State v. Pray

• Decision Date: 07 June 1904
• Citation: 99 N.W. 1065,126 Iowa 249
• Parties: STATE OF IOWA v. RICHARD PRAY, Appellant
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

99 N.W. 1065

126 Iowa 249

STATE OF IOWA v. RICHARD PRAY, Appellant

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

June 7, 1904

Appeal from Decatur District Court.--HON. H. M. TOWNER, Judge.

CONVICTION for arson. Defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

C. W Hoffman, W. R. McGinniss, and G. W. Baker, for appellant.

Charles W. Mullan, Attorney-General, and Lawrence De Graff, Assistant Attorney-General, for the State.

OPINION

MCCLAIN, J.

Defendant was convicted, on circumstantial evidence, of having set fire at night to a livery barn in the town of Grand Junction. It appears without question that, a short time before the barn was discovered to be on fire, the defendant had purchased a jug of kerosene oil at a grocery store not far away, and that he was seen going from the grocery store in the direction of the barn; that kerosene had been thrown on the side of the barn before it was ignited; and that a jug which had contained kerosene oil was found in the vicinity which some witnesses testified was the same jug which defendant had had filled with oil at the grocery store. There was also some evidence tending to show a motive for the crime.

It is contended by the appellant that the trial court erred in refusing to direct a verdict for the defendant, and in refusing to set aside the verdict for the State on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence, and on the further ground that it was apparently the result of passion and prejudice. But the commission of the crime was clearly established, and there was some evidence tending to connect the defendant therewith. The sufficiency of the evidence was for the jury, and we have no disposition to interfere with their conclusions.

Complaint is made of the action of the court in impaneling the jury, first, because one juror was excused on challenge of the State, over defendant's objection, on the ground that he was incorrectly named; and, second, that defendant's challenge to another juror on the same ground was overruled. The first of these objections is not well taken, for the reason that we cannot presume prejudice from the ruling of the court excusing the juror. Geiger v. Payne, 102 Iowa 581, 69 N.W. 554. It appears that the second objection was not made until after the counsel for defendant had waived a peremptory challenge, and there was therefore no prejudice to the defendant. State v. Elliott, 45 Iowa 486.

One of the grounds of motion for a new trial which was overruled was that one of the jurors was related to the prosecuting witness, which fact was not divulged by the juror when examined during the impaneling of the jury. Their relationship was by a former marriage of the prosecuting witness to the first cousin of the juror. This marriage had been terminated twenty years before the trial by the death of the wife, but counsel for appellant contend that the survival of children of the marriage was sufficient to perpetuate the relationship between the prosecuting witness and the juror. Without passing on this question, it is sufficient to say that the trial court, in ruling on the motion, had before it a showing that counsel for the defendant became aware of the relationship soon after the commencement of the...