State v. Pineda

• Citation: 712 A.2d 858
• Decision Date: 21 April 1998
• Docket Number: No. 97-282-M,97-282-M
• Parties: STATE v. Luis PINEDA. P.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island

Page 858

712 A.2d 858

STATE v. Luis PINEDA.

No. 97-282-M.P.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

April 21, 1998.

Annie Goldberg, Aaron L. Weisman, Providence, for Plaintiff.

Andrew Horwitz, Bristol, David S. Slepkow, for Defendant.

Before WEISBERGER C.J., and LEDERBERG, BOURCIER, FLANDERS and GOLDBERG, JJ.

OPINION

GOLDBERG, Justice.

This case is before the court on the petition of Luis Pineda (Pineda) for certiorari. Pineda seeks review of a decision of an Appeals Panel (appeals panel) of the Administrative Adjudication Court (AAC) in which the court affirmed the decision of the administrative judge's finding that Pineda had refused to submit to a chemical test in violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1. Pineda asserts several points of error with respect to the decision and urges this court to reverse the appeals panel. For the reasons set forth below, we deny Pineda's petition and affirm the holding of the appeals panel. The facts insofar as are pertinent to this petition are as follows. ¹

On September 27, 1996, a Pawtucket police officer, traveling in a marked police cruiser on Lonsdale Avenue in Pawtucket, Rhode Island, heard what he believed was a car running on a flat tire. The automobile, which was in fact operating on a blown tire and was being driven by Pineda, passed the officer's car, nearly hitting it as it went by. Accordingly the officer stopped the motor vehicle and subsequently asked Pineda for his license and registration. While waiting for Pineda to produce the requested materials, the officer detected an odor of alcohol emanating from him and noticed his bloodshot eyes. The officer ultimately requested that Pineda step out of the vehicle, and upon doing so, Pineda stumbled and fell against his car. He then proceeded to fail the field sobriety tests administered by the officer. As a result the officer advised Pineda of his rights from the Rights for Use at the Scene form, placed him in custody, and took him to the station for processing.

While enroute to the station, Pineda fell asleep in the rear of the police cruiser. Upon arriving at the station, Pineda was awakened, removed from the vehicle, and transported into the police station where he continued to have difficulty staying awake. The officer then read the Rights for Use at the Station form to Pineda, who was unable or unwilling to sign it. Thereafter, Pineda agreed to submit to a chemical breath test. Pineda did not, however, successfully complete the test, failing to provide a sufficient breath sample after two attempts to do so. On the basis of his inability to submit an adequate breath sample, Pineda was charged with refusal to submit to a chemical test in violation of § 31-27-2.1. He was also charged with driving under the influence of liquor in violation of § 31-27-2.

The driving under the influence charge was tried in Sixth Division District Court. Although no record of this proceeding has been submitted for review, Pineda places great reliance on the outcome of this trial. Apparently a judgment of acquittal entered at the conclusion of the case, based upon the failure of the prosecution to establish its compliance with § 31-27-3. This section affords a person arrested and charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of drugs or alcohol the right to be examined at his or her own expense by a physician selected by that person and requires the arresting officer "immediately [to] inform the person of this right and afford the person a reasonable opportunity to exercise the same." Id. At the individual's subsequent trial on the driving under the influence charge, the prosecution must prove that the accused "was so informed and was afforded that opportunity." Id. In this case, the only evidence of said finding, however, consists of an undated order entitled "Findings of Fact" that Pineda has filed with this court. This order reads in its entirety as follows:

"After a full trial on the merits in this case, the Court finds that the state failed to establish its compliance with section 31-27-3 of the Rhode Island General Laws for the purposes of this trial. For that reason the court granted [sic ] the Defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal [sic ]." (Emphasis added.)

Subsequently, on January 13, 1997, a hearing was held at the AAC on the charge of refusal to submit to a chemical test. At such a hearing the state must once again demonstrate its compliance with § 31-27-3 in order to sustain a finding under § 31-27-2.1. ² Therefore, Pineda sought a pretrial ruling that the state be collaterally estopped from relitigating its compliance with § 31-27-3, ostensibly on the basis of the so-called "Findings of Fact." Pineda argued that the state had a full and fair opportunity to litigate this issue at the criminal trial in the District Court and that both the state and the AAC judge were bound by this determination. The administrative judge denied the motion and proceeded to conduct a hearing on the merits, at the conclusion of which he sustained the refusal charge.

Pineda appealed both the prehearing ruling on the estoppel issue and the decision on the merits to an appeals panel of the AAC. In a written decision the appeals panel affirmed the administrative judge on all issues. Pineda then petitioned this court for a writ of certiorari, which we granted.

In his petition Pineda asserts several points of error, claiming (1) that the evidence produced at the hearing demonstrates that Pineda did submit to the breathalyzer tests because the breathalyzer printouts, which read "deficient sample," are in and of themselves insufficient to prove that Pineda did not submit to the test, (2) that Pineda was not fully informed of his rights because he was asleep at the time the rights were administered to him, and (3) that the state was collaterally estopped from relitigating its compliance with § 31-27-3 because the issue had previously been decided in the Sixth Division District Court.

We are cognizant of the fact that issues raised by Pineda in this petition are matters of great import that have yet to be addressed by this court. Specifically the issue of the conduct necessary to sustain a refusal charge pursuant to § 31-27-2.1--where the defendant allegedly submits to the test but fails to produce a sufficient breath sample for adequate testing--is one of first impression. Likewise, the question of the applicability of the doctrine of collateral estoppel in refusal hearings at the AAC in the face of a failure of proof on a condition precedent in a like proceeding in the District Court is an important issue in need of clarification. ³ Nevertheless, a majority of the justices of this court decline to reach these important questions on the basis of the record before us. We conclude that the record on appeal is devoid of the requisite findings and the evidentiary rulings of both the AAC judge and the District Court judge so as to preclude any meaningful review of the issues raised in this petition. To attempt to resolve these important questions on the state of the record before us would require inference and supposition.

Rule 10(b)(1) of the Supreme Court Rules of Procedure provides that within ten days after filing the notice of the appeal the appellant

"shall order from the reporter a transcript of such parts of the proceedings not already on file as the appellant deems necessary for inclusion in the record. Unless the entire transcript is to be included, the appellant shall, within the time above provided, file and serve on the appellee a description of the parts of the transcript which the appellant intends to include in the record and a statement of the specific points upon which he or she intends to rely on the appeal. If the appellee deems a transcript of other parts of the proceedings to be necessary the appellee shall immediately order such parts from the reporter or procure an order from the trial court requiring appellant to do so. The ordering and payment of the copies of the transcript shall be in accordance with the rules of the trial court."

This court has previously stated that the failure to comply with this requirement may result in a dismissal of the appeal. See In re Kimberly and James, 583 A.2d 877, 879 (R.I.1990) (failure to order a transcript precludes meaningful review by the court); State v. Jennings, 117 R.I. 291, 294, 366 A.2d 543, 545 (1976) (party seeking court's review must provide so much of the record as required to allow court to pass upon alleged error, otherwise court must affirm trial judge's holdings).

The only record submitted to this court by Pineda consists of a transcript of the hearing at the AAC, which he prepared. There is no stenographic record of the District Court proceedings and the "Findings of Fact" statement prepared by Pineda and signed by the trial judge is wholly inadequate. This order merely states that the court found that the state failed to establish its compliance with § 31-27-3 for purposes of that trial and therefore granted the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal. More importantly we are without a transcript of the pretrial hearing before the AAC judge on Pineda's motion to estop the state from relitigating its compliance with § 31-27-3. Thus we have absolutely no way of reviewing the decision of the hearing judge with respect to this issue. On the state of the record before us, we therefore have no alternative but to dismiss the petition and affirm the decision of the appeals panel.

Even were we to overlook the glaring defects in this record and assent to an analysis of the issues raised by Pineda, his petition suffers from other procedural infirmities that preclude our review of the case. Pineda's first two arguments, that there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate a refusal and that he was not adequately informed of his rights because he was asleep at the time they were being administered, are based on various constitutional and policy...