State v. Poyson

Citation198 Ariz. 70,7 P.3d 79
Decision Date06 July 2000
Docket NumberNo. CR-98-0510-AP.,CR-98-0510-AP.
PartiesSTATE of Arizona, Appellee. v. Robert Allen POYSON, Appellant.
CourtSupreme Court of Arizona

Janet Napolitano, Attorney General By Paul J. McMurdie and J.D. Nielsen, Phoenix, for Appellee.

John W. Rood, III, Phoenix, for Appellant.

OPINION.

ZLAKET, Chief Justice.

¶ 1 A jury convicted defendant Robert Allen Poyson on three counts of first degree murder, one count of conspiracy to commit first degree murder, and one count of armed robbery. The trial court sentenced him to death for the murders, and to terms of imprisonment for the other offenses. Defendant appeals from his capital convictions and sentences.1 We review this case pursuant to Art. 6, § 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution, A.R.S. § 13-4031, and Rule 31.2(b), Ariz. R.Crim. P. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS

¶ 2 Poyson met Leta Kagen, her fifteen year-old son, Robert Delahunt, and Roland Wear in April of 1996. The defendant was then nineteen years old and homeless. Kagen allowed him to stay with her and the others at their trailer in Golden Valley, near Kingman, Arizona. In August of the same year, Kagen was introduced to forty-eight year-old Frank Anderson and his fourteen year-old girlfriend, Kimberly Lane. They, too, needed a place to live, and Kagen invited them to stay at the trailer.

¶ 3 Anderson informed the defendant that he was eager to travel to Chicago, where he claimed to have organized crime connections. Because none of them had a way of getting to Chicago, Anderson, Poyson and Lane formulated a plan to kill Kagen, Delahunt, and Wear in order to steal the latter's truck.

¶ 4 On the evening of August 13, 1996, Lane lured Delahunt into a small travel trailer on the property, ostensibly for sex. There, Anderson commenced an attack on the boy by slitting his throat with a bread knife. Poyson heard Delahunt's screams and ran to the travel trailer. While Anderson held Delahunt down, the defendant bashed his head against the floor. He also beat the victim's head with his fists, and pounded it with a rock. This, however, did not kill Delahunt, so Poyson took the bread knife and drove it through his ear. Although the blade penetrated the victim's skull and exited through his nose, the wound was not fatal. Defendant thereafter continued to slam Delahunt's head against the floor until he lost consciousness. According to the medical examiner, Delahunt died of massive blunt force head trauma. In all, the attack lasted about 45 minutes. Remarkably, Kagen and Wear, who were in the main trailer with the radio on, never heard the commotion coming from the small trailer.

¶ 5 After cleaning themselves up, Poyson and Anderson prepared to kill Kagen and Wear. They first located Wear's .22 caliber rifle. Unable to find any ammunition, the defendant borrowed two rounds from a young girl who lived next door, telling her that Delahunt was in the desert surrounded by snakes and the bullets were needed to help rescue him. Defendant loaded the rifle and tested it for about five minutes to make sure it would function properly. He then stashed it near a shed. Later that evening, he cut the telephone line to the trailer so that neither of the remaining victims could call for help.

¶ 6 After Kagen and Wear were asleep, Poyson and Anderson went into their bedroom. Defendant first shot Kagen in the head, killing her instantly. After quickly reloading the rifle, he shot Wear in the mouth, shattering his upper right teeth. A struggle ensued, during which the defendant repeatedly clubbed Wear in the head with the rifle. The fracas eventually moved outside. At some point, Anderson threw a cinder block at Wear, hitting him in the back and knocking him to the ground. While the victim was lying there, the defendant twice kicked him in the head. He then picked up the cinder block and threw it several times at Wear's head. After Wear stopped moving, the defendant took his wallet and the keys to his truck. In order to conceal the body, the defendant covered it with debris from the yard. Poyson, Anderson, and Lane then took the truck and traveled to Illinois, where they were apprehended several days later.

TRIAL ISSUES
Admission of Statements to Police

¶ 7 Poyson was arrested just after 10:00 p.m. on August 23, 1996, at an Evanston, Illinois homeless shelter. Over the next twenty-four hours, he was questioned three times at the Evanston police station and made incriminating statements. He now challenges the admission of those statements at trial, contending that they were involuntary, given without proper Miranda warnings, and recorded in violation of the Illinois eavesdropping statute.

¶ 8 Soon after he was brought into custody, the defendant was placed in an interview room and handcuffed to a beam mounted on the wall. He was then questioned by Sgt. Ralph Stegall of the Illinois State Police. After being advised of his Miranda rights, the defendant confessed to the murders of Delahunt, Kagen, and Wear. This first interview began at 10:40 p.m. and lasted just over two hours. Defendant was then left alone in the interview room for about an hour and a half. During this period, he was given a cigarette, a cold soda and a cheeseburger. He was also allowed to use the bathroom. Stegall then conducted a second interview, which began at 2:55 a.m. and ended at 3:25 a.m. Defendant was advised of his Miranda rights and again made incriminating statements. Afterward, he was taken back to his holding cell, where he slept for five or six hours.

¶ 9 The final interview began on the evening of August 24, 1996, at 8:38 p.m. and lasted about two hours. This time, the defendant was interviewed by Detective Eric Cooper of the Mohave County Sheriff's Office, who had flown to Illinois. Defendant was advised of his rights and then gave a detailed, tape-recorded account of his involvement in the murders. He drank a soda during the interview and smoked a cigarette during a five to ten minute break.

¶ 10 Poyson argues that these confessions were given under conditions so oppressive that his statements must be deemed involuntary. In Arizona, confessions are presumed to be involuntary, and the State has the burden of proving otherwise. See State v. Scott, 177 Ariz. 131, 136, 865 P.2d 792, 797 (1993)

. In ruling on voluntariness, a court must examine the totality of circumstances. See id.; State v. Arnett, 119 Ariz. 38, 42, 579 P.2d 542, 546 (1978). Although "personal circumstances, such as intelligence and mental or emotional status, may be considered in a voluntariness inquiry, the critical element ... is whether police conduct constituted overreaching." State v. Stanley, 167 Ariz. 519, 524, 809 P.2d 944, 949 (1991); see also Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167, 107 S.Ct. 515, 522, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986) (holding that "coercive police activity is a necessary predicate" to an involuntariness finding); Scott, 177 Ariz. at 136,

865 P.2d at 797. A trial court's finding of voluntariness will be sustained absent clear and manifest error. See Scott, 177 Ariz. at 136,

865 P.2d at 797; Arnett, 119 Ariz. at 38,

579 P.2d at 546.

¶ 11 Defendant relies on his allegedly vulnerable mental state at the time of the statements. He emphasizes that he was depressed and remorseful when he made them. Defendant also cites his age (twenty at the time of the confessions), his "low average intelligence," and his fright at being interrogated by the police. He does not, however, point to any evidence in the record indicating that the officers exploited his remorse, his age, or his fear to gain a confession. In fact, we find no suggestion of police overreaching. The three interviews were not long, and occurred over a twenty-four hour period. One lasted only thirty minutes. The others were each about two hours in length. We find no indication that the questioning was particularly intense or marked by coercion. The officers scrupulously advised the defendant of his Miranda rights. Although handcuffed, he could comfortably sit or stand as he chose. See United States v. Elie, 111 F.3d 1135, 1144 (4th Cir.1997)

(noting that handcuffing alone does not establish involuntariness). The officers never denied the defendant an opportunity to eat, drink, smoke, or use the bathroom. In fact, they made sure those needs were taken care of while he was in their custody.

¶ 12 Poyson makes much of the fact that the interviews took place at night and suggests that the police exploited his fatigue to extract a confession. We reject this contention. Sgt. Stegall testified that the defendant was alert and answered questions coherently. Defendant never asked for an opportunity to sleep nor did he otherwise indicate that he was too tired to continue the interviews. Nothing in the record establishes a sleep-deprived condition that the police should have recognized on their own. After the first two interviews with Stegall, the defendant was left undisturbed in his cell for over fourteen hours. By his own account, he slept five or six of those hours. Nothing the police did prevented him from getting more sleep prior to the final interview that evening with Detective Cooper.

¶ 13 In short, the State proved that the defendant's statements were voluntary. See, e.g., State v. Spears, 184 Ariz. 277, 285-86, 908 P.2d 1062, 1070-71 (1996)

(confession during a 4:00 a.m. interview held voluntary where defendant was in custody for sixteen hours without being offered food, drink or bedding, and without having used the bathroom); Scott, 177 Ariz. at 136-37,

865 P.2d at 797-98 (confession held voluntary where defendant went to police station at 2:00 a.m., was questioned for fourteen hours, and was given soft drinks and cigarettes upon request).

¶ 14 Defendant next argues that he did not receive proper Miranda warnings before the interview with Detective Cooper. The officer testified that he advised Poyson of his rights before he turned on the tape recorder. Although the...

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