State v. Porter
Decision Date | 06 July 2015 |
Docket Number | No. 71801–1–I.,71801–1–I. |
Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Casey Fredrick PORTER, Appellant. |
Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
Steve Karimi, Attorney at Law, Seattle, WA, for Appellant.
Casey F. Porter Shoreline, WA, Appearing Pro Se.
Seth Aaron Fine, Attorney at Law, Mary Kathleen Webber, Snohomish County Prosecutors Office, Everett, WA, for Respondent.
¶ 1 An offender's date of discharge is the date the trial court receives notice that all sentence requirements have been satisfied. By December 18, 2008, the trial court had notice that Porter completed all of his sentence terms; however, he remained subject to a no-contact order, which expired on January 23, 2012. Porter petitioned the court for discharge after the expiration of his no-contact order. Accordingly, the trial court determined that his date of discharge was the date the no-contact order expired. For purposes of discharge, a no-contact order is not a sentence requirement. We reverse and remand for amendment of the certificate of discharge to reflect an effective date of December 18, 2008.
¶ 2 On December 11, 2006, Casey Porter pleaded guilty to one count of violation of a domestic violence court order. Porter was sentenced to six months confinement, 12 months of community custody, $500 in legal financial obligations (LFOs), and no contact with his ex-wife for five years. The no-contact order was entered on January 23, 2007. Porter's confinement began on February 1, 2007.
¶ 3 On July 1, 2007, Snohomish County Corrections notified the trial court that Porter had completed his term of confinement. On March 24, 2008, the Department of Corrections notified the trial court that Porter had completed his term of community custody. On December 18, 2008, the county clerk notified the trial court that Porter had paid his LFOs in full. On January 23, 2012, the no-contact order expired.
¶ 4 On April 13, 2013, Porter moved to vacate his conviction. The State responded that Porter was not yet discharged and thus had not met the requirements for vacating a conviction under RCW 9.94A.640. No further action was taken on Porter's motion to vacate.
¶ 5 On February 28, 2014, Porter petitioned the court for a certificate of discharge. The State agreed that discharge was proper, because Porter had satisfied all terms of his sentence. However, the parties disputed the effective date of discharge. Porter argued that, under RCW 9.94A.637(2), a no-contact order is a not a sentence requirement for purposes of discharge. Therefore, he asserted, the effective date was December 18, 2008, when the trial court had notice that he satisfied all actual terms of his sentence. The State argued that RCW 9.94A.637(2) requires an offender to seek a certificate of discharge while the no-contact order is still active. Because Porter did not do so, the State maintained that the effective date was January 23, 2012, when the no-contact order expired.
¶ 6 The trial court ruled in favor of the State and entered a certificate of discharge with the effective date of January 23, 2012. Porter appeals.
¶ 7 A certificate of discharge restores an offender's civil rights lost as a result of conviction. State v. Miniken, 100 Wash.App. 925, 927, 999 P.2d 1289 (2000). RCW 9.94A.637 sets forth the process by which an offender is discharged. When the trial court receives notice that an offender has completed all conditions of his sentence, the court must issue a certificate of discharge. RCW 9.94A.637(1). The effective date of discharge is the date the trial court receives notice that all sentence requirements have been satisfied. State v. Johnson, 148 Wash.App. 33, 39, 197 P.3d 1221 (2008).
¶ 8 In 2009, RCW 9.94A.637 was amended to include current subsection (2), which provides, in relevant part:
¶ 9 Here, Porter petitioned for a certificate of discharge after his no-contact order expired. We are asked to determine the effective date of discharge under these circumstances.
¶ 10 Statutory construction is a question of law that we review de novo. Stuckey v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 129 Wash.2d 289, 295, 916 P.2d 399 (1996). If a statute is unambiguous, the court does not engage in statutory construction; rather, the statute's meaning must be derived solely from its plain language. Rozner v. City of Bellevue, 116 Wash.2d 342, 347, 804 P.2d 24 (1991). If a statute is ambiguous, courts may “resort to statutory construction, legislative history, and relevant case law for assistance in discerning legislative intent.” Christensen v. Ellsworth, 162 Wash.2d 365, 373, 173 P.3d 228 (2007). “A statute is ambiguous if it can reasonably be interpreted in two or more ways, but it is not ambiguous simply because different interpretations are conceivable.” Berger v. Sonneland, 144 Wash.2d 91, 105, 26 P.3d 257 (2001).
¶ 11 The parties present two readings of RCW 9.94A.637, each focusing on subsection (2). Porter takes the position that, under RCW 9.94A.637(2)(a), a no-contact order is not a sentence requirement. Therefore, he asserts, his effective date of discharge was December 18, 2008, when the trial court had notice that all actual sentence requirements were completed. Under the State's interpretation of the statute, a no-contact order remains a sentence requirement until it expires or is replaced with a civil order under the petition process set forth in RCW 9.94A.637(2)(b). The State contends that, because Porter did not bring a(2)(b) petition prior to the expiration of his no-contact order, his date of discharge was January 23, 2012, when the no-contact order expired.
RCW 9.94A.637(6) (emphasis added); see alsoLaws of 2000, ch. 119, § 3. The plain language of this provision acknowledges an offender's ability to obtain a certificate of discharge notwithstanding a no-contact order. Necessarily, the legislature did not regard a no-contact order as a sentence requirement that must be satisfied to obtain a certificate of discharge. Therefore, the existence of a no-contact order in a judgment and sentence could not delay the effective date of discharge.
¶ 13 Subsection (6) was part of Engrossed Second Substitute Senate Bill 6400 (S.B. 6400), which was passed in March 2000 and became effective June 8, 2000.1 Engrossed Second Substitute S.B. 6400, 56th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash.2000); Laws of 2000, ch. 119, § 3. On May 30, 2000—before S.B. 6400 became effective—the Court of Appeals held that a no—contact order was a sentence requirement, and thus the trial court properly denied a request for discharge prior to the order's expiration. Miniken, 100 Wash.App. at 927, 999 P.2d 1289. The earlier version of the discharge statute considered in Miniken was silent as to whether a no-contact order was a sentence requirement. See former RCW 9.94A.220 (1994), recodified as RCW 9.94A.637 (Laws of 2001, ch. 10, § 6); see alsoLaws of 2000, ch. 119, § 3. The Miniken court noted that another provision of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, chapter 9.94A RCW, authorizes a sentencing court to enforce a no-contact order beyond an offender's term of community supervision or placement. 100 Wash.App. at 928, 999 P.2d 1289. Accordingly, the court reasoned, the legislature “necessarily intended that the sentencing court retain jurisdiction over the offender after he or she has met the supervision and placement requirements.” Id. at 928, 999 P.2d 1289. The court therefore concluded that “the no-contact order is properly characterized as a ‘requirement of the sentence’ and the sentencing court retains jurisdiction until the offender's completion of his or her sentence requirements.” Id. at 929, 999 P.2d 1289.
¶ 14 Miniken 's holding was premised on the concern that a certificate of discharge would render a no-contact order unenforceable. See id. at 928–29, 999 P.2d 1289. S.B. 6400 provided...
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State v. Hubbard
...is the date the court received notice that the offender has satisfied all conditions of his or her sentence. State v. Porter , 188 Wash. App. 735, 356 P.3d 207 (2015) ; State v. Johnson , 148 Wash. App. 33, 197 P.3d 1221 (2008).¶14 However, Hubbard argues that we should decline to follow Di......