation of the parties, the district court deferred disposition and released the CRI from custody. On March 17, the CRI met with Officer Solee and Officer Ryan Pierre. In his report regarding that meeting, Officer Solee wrote that "[the CRI] advised that she wanted to become a confidential informant for the Paul Bunyan Drug Task Force again." On March 20, the CRI made two controlled buys from Peterson.² On April 9, the CRI appeared for a hearing on her pending criminal cases. The state recommended a probationary disposition on the new DWI conviction and reinstatement of the CRI's felony-level probation with no additional consequences. The district court followed the state's recommendation.

Peterson demanded that the state disclose the terms of any agreement between the CRI and the state regarding consideration for her participation in the controlled buys from Peterson. The prosecutor originally informed defense counsel that he thought there was an express agreement between the CRI and law enforcement regarding consideration for herparticipation.³ Later, the prosecutor indicated that he was mistaken and insisted that there was not a record of any express agreement for consideration between law enforcement and the CRI or between the prosecution and the CRI. The prosecutor submitted a letter from Officer Solee, summarizing the substance of his oral communications with the CRI as follows:

[T]he initial contact was made by [the CRI]. She was in custody at the Clearwater County Jail for a D.W.I. offense and had requested to speak with a narcotics agent. She was looking for sentencing consideration for her offense, and for the probation violation that would follow.

Peterson's investigator interviewed Officer Solee about the CRI's controlled buys. Peterson disclosed the investigator's notes from the interview, which indicate that "[t]he CRI had been incarcerated on separate charges and was seeking sentencing consideration," the "CRI identified Coleen Peterson early on as someone the CRI knew was involved in narcotics," Officer Solee "told [the] CRI if the opportunity presented itself to give him a call," Officer Solee believed that the CRI either called him or texted him that day and told him "'[h]ey, it's on,'" and he remembered the events "unfolding rather quickly that day."

On July 14, 2015, Peterson moved the district court to sanction the state for discovery violations. Specifically, Peterson asked the district court to exclude the CRI's testimony at trial, arguing that the state failed to provide "critical and necessary evidence relating to the credibility of [the CRI]" by failing to disclose information "confirming whether [the CRI] received any consideration in exchange for her work for lawenforcement." The district court granted the request for sanctions, ruling that the CRI's testimony would not be allowed at trial.

DECISION

I.

The state may appeal from "any pretrial order" so long as "the district court's alleged error, unless reversed, will have a critical impact on the outcome of the trial." Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.04, subds. 1(1), 2(1). "[A] pretrial order will only be reversed if the state demonstrates clearly and unequivocally that the [district] court has erred in its judgment and that, unless reversed, the error will have a critical impact on the outcome of the trial." State v. Underdahl, 767 N.W.2d 677, 681 (Minn. 2009) (quotation omitted). "The critical impact requirement has evolved into a threshold issue, so that in the absence of critical impact we will not review a pretrial order." Id. (quotations omitted).

Peterson concedes that the district court's exclusion of the CRI's testimony satisfies the critical-impact standard. Because it appears that the CRI is the only eyewitness to the charged offense, we agree that the exclusion of the CRI's testimony would have a critical impact on the outcome of the trial. The district court's pretrial discovery sanction is therefore reviewable on appeal.

II.

"The imposition of sanctions for violations of discovery rules and orders is a matter particularly suited to the judgment and discretion of the [district] court. Accordingly, [appellate courts] will not overturn its ruling absent a clear abuse of discretion." State v. Patterson, 587 N.W.2d 45, 50 (Minn. 1998) (quotation omitted). However, "[p]reclusionof evidence is a severe sanction which should not be lightly invoked." State v. Lindsey, 284 N.W.2d 368, 374 (Minn. 1979). The district court abuses its discretion if it misinterprets or misapplies the law. Johnson v. State, 733 N.W.2d 834, 836 (Minn. App. 2007), review denied (Minn. Sept. 18, 2007).

The district court's discovery sanction is based on its conclusions that the state failed to preserve evidence regarding whether the CRI was promised or given consideration for her cooperation, failed to make a reasonable and diligent effort to respond to discovery requests, and failed to respond to some discovery requests. The district court also concluded that these discovery violations caused defense counsel to expend unnecessary time obtaining discovery. We address the alleged discovery violations in turn.

Failure to Preserve Evidence

The first basis for the district court's discovery sanction is its conclusion that "[t]he state failed to preserve evidence regarding whether [the CRI] was promised or given consideration for her cooperation." A defendant's due-process right to a fair trial is violated by the state's destruction of potentially useful evidence when the defendant can show that the state destroyed the evidence in bad faith. See State v. Hawkinson, 829 N.W.2d 367, 369 (Minn. 2013). This rule stems from the United States Supreme Court's holdings in California v. Trombetta and Arizona v. Youngblood. See id. at 371-72 (discussing California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 104 S. Ct. 2528 (1984), and Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 109 S. Ct. 333 (1988)).

In Trombetta, the United States Supreme Court considered, for the first time, "the government's duty to take affirmative steps to preserve evidence on behalf of criminaldefendants" and held that the state's constitutional duty to preserve evidence is "limited to evidence that might be expected to play a significant role in the suspect's defense." 467 U.S. at 486, 488, 104 S. Ct. at 2533, 2534. Later, in Youngblood, the United States Supreme Court held that "unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law." 488 U.S. at 58, 109 S. Ct. at 337. The Court noted its "unwillingness to read the 'fundamental fairness' requirement of the Due Process Clause as imposing on the police an undifferentiated and absolute duty to retain and to preserve all material that might be of conceivable evidentiary significance in a particular prosecution." Id. (citation omitted).

The failure-to-preserve-evidence caselaw generally involves situations in which physical evidence was lost or destroyed. See, e.g., Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 52, 109 S. Ct. at 334 (semen samples); Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 481, 104 S. Ct. at 2530 (breath samples); State v. Jenkins, 782 N.W.2d 211, 235-36 (Minn. 2010) (GPS data from taxicab, wallet, pair of shoes, car, pants, blood evidence on gun, biological material on bullets and bullet fragments); State v. McDonough, 631 N.W.2d 373, 387 (Minn. 2001) (car, information recorded in caller ID box). But...