State v. Kaleohano

Decision Date07 October 2002
Docket Number No. 23828, No. 23829.
Citation99 Haw. 370,56 P.3d 138
PartiesSTATE of Hawai`i, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Kristine K. KALEOHANO, also known as Kristine K. Kalehano, Defendant-Appellee. State of Hawai`i, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Leanda M. Rawlins, also known as Leanda M. Duvauchelle, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtHawaii Supreme Court

Arleen Y. Watanabe, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, on the briefs, for plaintiff-appellant.

Linda C.R. Jameson, Deputy Public Defender, on the briefs, for defendant-appellee Kristine K. Kaleohano.

Keith E. Tanaka, on the briefs, for defendant-appellee Leanda M. Rawlins.

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, and NAKAYAMA, JJ., and ACOBA, J., dissenting, with whom RAMIL, J., joins.

Opinion of the Court By MOON, C.J.

Plaintiff-appellant State of Hawai`i (the prosecution) appeals from the September 27, 2000 order of the Second Circuit Court, the Honorable Artemio C. Baxa presiding, granting defendants-appellees Kristine K. Kaleohano and Leanda M. Rawlins's [hereinafter, collectively, the defendants1] motion to suppress evidence. Briefly stated, this case involves a routine traffic stop for suspicion of driving under the influence, which ultimately resulted in the discovery of a glass pipe that contained what appeared to be crystal methamphetamine residue. In justifying its warrantless search of Kaleohano's automobile and bag (which contained the glass pipe belonging to Rawlins), the prosecution relies upon a theory of voluntary consent and argues that it was error for the circuit court to find that Kaleohano was at any point unlawfully detained and to conclude that Kaleohano's consent to search was invalidated by the failure of police officers to provide her with Miranda warnings. We agree that, under the facts of this case, Miranda warnings were not mandated because the police did not possess probable cause to arrest Kaleohano. We also conclude that the police officer's temporary detention of Kaleohano was lawful because it was supported by reasonable suspicion that she was driving while impaired. However, because the circuit court failed to make appropriate findings and conclusions regarding the voluntariness of Kaleohano's consent to the search of her vehicle, we vacate the circuit court's suppression order and remand this case for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

On appeal, the prosecution challenges one finding of fact (FOF)i.e., FOF No. 13—and all of the seven conclusions of law (COL), except for COL No. 3. The findings and conclusions of the court indicate the following:

In the late evening hours on February 19, 1999, Kaleohano was driving eastbound on Molokai's Kamehameha V Highway and was accompanied by Rawlins, who occupied the front passenger seat. At approximately 11:38 p.m., police officer Jay Serle (Officer Serle) observed Kaleohano's black Mustang swerve within its lane of travel and cross the solid double center line twice. Officer Serle suspected that the driver of the car was impaired. He, therefore, decided to stop the vehicle and turned on his blue lights.

At the time he stopped the vehicle, Officer Serle was aware that it belonged to Kaleohano. He also knew that she had been arrested on drug charges in the past, that the car had previously been searched pursuant to a warrant, and that drugs had been recovered. Officer Serle, however, was not involved in the previous arrest or search of Kaleohano's vehicle.

When he approached the vehicle to check on the driver's impairment, Officer Serle recognized both Kaleohano and Rawlins. He observed that Kaleohano's eyes were red and glassy, but did not detect an odor of alcohol. When questioned, Kaleohano denied having had anything to drink that night. When asked to explain why her car had been weaving, Kaleohano claimed that "she was just tired." At the suppression hearing, Officer Serle testified that he ruled out alcohol as a cause of impairment and opted not to subject Kaleohano to field sobriety tests.

Officer Serle had never arrested anyone for driving under the influence of drugs and was not trained in testing for drug impairment. Nevertheless, based on his observation of Kaleohano's erratic driving, her red and glassy eyes, his knowledge that drugs had been recovered from her car in the past, and "the fact that [he] knew she had been arrested for drug use before[,]" Officer Serle suspected Kaleohano was impaired or "possibly a drug carrier at that time or might be in possession of drugs." Officer Serle then asked Kaleohano "for her consent to search the vehicle and told her that she didn't have to consent to the search, that she had the right to refuse, and that she was free to go." He did not read her any Miranda warnings, but did inform Kaleohano that she was not under arrest.

Officer Serle had also decided, by this point, that he would not allow Kaleohano to regain control of her car "[b]ecause of possible evidentiary value of the vehicle[] and also due to her possible impairment." Although the circuit court recognized that Officer Serle would not allow Kaleohano to regain possession of her car, it also found that Officer Serle "would have allowed ... Kaleohano to leave after he was done with his investigation." (Emphasis added.)

Kaleohano responded to Officer Serle's request for consent to search the vehicle by stating that "she had nothing to hide." Officer Serle testified that Kaleohano "was compliant. She didn't seem to have a problem. She agreed." Although he had obtained oral consent to a search, Officer Serle did not proceed to inspect Kaleohano's vehicle. Instead, he awaited the arrival of police back-up while Kaleohano and Rawlins remained in the car. Officer Serle had never before applied for a search warrant; however, he indicated that he would have done so had Kaleohano left the area. He believed he had enough information to obtain a warrant.

Once he was joined by Officer Manaois, Officer Serle asked Kaleohano and Rawlins to exit the vehicle in order to memorialize her consent on Maui Police Department Form # 113A (consent to search form) and to facilitate the search of the vehicle. Officer Serle filled out the consent to search form, which Kaleohano read and signed.

Kaleohano and Rawlins were left under the supervision of Sergeant Aoki, who also appeared at the scene, while Officers Serle and Manaois searched the vehicle. While searching the interior of the vehicle, Officer Serle found a blue, floral print bag. After ascertaining that the bag belonged to Kaleohano, Officer Serle asked for her consent to search it. Officer Serle testified that he informed Kaleohano "that the procedure was that if she didn't consent to a search, that the standard procedure is that we are obligated to apply for a search warrant." Kaleohano again responded that she had nothing to hide and that she would allow Officer Serle to search the bag. Officer Serle then listed the bag on the consent form and had Kaleohano initial next to the addition. He proceeded to search the bag and discovered a glass pipe with residue resembling that of crystal methamphetamine. At that point, Rawlins informed Officer Serle that the pipe belonged to her. Kaleohano and Rawlins were formally arrested and taken to the Molokai Police Station, where they were read their Miranda rights and waived them. Kaleohano thereafter made incriminatory oral and written statements. Kaleohano and Rawlins were subsequently indicted and charged with promoting a dangerous drug in the third degree, in violation of Hawai`i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 712-1243(1) (1993)2, and prohibited acts related to drug paraphernalia, in violation of HRS § 329-43.5(a) (1993).3

On May 19, 2000, Kaleohano moved to suppress the statements and the evidence gathered by Officers Serle and Manaois during the February 19, 1999 traffic stop and search. Rawlins filed a joinder in the motion on June 15, 2000. A hearing was held on June 23, 2000 during which Kaleohano and Rawlins presented different arguments in favor of suppression. Kaleohano argued that her consent to search was vitiated because the police had failed to give her Miranda warnings prior to asking her questions likely to elicit an incriminating response even though they had probable cause to arrest her for driving while impaired. Rawlins, on the other hand, maintained that Officer Serle lacked reasonable suspicion to search the vehicle. Rawlins argued that, although Kaleohano's erratic driving may have provided a valid basis for the traffic stop, it was an insufficient predicate to justify the request to search the vehicle, the request that Kaleohano exit the car to give written consent, and the request that Rawlins exit the car to facilitate the search. The record demonstrates that the circuit court believed the two positions were inconsistent inasmuch as Kaleohano's argument depended on a finding of probable cause to arrest while Rawlins' argument was premised on there being no reasonable suspicion to search.4 At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court ruled in favor of the defendants and ordered the evidence suppressed.

The circuit court adopted the "probable cause" argument and concluded that suppression was necessary inasmuch as Kaleohano's right to Miranda warnings had been violated because Kaleohano was in police custody as a result of the traffic stop and that she was subjected to interrogation when Officer Serle asked her whether she had been drinking.5 Because Officer Serle failed to advise Kaleohano of her Miranda rights prior to asking her a question "designed and reasonably likely to elicit an incriminatory response[,]" the circuit court concluded that "[a]ny statements made by Ms. Kaleohano after Officer Serle questioned her about whether she had anything to drink [could not] be admitted against her in trial because Officer Serle's violation of Ms. Kaleohano's Miranda rights cultivated a poisonous tree." Furthermore, the circuit court concluded that "Kaleohano's consent to search her vehicle and bag was...

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