State v. Prestwich
| Citation | 766 P.2d 787,115 Idaho 317 |
| Decision Date | 01 December 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 16947,16947 |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Keith PRESTWICH, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
Reginald R. Reeves of Denman & Reeves, Idaho Falls, for defendant-appellant.
Jim Jones, Atty. Gen., Myrna A.I. Stahman, Deputy Atty. Gen., for plaintiff-respondent.
This appeal follows from our earlier decision in State v. Prestwich, 110 Idaho 966, 719 P.2d 1226 (Ct.App.1986) (Prestwich I ). There, Prestwich had entered a conditional plea of guilty to a charge of manufacturing a controlled substance, marijuana, preserving his right to appeal from an order denying a motion to suppress evidence obtained with a search warrant. We vacated the order on the ground that a magistrate lacked probable cause to issue a search warrant. However, we remanded the case so the district court could determine whether the search should be upheld because of the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule. The district court upheld the search. Prestwich has appealed again. He contends that the district court erred in its application of the "good faith" exception.
The record reveals the following: Law enforcement officers received three anonymous telephone calls pertaining to the cultivation of marijuana by Prestwich at his residence in Idaho Falls. 1 The first call provided the officers only with the informant's tip that Prestwich was growing marijuana in a van-type truck body attached to a mobile home. This male caller gave the location of Prestwich's residence and a brief description of the property. The second call was made to the sheriff's office a month later by a different caller. She stated that she had wandered onto Prestwich's property in an effort to locate her lost dog. While searching, the caller became curious about lights at the residence that were still on during the daytime. The caller stated that she looked through a window into a shed attached to Prestwich's residence and observed what she believed to be marijuana plants about five to six feet tall growing inside. The caller gave the location of Prestwich's residence and described the premises including details about the shed in which the plants were growing. The third call was a follow up by the second informant. The caller confirmed the information given previously and stated that she wanted to remain anonymous.
The officers compared the information received from the two unknown informants and found that the information given by the second caller was consistent with information received from the first. Officer Birch then made his own observation of the Prestwich property to confirm that the description of the buildings and their layout was correct. The presence of the described shed and ventilator fan was noted. Another officer carried out a surveillance of the residence during the following evenings and confirmed the presence of lights during the late hours of the night. Officer Birch testified that he believed the second independent call corroborated the information received from the first. He also believed, based on his training and experience, that the layout of the premises, together with the presence and use of lights and the ventilating fan, indicated a marijuana growing operation. Birch then went to the prosecutor's office for assistance. Birch testified that the prosecutor agreed that they had sufficient information to seek a search warrant. The prosecutor assisted the officer in presenting the information to the magistrate.
After taking additional testimony from Officer Birch, the magistrate issued a search warrant for Prestwich's residence and the attached shed. The search, taking place at approximately 5:00 p.m., yielded a large quantity of marijuana plants, related evidence and equipment. Prestwich's motion to suppress the items was denied by the district court and Prestwich entered a conditional plea of guilty to the charge of manufacturing a controlled substance under I.C. § 37-2732.
On appeal in Prestwich I we vacated the order of the district court denying Prestwich's suppression motion, holding that there was not probable cause for issuance of the search warrant. The case was remanded to the district court to reconsider the motion to suppress and to determine whether the evidence obtained in the search was still admissible under the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule as found in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). 2
On remand the district court conducted a hearing, taking additional evidence concerning the officers' information and their conduct in seeking the warrant. The court held that the officers had taken every step that could reasonably be expected of them in order to secure a valid warrant. The court concluded that because the officers had received basically the same incriminating information from two apparently independent sources, the officers were entitled to believe the information was reliable. Based on this "corroboration" of the calls, the efforts taken to verify the facts in the calls, and the lack of any improper act by the magistrate in issuing the warrant, the court concluded that the officers had acted in good faith and could reasonably rely on the validity of the warrant.
Our review of the district court's application of Leon presents a question of law under which we exercise free review. In Leon, the United States Supreme Court held a search pursuant to a warrant later determined to have been issued without probable cause may still be upheld under a "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule. Evidence obtained in the search is admissible under this exception if it can be said that the officers acted "in objectively reasonable reliance" on the sufficiency of the warrant and on the magistrate's probable cause determination.
Leon recognizes that suppression of the evidence remains an appropriate remedy under circumstances where the officer did not have reasonable grounds for belief in the warrant's validity. These circumstances exist where:
the magistrate or judge in issuing a warrant was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth[;] the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial role in [such a manner or under] such circumstances [that] no reasonably well-trained officer should rely on the warrant[;] ... [the warrant is] based on an affidavit "so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable[;]" ... [or] a warrant [is] so facially deficient--i.e., in failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized--that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume [the warrant] to be valid. [Citations omitted.]
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923, 104 S.Ct. at 3420-3421. See also State v. Rice, 109 Idaho 985, 712 P.2d 686 (Ct.App.1985); State v. Schaffer, 107 Idaho 812, 693 P.2d 458 (Ct.App.1984).
Prestwich asserts that the officers' reliance was not reasonable because the magistrate abandoned his neutral and detached judicial role and merely ratified the unsupported conclusions of the investigating officers when he authorized the warrant. The magistrate compromised his role, Prestwich argues, by failing to observe the minimum applicable standards for issuance of the warrant. Prestwich supports this view by noting that the warrant lacks probable cause and that it authorizes nighttime execution without reciting a substantial supporting rationale.
This argument by Prestwich is misplaced. While in Prestwich I it was determined that the warrant was invalid due to a lack of probable cause, this does not demonstrate that the role of the magistrate was compromised. In Leon, the Supreme Court described this category as one where the magistrate, instead of acting in a neutral and detached manner, serves merely as a rubber stamp for the officers and their request for...
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State v. Wright
...art. 1, § 17, should be interpreted in conformity with the Fourth Amendment. As recently explained in State v. Prestwich, 115 Idaho 317, 766 P.2d 787 (Ct.App.1988), we still feel constrained to follow Leon. We will do so unless and until our Supreme Court decides otherwise on independent st......
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State v. Guzman
...for review in every case in order to prevent the precedent of this Court from being created by default. 115 Idaho at 317, 766 P.2d at 787 (Bakes, C.J., dissenting in part). Whenever this Court entertains any doubt as to the validity of a new rule of law announced by the Court of Appeals, we......
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State v. Prestwich
...because the police officers who seized them reasonably relied on the validity of the warrant. In Prestwich II (State v. Prestwich, 115 Idaho 317, 766 P.2d 787 (Ct.App.1988)) the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. We granted review of the decision of the Court of We h......
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State v. Beaty
...the officer cannot reasonably presume the warrant to be valid (the facially deficient warrant exception). See State v. Prestwich, 115 Idaho 317, 766 P.2d 787 (Ct.App.1988), aff'd on review, 116 Idaho 959, 783 P.2d 298 (1989). In Leon, the United States Supreme Court stated that: [O]ur good-......