State v. Potter

• Decision Date: 15 May 1974
• Docket Number: No. 60,60
• Citation: 285 N.C. 238,204 S.E.2d 649
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. James Perry POTTER.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Page 649

204 S.E.2d 649

285 N.C. 238

STATE of North Carolina v. James Perry POTTER.

No. 60.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

May 15, 1974.

Atty. Gen. Robert Morgan, Asst. Atty. Gen. Myron C. Banks and Associate Atty. Norman L. Sloan, Raleigh, for the State.

Sasser, Duke & Brown by J. Thomas Brown, Jr., Goldsboro, for defendant-appellant.

James Perry Potter in pro. per.

BOBBITT, Chief Justice.

We consider first the assignment of error which challenges the court's ruling that defendant when arraigned and tried had sufficient mental capacity to plead to the indictments and to conduct a rational defense.

'In determining a defendant's capacity to stand trial, the test is whether he has the capacity to comprehend his position, to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to conduct his defense in a rational manner, and to cooperate with his counsel to the end that any available defense may be interposed.' 21 Am.Jur.2d, Criminal Law § 63 (1965); Accord, State v. Propst, 274 N.C. 62, 70, 161 S.E.2d 560, 566 (1968); State v. Jones, 278 N.C. 259, 266, 179 S.E.2d 433, 438 (1971); 2 Strong, N.C.Index 2d, Criminal Law § 29.

The uncontradicted evidence is to the effect that, when tested by the rule stated above, defendant had sufficient mental capacity to plead to the indictments and conduct a rational defense. Assuming, Arguendo, he had such mental capacity at the time of his arraignment and trial, defendant contends it was dependent upon his continued use of prescribed medication to control the psychotic symptoms of a paranoid schizophrenic. Defendant refers to mental capacity under these circumstances as 'synthetic sanity' and asserts such a person is mentally incapable of pleading to the indictment and conducting a rational defense.

The Supreme Court of Louisiana considered and rejected the precise contention now made by defendant. The Louisiana statute provided: 'Mental incapacity to proceed exists when, as a result of mental disease or defect, a defendant presently lacks the capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his defense.' In State v. Plaisance, 252 La. 212, 210 So.2d 323 (1968), and in State v. Hampton, 253 La. 399, 218 So.2d 311 (1969), the defendant asserted he was mentally incapable of pleading and of standing trial in that his 'sanity' was 'synthetic' because of circumstances closely analogous to those disclosed by the evidence in the present case. Speaking for the Supreme Court of Louisiana, Justice (now Chief Justice) Sanders, in Hampton, said:

'The test of present insanity under the above Article is whether the defendant Presently lacks the capacity to understand the proceedings or to assist in the defense. A defendant who is capable of understanding the nature and object of the proceedings and assisting rationally in the defense is competent to stand trial. (Citations omitted.)

'The members of the sanity commission were the only witnesses to testify at the hearing. In their opinion, defendant can understand the nature of the proceedings and assist in her defense. The record contains no evidence to the contrary. The psychotic symptoms are in remission. That this condition has resulted from the use of a prescribed tranquilizing medication is of no legal consequence. Under the codal test, the court looks to the condition only. It does not look beyond existing competency and erase improvement produced by medical science.' State v. Hampton, Supra, at 403, 218 So.2d at 312. Cf. State v. Hancock, 247 Or. 21, 426 P.2d 872 (1967); State v. Rand, 20 Ohio Misc. 98, 247 N.E.2d 342 (1969).

The sole question now under consideration is whether defendant was capable of pleading and standing trial at the time of his arraignment and trial. All the evidence tends to show he had sufficient mental capacity at that time to meet the prescribed test. Hence, the court's ruling was proper.

We consider now the assignment of error which challenges the court's denial of defendant's motion at the conclusion of all the evidence for judgment as in case of nonsuit. Defendant's position is based largely on the fact that his mental condition was diagnosed 'paranoid schizophrenia' and on Dr. Maynard's testimony (on Voir dire) that he knew of no cure for schizophrenia or paranoia, although both could be brought into remission by medication. The contention seems to be that a person who has the mental condition or disease disgnosed as 'paranoid schizophrenia' lacks legal responsibility for conduct which constitutes a violation of the criminal law when committed by a 'normal' person and therefore is not guilty as a matter of law.

In view of the recurrence of trials in which the mental condition of the defendant is diagnosed as 'schizophrenia' or 'paranoia' or 'paranoid schizophrenia,' we have set forth the evidence in greater detail to indicate the legal problems these cases present to the jury and to the court.

Defendant's contention that he is exempt from criminal responsibility as a matter of law by reason of mental disease ignores the well established legal test for determining whether a person is exempt from criminal responsibility by reason of insanity. In State v. Swink, 229 N.C. 123, 125, 47 S.E.2d 852, 853 (1948), Ervin, J., restated the rule in this jurisdiction as follows: '(A)n accused is legally insane and exempt from criminal responsibility by reason thereof if he commits an act which would otherwise be punishable as a crime, and at the time of so doing is laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as to be incapable of knowing the nature and quality of the act he is doing, or, if he does know this, incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong in relation to such act.' Subsequent dicisions in accord therewith include the following: State v. Creech, 229 N.C. 662, 674, 51 S.E.2d 348, 357 (1949); State v. Spence, 271 N.C. 23, 38, 155 S.E.2d 802, 814 (1967); State v. Jones, 278 N.C. 259, 266, 179 S.E.2d 433, 438 (1971); State v. Humphrey, 283 N.C. 570, 573--574, 196 S.E.2d 516, 518--519 (1973); State v. Helms, 284 N.C. 508, 513, 201 S.E.2d 850, 853--854 (1974). Insanity is incapacity, from disease of the mind, To know the nature and quality of one's act or to Distinguish between right and wrong in relation thereto. State v. Mercer, 275 N.C. 108, 117, 165 S.E.2d 328, 335 (1969); State v. Atkinson, 275 N.C. 288, 313--314, 167 S.E.2d 241, 256 (1969); 2 Strong's N.C.Index 2d, Criminal Law § 5.

When a defendant in a criminal case pleads insanity, the applicable rule with reference to the burden of proof on this issue has been well stated as follows: 'Since soundness of mind is the natural and normal condition of men, everyone is presumed to be sane until the contrary is made to appear. This presumption of sanity applies to persons charged with crime, but it is rebuttable. (Citations omitted.) These considerations give rise to the firmly established rule that the burden of proof upon a plea of insanity in a criminal case rests upon the accused who sets it up. But he is not obliged to establish such plea beyond a reasonable doubt. He is merely required to prove his insanity to the satisfaction of the jury. (Citations omitted.)' State v. Swink, Supra, 229 N.C. at 125, 47 S.E.2d at 853.

Dr. Maynard testified that 'every schizophrenic is an individual'; that 'some clearly know right from wrong and . . . some don't'; and that, in his opinion, defendant knew the difference between right and wrong on 29 December 1972, the date of the alleged crime(s), without regard to whether he was then under medication. However, the opinion of an expert psychiatrist is not conclusive. As noted in In re Tew, 280 N.C. 612, 619, 187 S.E.2d 13, 18 (1972): 'Psychiatry is not an exact science. . . .' Here, in addition to Dr. Maynard's expert testimony, the evidence includes testimony of significant facts bearing upon whether defendant was criminally responsible on 29 December 1972.

The testimony of Hall and Harrell tends to portray defendant as a somewhat nervous person; that defendant entered the store at night at a time when no one was there except the two cashiers; that he got his bearings while making inquiry and getting advice concerning a job; that he wanted all the cash but no checks; and that before walking out he warned the employee(s) of the store not to follow him. Their testimony tends to show a planned robbery, executed with finesse. In their opinion, defendant appeared to be in his right mind. There is no evidence that defendant had identified himself with Jesse James prior to his entering Cherry Hospital on 6 February 1973. The facts recited by him to Dr. Maynard do not point to any incident in which he contributed to the poor the fruits of any robbery or theft he committed.

There was evidence tending to show that, when arrested and advised of his constitutional rights, defendant made no statement except to say that he wanted a lawyer; and that, when brought from Wake jail to Wayne jail, defendant appeared to be in his right mind.

There was evidence tending to show that on the morning of his trial he called upon his father to testify that he was crazy. Too, it might be inferred that his outburst at trial, considered in the light of the evidence that he had not previously shown hostility toward Maynard, was a calculated attempt to convey the impression that he was insane.

We hold that diagnosis of a defendant's mental condition or disease as 'paranoid schizophrenia,' standing alone, does not exempt him from legal responsibility for criminal conduct; that he is exempt only if insane when tested by the rule stated above; and that expert testimony in respect of his mental condition or disease is for consideration by the jury along with all other evidence pertinent to the issue raised by the plea of insanity.

The jury decided the issue of insanity against this defendant and found him guilty of the crime(s) charged in the indictments. The...