State v. Plyler
| Decision Date | 10 November 1910 |
| Citation | 69 S.E. 269,153 N.C. 630 |
| Parties | STATE v. PLYLER. |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Superior Court, Union County; W. R. Allen, Judge.
Charles B. Plyler, George Mayhew, and John McManus were indicted for murder. The defendant McManus was acquitted. The court below has now under advisement a motion to set aside the verdict as to defendant Mayhew as being against the weight of the evidence. The defendant Plyler was convicted and sentenced to death. From the judgment of the court, he appeals. Affirmed.
In a prosecution for homicide evidence that, on the night accused surrendered to the officers, he went to witness' house about 1 o'clock a.m., awakened witness, and wanted to talk about the shooting, telling witness he did not do the shooting, but knew who did, but did not want to tell for fear of what the person would do to him, etc., was admissible.
Adams & Armfield, J. J. Parker, and Williams, Lemmond & Love, for appellant.
The Attorney General and George L. Jones, for the State.
1. The prisoner excepted to the refusal of the court below to remove the cause for trial to some adjoining county. As admitted in the brief of the learned counsel for the prisoner, it has been repeatedly decided by this court that a motion to remove is almost always a matter within the sound discretion of the nisi prius judge and not reviewable here. Pell's Revisal 1908, § 426, and cases cited. We find nothing in the record which takes this case out of the general rule.
2. The prisoner excepts to the ruling of the court permitting the introduction of evidence by the state tending to prove that not long before the homicide the deceased had been called out on the piazza of his residence at night, shot at, and wounded, as contended by prisoner, by an unknown person. The prisoner's contention is evidently based upon the theory that there is no evidence connecting the prisoner with this particular affair. Upon that theory the authorities cited by the learned counsel support the objection to the evidence. In this case, however, there is abundant evidence, which, if believed, tends to prove not only that the deceased was shot on the occasion in question, but that the prisoner either did the shooting himself, or was present in person aiding and abetting it. The witness Richardson testified that the prisoner, just before the shooting occurred, said to witness The same witness said he was at deceased's house the night when the shooting occurred, and that he recognized defendant outside by his voice. Again, he testified that on another occasion, while defendant was talking to him about Carter, he (defendant) said: In addition to this, the record shows other matters tending to connect the defendant with the first shooting, amply sufficient to convict him of the crime if he had been indicted for it.
It early became necessary for the protection of society that courts should permit the evidence of circumstances to establish the guilt of persons accused of crime. For this purpose many independent facts are permitted to be proven, which taken collectively point to a certain conclusion. It has been well said: "Where the particular fact offered to be proved is equally consistent with the existence or nonexistence of the fact sought to be inferred from it, then the evidence can raise no presumption either way and should be excluded." Rodman, J., in State v. Vinson, 63 N.C. 335; State v. Brantley, 84 N.C. 769. If there was nothing to connect the prisoner with this particular shooting testified to by Richardson, it would be a collateral fact from which no inference could reasonably be drawn injurious to the prisoner, and would therefore be incompetent. But when this extraneous crime has been brought home to the prisoner, then the fact becomes competent, because it is much more consistent with his guilt, than it is with his innocence, of the crime of shooting the same person a short while after. State v. Alston, 94 N.C. 932; 1 Wharton, Crim. Law, §§ 631-670. A previous attempt by the prisoner to assassinate his victim is very potent evidence of the quo animo, the motive, and of a fixed purpose to take the life of the deceased. There are a number of illustrative cases cited in Lawson on Presumptive Ev. p. 589, directly in point, some of which we cite: V. is indicted for shooting at P. with intent to kill. Proof that V. at a previous time had shot at P. is relevant. R. v. Voke, R. & R. 531. A. was indicted for poisoning his wife by giving her laudanum. The fact that A. had on a former occasion given her laudanum, which made her sick, is relevant. Johnson v. State, 17 Ala. 622. In the case of Rex v. Dorset, 2 C. & K. 306, defendant was charged with having willfully set fire to a haystack. The fact that, on a previous day, the rick was seen to be on fire, and the defendant to be near it, was held relevant. While the cases cited by counsel for prisoner recognize the general rule that evidence of a distinct substantive offense cannot be admitted in support of another offense, they also recognize the exceptions within which the fact sought to be proved in this case clearly falls.
3. Prisoner excepted to evidence of a declaration made to P. P W. Plyler, who testified that prisoner came to his house about 1 o'clock on the night that he gave himself up to the officers and said he wanted to talk some about the case. He said "he did not do the shooting, but he knew who did it, and did not want to tell it for fear of what the man would do to him if they did not put him where he could not get to him; that he said he would kill him if he told, and he was a dangerous man." This was both relevant and competent. The fact that the defendant went at 1 o'clock and waked witness and wanted to talk about the shooting was conduct on the part of the defendant which the jury was entitled to consider along with the other evidence. "Everything calculated to elucidate the transaction is admissible, since the conclusion depends upon the number of links, which alone are weak, but taken together are strong and able to...
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