State v. Posenfield
| Decision Date | 01 July 1910 |
| Citation | 111 Minn. 301,126 N.W. 1068 |
| Parties | STATE v. POSENFIELD et al. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Municipal Court of Minneapolis; C. L. Smith, Judge.
L. J. Rosenfield and others were convicted of permitting a person under 21 years old to remain in a dance house, and they appeal from an order denying a new trial. Affirmed.
The defendants were convicted of the offense of permitting, contrary to Rev. Laws 1905, s 4936, a person under the age of 21 years to be and remain in a dance house conducted by them. Held, that the statute is a proper exercise of the police power; that it is not class legislation; that a ‘dance house,’ as the term is used in the statute, is a place maintained for promiscuous and public dancing, the rule of admission to which is not based upon personal selection or invitation; that the complaint states a cause of action; that the trial court did not err in its instructions to the jury; and that the verdict is sustained by the evidence. Geo. W. Caldwell, for appellants.
Frank Healy and John A. Dahl, for the State.
The defendants were charged by complaint in the municipal court of the city of Minneapolis with the offense of permitting, on March 20, 1909, a person under the ege of 21 years to be and to remain in a dance house owned and managed by them. The prosecution was based upon Rev. Laws 1905, § 4936, which is as follows: ‘Whoever permits any person under the age of 21 years to be or remain in any dance house, concert saloon, place where intoxicating liquors are sold or given away, or in any place of entertainment injurious to the morals, and owned, kept and managed by him in whole or in part, * * * shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. * * *’ There was a trial by jury, and a verdict of guilty against each of the defendants, and they appealed from an order denying their motion for a new trial.
1. The first contention of the appellants is that the complaint does not charge a public offense. The here material allegations of the complaint are these: On March 20, 1909, within the corporate limits of the city of Minneapolis the defendants did unlawfully permit Marie O'Conners to be and to remain in the premises known as No. 401 Washington Avenue South, then being a dance hall owned, kept, and managed by them, and Marie O'Conners then being a person under the age of 21 years, to wit, of the age of 16 years, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided.
It is urged that the complaint does not in any way describe the character of the dance house, nor does it allege that it was a place injurious to morals; hence it does not charge a public offense, for the reason that the statute applies only to dance house in which intoxicating liquors are sold and to those which are injurious to morals. The statute cannot be so construed, for its express language makes it an offense to permit persons under the age of 21 years to be or remain in any one of the four specified places, namely, a dance house, a concert saloon, a place where intoxicating liquors are sold or given away, and any place of entertainment injurious to morals. If the offense be for permitting a minor to remain in a place other than a dance house or concert saloon, it is clear that the complaint must charge, either that intoxicating liquors were sold or given away at such place, or that the place was one injurious to morals. But it is clear from the language of the statute that dance houses and concert saloons are within its prohibition, whether or not in fact they are conducted in a manner injurious to morals. It is evident that the Legislature, in enacting the statute, was satisfied that the tendency of dance houses and concert saloons as ordinarily conducted was the corruption of youth, and in the exercise of the police power of the state it decided that, without reference to the manner in which they might be conducted, young persons should not be permitted to be or remain therein. It is true, as claimed by defendants' counsel in this connection, that the statute does not define a dance house; but in the absence of such a definition the term must be construed in accordance with its ordinary usage. So construing it, a dance house is a place maintained for promiscuous and public dancing, the rule of admission to which is not based upon personal selection or invitation. The gist of the offense as defined by the statute is the permitting of persons under 21 years of age to be or remain in a dance house. This is a sufficient definition of the offense. The complaint...
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State in Interest of K. V. N., In re
...for the protection of the public. State ex rel. Emerson v. Erickson, 159 Minn. 287, 198 N.W. 1000 (Sup.Ct.1924); State v. Rosenfield, 111 Minn. 301, 126 N.W. 1068 (Sup.Ct.1910). See Smith v. State, 444 S.W.2d 941 (Tex.Civ.App.1969), application for writ of error refused; R.R. v. State, 448 ......
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...is a valid legislative purpose in protecting society from those who would corrupt the morals of its youth. State v. Rosenfield, 111 Minn. 301, 303, 126 N.W. 1068, 29 L.R.A.,N.S., 331. A defendant cannot deny his guilt on the basis of ignorance of the age of a minor, especially where the sta......
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