State v. Elliott

• Decision Date: 08 December 1916
• Docket Number: No. 20138[7].,20138[7].
• Parties: STATE v. ELLIOTT et al.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

135 Minn. 89

160 N.W. 204

STATE

v.ELLIOTT et al.

No. 20138[7].

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Dec. 8, 1916.

Certified from District Court, Hennepin County; H. D. Dickinson, Judge.

J. K. Elliott and another were indicted for making false statements to obtain credit. Demurrer to indictment was overruled, and case certified. Affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court

A law is not invalid because its scope is not as broad or all-inclusive as its title indicates.

Chapter 431, Laws of 1909 (section 8901, G. S. 1913), entitled ‘An act to punish the making or use of false statements to obtain credit,’ does not contravene section 33 of article 4 of the state Constitution as being class legislation nor the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution, although the act is aimed at those only who make or use false statements to obtain credit from banks, savings banks, and trust companies. Lyndon A. Smith, Atty. Gen., and John M. Rees, Co. Atty., of Minneapolis, for the State.

Thomas, McCune & Wunderman, of Minneapolis, for defendants.

HOLT, J.

Chapter 431, Laws of 1909 (section 8901, G. S. 1913), entitled ‘An act to punish the making or use of false statements to obtain credit,’ is assailed as unconstitutional by this appeal. Upon overruling a demurrer to the indictment charging appellants with a violation of this statute, the court below certified the case to this court as one involving an important and doubtful question. However, the memorandum attached to the order overruling the demurrer clearly indicates that the learned trial court entertained no doubt whatever touching the validity of the act.

[1] No authorities need be adduced in support of the state's power to proscribe and punish the acts embraced in the title of this law. And counsel for appellants willingly concedes that no constitutional flaw could be found with the act were it as broad and comprehensive as its title. In fact, laws with a similar title, but penalizing the making or use of false statements to obtain credit or property without distinction as to the party from whom the credit or property is sought, are on the statute books of a majority, perhaps, of the states. But it is claimed that, because the body of the act here covers false statements only when made to banks, savings banks, or trust companies, it is repugnant to both state and federal constitutional provisions. No constitutional objection can be found in the mere fact that the title is more comprehensive than the scope of the act itself.

‘The fact that the title of an act is broader than the act itself does not render the enactment invalid under section 27, art. 4, of the Constitution.’ State v. Standard Oil Co., 111 Minn. 85, 126 N. W. 527.

[2] The main contention of appellant is that the statute is repugnant to section 33, art. 4, of the state Constitution, providing, ‘In all cases where a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted,’ and that it contravenes the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution, in that it abridges appellant's immunities and privileges and denies the equal protection of laws to persons similarily situated.

So long as the classification adopted by the Legislature is not clearly arbitrary or fanciful, there is no violation of section 33, art. 4 of the state Constitution. State v. Wise, 70 Minn. 99, 72 N. W. 843;State v. Petit, 74 Minn. 376, 77 N. W. 225, affirmed 177 U. S. 164, 20 Sup. Ct. 666, 44 L. Ed. 716;Phelan v. Terry, 101 Minn. 454, 112 N. W. 872;State v. Standard Oil Co., 111 Minn. 85, 126 N. W. 527;State v. Rosenfield, 111 Minn. 301, 126 N. W. 1068,29 L. R. A. (N. S.) 331;Majavis v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 121 Minn. 431, 141 N. W. 806;Mathison v. Minneapolis Street Ry. Co., 126 Minn. 286, 148 N. W. 71, L. R. A. 1916D, 412; and many cases cited in section 1675, Dunnell's Minn. Digest. Long ago this state placed banking institutions in a class by themselves in respect to many matters. Their business is regulated and supervised to an extent not attempted with other business. Their officers and directors are made amenable to severe punishments if the statutes relating to the conduct of banking business are violated. The protection of those who make use of banks-and that means practically all who do business or possess or need money-require the state to legislate and supervise banking institutions. Banks are repositories of public as well as private funds. Public interest demands that the state, for the purpose of regulating and supervising banking as a business, place it in a class by itself. How, then, can it be said that the state may not also place banks in a class separate from other business when the purpose is to afford them a protection against the misrepresentations by the use of which their funds may be depleted and their stability threatened?

Our statutes are not wanting in examples of classifications for the purpose of giving to those employed in a particular business protection, or for the protection of certain business against the fraudulent practices to which it might be subject. Section 9019, G. S. 1913, relating to the protection of motormen on electric cars against the inclemency of weather, was attacked as class legislation and therefore violative of section 33, art. 4, of the Constitution. The contention was overruled in State v. Smith, 58 Minn. 35, 59 N. W. 545,25 L. R. A. 759. For many years the law has existed protecting innkeepers against frauds. Section 8969, G. S. 1913. It was unsuccessfully assailed as unconstitutional in State v. Benson, 28 Minn. 424, 10 N. W. 471, but, fo course, not on the point now raised. Sections 9010, 9020, 9021, and 9025 prohibit and punish various acts only when perpetrated against railway companies. When compared with classifications that have been made by the Legislature and with those sustained by this court, we think the one now under consideration is neither arbitrary nor fanciful, but rather one for which good reasons may be adduced. It may well be that as good and cogent reasons exist for protecting all business against those who attempt to obtain credit by use of false statements, but these are to be adduced to the Legislature. The courts are not to undo the effect of a step of the Legislature to check an evil simply because two or three additional steps in the same direction were not also taken.

Under no possible view can the act be held to abridge any right, privilege, or immunity assured to appellants by the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution. No one may be heard to claim a moral or legal right or privilege to obtain a loan or credit by the use of falsehood. And it is difficult to appreciate the propriety of one charged with a punishable fraud making the defense that the law he has offended is invalid because it does not penalize the same fraud when perpetrated upon certain other parties who might have been covered by the law, but were not. Of course, a state may not by a criminal statute so glaringly discriminate in the protection given its own citizens, and denied others, as was attempted by the one held repugnant...