State v. Pressley

• Decision Date: 20 January 1986
• Docket Number: No. 22498,22498
• Citation: 288 S.C. 128,341 S.E.2d 626
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: The STATE, Respondent, v. Steven PRESSLEY, Appellant. . Heard

Page 626

341 S.E.2d 626

288 S.C. 128

The STATE, Respondent, v. Steven PRESSLEY, Appellant.

No. 22498.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard Jan. 20, 1986.

Decided March 12, 1986.

Deputy Chief Atty. Elizabeth C. Fullwood, of the South Carolina Office of Appellate Defense, Columbia, for appellant.

Atty. Gen. T. Travis Medlock, Asst. Atty. Gen. Harold M. Coombs, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen. Carlisle Roberts, Jr., Columbia; and Wade S. Kolb, Jr., Sol. of the Third Judicial Circuit, of Sumter, for respondent.

FINNEY, Justice:

Appellant, Steven Pressley, was convicted of armed robbery, housebreaking, and grand larceny by a jury trial in his absence. We affirm.

On July 2, 1984, the house of Mr. and Mrs. Hall was broken into and burglarized. The Halls returned to their residence while the perpetrator of the crimes was still on the premises. They were robbed at gunpoint of approximately one thousand five hundred ($1500.00) dollars. He also took a watch, ring, and the keys to their car in which he escaped. Steven Pressley was arrested and confessed to the crimes. After a bond hearing was held for Pressley, he escaped from jail. While a fugitive, Pressley was tried by a jury and found guilty as charged. He was represented at trial by his court appointed attorney.

Appellant alleges the trial judge erred in admitting the watch and the ring into evidence because the search of Mrs. McClam's residence, where the items were recovered, was not authorized by valid consent.

A third party may grant consent to search the premises if they possess "common authority" over or "sufficient relationship" to the premises or effects sought to be inspected. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974); State v. Middleton 266 S.C. 251, 222 S.E.2d 763 (1976), vacated, 429 U.S. 807, 97 S.Ct. 44, 50 L.Ed.2d 69, on remand, 268 S.C. 152, 232 S.E.2d 342 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 878, 98 S.Ct. 230, 54 L.Ed.2d 157 (1977).

Mrs. McClam did not relinquish control over her premises simply because Pressley resided at her house on occasion. As in State v. Moultrie, 271 S.C. 526, 248 S.E.2d 486 (1978), Pressley was a guest in Mrs. McClam's house and she maintained "common authority" and "sufficient relationship" to the premises to consent to the search. There is no evidence that a landlord/tenant relationship existed between Mrs. McClam and Pressley, which would have invalidated the consent to search. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 81 S.Ct. 776, 5 L.Ed.2d 828 (1961); State v. Loftin, 276 S.C. 48, 275 S.E.2d 575 (1981).

Appellant alleges the trial judge erred in permitting a shirt to be introduced into evidence because the warrant under which the shirt was seized was not supported by probable cause.

As reaffirmed in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), a magistrate must view the totality of the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him in determining whether there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. Determination of probable cause to search made by a neutral and detached magistrate is entitled to substantial deference. Id.

There is no allegation that the magistrate abandoned his neutral and detached role, nor is there any evidence to show that the officers were reckless or dishonest and could not have harbored an objectively reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). The duty of this Court is to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed. Illinois v. Gates, supra.

In viewing the entire record, particularly the citizen's report and the information received from a confidential reliable informant, we find that the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding probable cause existed to authorize a search of the home of appellant's aunt where he sometimes resided. Although the shirt seized was not named in the warrant, it was in plain view and matched the description given by the Halls. The officers properly confiscated the shirt and it was properly admitted into evidence.

Appellant alleges the detective's testimony regarding Mrs. McClam's consent to the search of her home and appellant's attorney informing the detective that appellant was willing to talk is hearsay and should not have been admitted into evidence. We disagree.

The use of hearsay evidence in a hearing...