State v. Pocklington
| Decision Date | 13 January 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 2 CA-CR 2016-0280-PR,2 CA-CR 2016-0280-PR |
| Parties | THE STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent, v. WEYLIN JAMES POCKLINGTON, Petitioner. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24.
Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Pima County
The Honorable Carmine Cornelio, Judge
REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED
Barbara LaWall, Pima County Attorney
By Jacob R. Lines, Deputy County Attorney, Tucson
Counsel for Respondent
Dean Brault, Pima County Legal Defender
By Joy Athena, Deputy Legal Defender, Tucson
Counsel for Petitioner
Judge Miller authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Vásquez and Chief Judge Eckerstrom concurred.
¶1 Weylin Pocklington seeks review of the trial court's summary denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, filed pursuant to Rule 32, Ariz. R. Crim. P. For the following reasons, we grant review, but we deny relief.
¶2 Pursuant to a plea agreement, Pocklington was convicted of failure of a person required to register as a sex offender to give notice of his change of residence. See A.R.S. §§ 13-3822, 13-3824. The trial court sentenced him to a mitigated, one-year prison term. Pocklington filed a timely notice of post-conviction relief and, in the petition that followed, claimed he was convicted in violation of his constitutional rights, including his right to the effective assistance of counsel.
¶3 Relying on A.R.S. § 13-3821(D) and (F), Pocklington argued his duty to register as a sex offender, imposed when he was a juvenile, "ended when he turned 25 years of age,"1 notwithstanding his previous conviction, as an adult, for a registration offense. See § 13-3821(A)(19) (). He maintained § 13-3821 is "[a]t best" ambiguous and should be resolved in his favor under the rule of lenity. In the alternative, he argued construing the statute to impose a lifetime obligation to register as a sex offender based on a "mere failure to register" between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five wouldviolate his due process and equal protection rights under the United States Constitution. Finally, he maintained trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise these arguments. The trial court summarily denied relief, and this petition for review followed.
¶4 In 1996, Pocklington, then thirteen, was adjudicated delinquent for sexual conduct with a minor. The juvenile court placed him on probation in December 1996, and, on March 5, 1997, ordered him to register as a sex offender.
¶5 As an adult, Pocklington pleaded guilty to a registration violation committed in January 2007 and to a separate registration violation committed in December 2007, each prior to his twenty-fifth birthday. Both convictions were pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-3822. He was sentenced to .75 years' incarceration for the first conviction and a two-year term of imprisonment for the second. In the instant case, Pocklington pleaded guilty to a registration violation based on his failure to timely register as a transient. See § 13-3822(A). He was thirty-two years old on the date of this offense.
¶6 We review a summary denial of post-conviction relief for an abuse of discretion. State v. Bennett, 213 Ariz. 562, ¶ 17, 146 P.3d 63, 67 (2006). Although we defer to a trial court's findings of fact, we review its legal conclusions de novo. State v. Denz, 232 Ariz. 441, ¶ 6, 306 P.3d 98, 101 (App. 2013). In his petition for review, Pocklington reasserts his claim that § 13-3821(A)(19), which effects a lifelong registration requirement upon conviction for a registration violation, does not "legally limit" other portions of the statute which provide that "[a]ny duty to register" based on a juvenile delinquency adjudication terminates "when the person reaches twenty-five years of age," § 13-3821(D), (F). In the alternative, he argues, as he did below, that applying the statute to extend his registration requirement to lifelong duration, based on "the non-sex offense" of failing to comply with registration requirements, violates his rights to due process and equal protection.
¶7 Although a pleading defendant waives the right to a direct appeal, see Ariz. R. Crim. P. 17.1(e), he retains a constitutional right to appellate review by way of the post-conviction relief afforded by Rule 32. See id.; see also Ariz. Const. art. II, § 24; Wilson v. Ellis, 176 Ariz. 121, 123, 859 P.2d 744, 746 (1993). Pursuant to Rule 32.1(a), he may seek relief on the ground that his guilty plea was not intelligent or voluntary, and was therefore "in violation of the Constitution of the United States or of the State of Arizona." See also Wilson, 176 Ariz. at 123, 859 P.2d at 746 (). "That right" of review "cannot be waived merely by a plea or admission." Wilson, 176 Ariz. at 123, 859 P.2d at 746; cf. State v. Johnson, 142 Ariz. 223, 224-25, 689 P.2d 166, 167-68 (1984) (); State v. Bishop, 139 Ariz. 567, 571, 679 P.2d 1054, 1058 (1984) (); State v. Ethington, 121 Ariz. 572, 573, 592 P.2d 768, 769 (1979) ().
¶8 Nonetheless, "[b]y entering a plea of guilty, the accused is not simply stating that he did the discrete acts described in the indictment; he is admitting guilt of a substantive crime." United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 570 (1989). Accordingly, as a general rule, "a guilty plea, intelligently and voluntarily made, bars the later assertion of constitutional challenges to the pretrial proceedings," Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283, 288 (1975), and a pleading defendant "may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea," Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973).
¶9 Rule 17.3, Ariz. R. Crim. P., like its federal counterpart, Rule 11, Fed. R. Crim. P., "is intended to produce a complete record at the time the plea is entered of the factors relevant to this voluntariness determination." State v. Carr, 112 Ariz. 453, 454-55, 543 P.2d 441, 442-43 (1975), quoting McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 465 (1969). In order to find a factual basis for the plea, asrequired by Rule 17.3, "[t]he judge must determine that the conduct which the defendant admits constitutes the offense charged in the indictment or information or an offense included therein to which the defendant has pleaded guilty." Id., quoting McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 467. Thus, Rule 17.3, like its federal counterpart considered in McCarthy, is "designed to assist the . . . judge in making the constitutionally required determination that a defendant's guilty plea is truly voluntary" and "to 'protect a defendant who is in the position of pleading voluntarily with an understanding of the nature of the charge but without realizing that his conduct does not actually fall within the charge.'" McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 465, 467, quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 advisory committee's note to 1966 amendment.
¶10 As the Supreme Court has explained, "[B]ecause a guilty plea is an admission of all the elements of a formal criminal charge, it cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant possesses an understanding of the law in relation to the facts." Id. at 466. Accordingly, our supreme court has held a conviction on a guilty plea "cannot be sustained unless there is a factual basis to support each of the elements of the crime to which the plea is made." Carr, 112 Ariz. at 455, 543 P.2d at 443.
¶11 We conclude Pocklington's first argument, that "§ 13-3821(A)(19) [does not] legally limit the application of § 13-3821(C)" is consistent with these authorities and so is cognizable under Rule 32.1(a). Although his claim requires us to engage in statutory construction, this is often the case when a defendant contends that a particular element of an offense, as defined by statute, is unsupported by a sufficient factual basis. For example, in Johnson, the defendant's plea agreement provided for sentence enhancement based on two historical prior felony convictions, but he informed the court that those convictions arose from a single incident, a fact that was not disputed by the state. 142 Ariz. at 224-25, 689 P.2d at 167-68. On appeal, he challenged the factual basis to enhance his sentence for two historical prior convictions, noting the statutory provision that "[c]onvictions for two or more offenses committed on the same occasion shall be counted as only one conviction for the purposes of" the repetitive offender sentencing provisions. Id., quoting 1978 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 201, § 101; see A.R.S. § 13-703(L). Reviewing therecord in light of this provision, our supreme court found "the trial court erred in finding a factual basis to support the allegation of two prior convictions available for use as enhancement," and it vacated the conviction, the order accepting the plea agreement, and the appellate court decision that found the argument had been waived. Id.
¶12 In essence, Pocklington similarly "attack[s] the factual or legal basis" for the plea, Wilson, 176 Ariz. at 123, 859 P.2d at 746, by arguing, based on the statutory construction he proposes, that he was not "a person who is required to register under [title 13, chapter 38, article 3]," § 13-3822(A), and so could not have violated § 13-3822. As addressed below, we are not persuaded by this argument.
¶13 "In addressing...
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