Watson v. Nix

• Decision Date: 09 February 1982
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 81-351-D.
• Parties: William Ray WATSON, Petitioner, v. Crispus NIX, Warden, Iowa State Penitentiary, and Attorney General of the State of Iowa, Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa

551 F. Supp. 1

William Ray WATSON, Petitioner, v. Crispus NIX, Warden, Iowa State Penitentiary, and Attorney General of the State of Iowa, Respondents.

Civ. No. 81-351-D.

United States District Court, S.D. Iowa, C.D.

February 9, 1982.

Gary B. Garrison, Des Moines, Iowa, for petitioner.

Thomas D. McGrane, Asst. Atty. Gen. of Iowa, Des Moines, Iowa, for respondents.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

VIETOR, District Judge.

This is a habeas corpus proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 brought by an inmate of the Iowa State Penitentiary at Fort Madison, Iowa, where respondent Crispus Nix is the warden.¹ Petitioner is serving a sentence of 20 years in prison imposed on February 18, 1975, by Iowa District Judge M.C. Herrick after petitioner was found guilty by a jury of assault with intent to commit rape in violation of Iowa Code § 698.4 (1973). The conviction was affirmed by the Iowa Supreme Court. State v. Watson, 242 N.W.2d 702 (Iowa 1976).

The sole claim asserted by petitioner is that he was denied due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States on the ground that upon the record evidence adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt, specifically proof of intent to commit rape, beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). This issue, of course, is submitted upon the record evidence adduced at the trial. The court also has before it the threshold question of whether petitioner exhausted his state remedies.

EXHAUSTION

28 U.S.C. § 2254 provides in part:

(b) An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, or that there is either an absence of available State corrective process or the existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner.

(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.

Examination of the exhaustion issue requires a review of some United States Supreme Court and Iowa Supreme Court decisions as well as a review of petitioner's state court litigation.

In 1970 the United States Supreme Court held "that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." In re Winship, supra, 397 U.S. at 364, 90 S.Ct. at 1072.²

Petitioner's trial was conducted in January of 1975. Petitioner introduced no evidence. At the conclusion of the state's evidence petitioner's counsel moved for a directed verdict on the ground, inter alia, that "the State has not introduced evidence sufficient to generate a jury question or from which the jury can find beyond a reasonable doubt that if there was any such assault by defendant that the assault was with the intent to commit rape * * *." Petitioner's counsel did not cite the due process clause of the United States Constitution or In re Winship, supra, or any other case authority. The motion was denied.

On appeal to the Iowa Supreme Court petitioner again challenged the sufficiency of the evidence on the necessary element of intent to commit rape, but again his counsel did not cite the due process clause of the Constitution, In re Winship, supra, or any other due process case. The court held that the evidence was sufficient. State v. Watson, supra, 242 N.W.2d at 705.

On June 28, 1979, the United States Supreme Court decided Jackson v. Virginia, supra, holding

that in a challenge to a state criminal conviction brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 — if the settled procedural prerequisites for such a claim have otherwise been satisfied — the applicant is entitled to habeas corpus relief if it is found that upon the record evidence adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Jackson v. Virginia, supra, 443 U.S. at 324, 99 S.Ct. at 2791 (footnote omitted). The Court stated that "Under the Winship decision, it is clear that a state prisoner who alleges that the evidence in support of his state conviction cannot be fairly characterized as sufficient to have led a rational trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt has stated a federal constitutional claim." Id. at 321, 99 S.Ct. at 2790.

On February 20, 1980, the Iowa Supreme Court decided State v. Robinson, 288 N.W.2d 337 (Iowa 1980), a sufficiency of the evidence case. The court reviewed its historical sufficiency of evidence standard as follows:

Required quantum of evidence. At one time this court examined the record to see if it contained "competent" evidence of guilt. See State v. Pray, 126 Iowa 249, 253, 99 N.W. 1065, 1066 (1904). See also, 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 910, at 593-94 (1961); 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1139, at 349 (1961) (consideration of prior scintilla of evidence rule). Later this court examined for "substantial" evidentiary support. See State v. Gibson, 189 Iowa 1212, 1233, 174 N.W. 34, 42 (1919).

The evidentiary measure this court now applies we recently explained in this way: "In reviewing these rulings we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, without regard to contradiction or inconsistencies and assisted by all reasonable inferences. If there is substantial support for the verdict in the record, the jury verdict is conclusive." State v. Jones, 271 N.W.2d 761, 763 (Iowa 1978) (emphasis added, citation omitted). We have also said that "where the verdict is clearly against the weight of the evidence" a new trial should be granted. State v. Tokatlian, 203 N.W.2d 116, 119 (Iowa 1972). See present Iowa R.Crim.P. 23(2)(b)(6) (new trial when "verdict is contrary to law or evidence"). We have said that evidence is "substantial" when a reasonable mind would accept it as adequate to reach a conclusion. General Telephone Co. of Midwest v. Iowa State Commerce Commission, 275 N.W.2d 364, 370 (Iowa 1979); City of Davenport v. Public Employment Relations Board, 264 N.W.2d 307, 311 (Iowa 1978).

State v. Robinson, supra, 288 N.W.2d at 338.

After discussing and quoting Jackson v. Virginia, the court went on to state:

We do not agree with Robinson that the measure of proof announced in Jackson is inconsistent with our substantial evidence rule. Substantial evidence, under the definition we have already stated, means such evidence as could convince a rational trier of fact that defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Examination of past criminal cases in which sufficiency of the evidence was an issue demonstrate that such is the manner in which this court has applied the substantial evidence rule. See, e.g., State v. White, 223 N.W.2d 163, 165 (Iowa 1974) ("We hold that there was substantial evidence reasonably supporting the charge against defendant."); Tokatlian, 203 N.W.2d at 119 ("Where the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution is found to be substantial and reasonably tending to support the charge, a conviction should not be disturbed."); State v. Cartee, 202 N.W.2d 93, 97 (Iowa 1972) ("The evidence clearly discloses adequate substantive evidence from which the jury could reasonably conclude Cartee at the time here concerned, inflicted death-causing injuries to his wife."); State v. Gilroy, 199 N.W.2d 63, 67 (Iowa 1972) ("The record discloses adequate substantive evidence from which the jury could reasonably conclude money was taken during the fatal Fareway Store incident. From this also flows the unavoidable conclusion, there was sufficient evidence to support the jury verdict ....").

We find considerable support in the decisions of other courts for defining substantial evidence as such evidence as could convince a rational trier of fact that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Green, 548 F.2d 1261, 1266 (6th Cir.1977); United States v. Harper, 450 F.2d 1032, 1040 (5th Cir.1971); United States v. Delay, 440 F.2d 566, 568 (7th Cir.1971); Woodard Laboratories v. United States, 198 F.2d 995, 998 (9th Cir.1952); Dolchok v. State, 519 P.2d 457, 460 (Alaska 1974); State v. Bearden, 99 Ariz. 1, 4, 405 P.2d 885, 886 (1965); People v. Romo, 47 Cal. App.3d 976, 986, 121 Cal.Rptr. 684, 690 (1975); Youngker v. State, 215 So.2d 318, 324 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1968); State v. Taylor, 445 S.W.2d 282, 284 (Mo.1969); State v. Pendergrass, 586 P.2d 691, 698 (Mont. 1978); State v. Encee, 79 N.M. 23, 24, 439 P.2d 240, 241 (1968); Rhyne v. State, 514 P.2d 407, 409 (Okl.Crim.App.1973); State v. Hall, 13 Wash.App. 620, 622, 536 P.2d 680, 682 (1975).

Because our substantial evidence test is generally consistent with Jackson, we refuse to abandon it. One aspect of that test, however, requires modification.

We have often stated that "it is necessary to consider only the supporting evidence whether contradicted or not" when considering sufficiency of the evidence. Tokatlian, 203 N.W.2d at 119. We now hold instead that although Iowa courts view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution they must consider all the evidence when determining the sufficiency of the evidence to support a guilty verdict. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. at 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d at 573. ("Once a defendant has been found guilty of the crime charged, the factfinder's role as weigher of the evidence is preserved through a legal conclusion that upon judicial review all of the evidence is to be considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution."). A court could not determine whether any rational factfinder

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