State v. Price, 5031.
Decision Date | 18 October 2012 |
Docket Number | No. 5031.,5031. |
Citation | 400 S.C. 110,732 S.E.2d 652 |
Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
Parties | The STATE, Respondent, v. Demetrius PRICE, Appellant. Appellate Case No.2009–147286. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appellate Defender Kathrine H. Hudgins, for Appellant.
Attorney General Alan Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, and Assistant Attorney General Mark R. Farthing, all of Columbia, and Solicitor Isaac McDuffie Stone, III, of Beaufort, for Respondent.
Demetrius Price appeals his conviction for assault and battery with intent to kill (ABWIK). He argues the trial court erred in instructing the jury it could infer malice from the use of a deadly weapon. We affirm.
Deon Cannick was shot in the neck at close range. The bullet exited through his back, leaving his spinal cord exposed. He was instantly paralyzed, but survived. There was no evidence the shooting was unintentional.
On the day of the shooting, Price and Lucius Simuel went to the apartment Deon shared with his brother, Deverol. The men asked Deon if he wanted to buy some drugs. When Deon declined, they asked him to go get Deverol so they could see if he wanted to make a purchase. Deon went upstairs and told Deverol the men wanted to see him. Deverol walked downstairs and outside to speak with Price and Simuel. Price offered to sell him pills and cocaine. When Deverol said “no,” the men forced him back into the apartment and pulled out guns. They asked him, “where is the iron at?”, which Deverol understood to mean, “where are the guns?” 1
Meanwhile, Deon was upstairs playing a video game. His dog got out of the room, and he chased after her. When he caught the dog on the stairs, he looked up and saw Price pointing a gun at him from below. He also saw that Simuel had a gun aimed at Deverol's chest. Deon put his hands up and said, Price and Simuel instructed Deon to come to them. With his hands still up, Deon began walking towards them. Price ran up the stairs, moved his gun to the left side of Deon's neck, and shot him. Deon tumbled down the stairs. As Deon lay bleeding at the foot of the staircase, Price and Simuel again asked, “where's the iron at?” and then ran away. Deverol went outside to look for Price and Simuel's car, and he was shot in his hand and abdomen.
Price was indicted and tried for ABWIK, first degree burglary, possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime, and unlawful possession of a firearm under section 16–23–30(B) of the South Carolina Code (Supp.2011). In its jury charge, the trial court instructed the jury that malice was an element of ABWIK and that The court also charged ABHAN as a lesser-included offense. During deliberations, the jury asked the court for a “summary of the conditions for ABWIK.” The trial court recharged the jury on ABWIK and ABHAN, including the instruction that malice may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon. The jury found Price guilty of all charges, and the court sentenced him to life without the possibility of parole on both the ABWIK and burglary convictions.2 Price appeals only the conviction for ABWIK.
Price argues the trial court erred in instructing the jury that malice could be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon. See State v. Belcher, 385 S.C. 597, 685 S.E.2d 802 (2009).
The State claims this issue is not preserved because Price did not object to the instruction in the charge conference or when the court initially charged the jury, but only after the court recharged the jury. The State argues Price was required to object before the jury began deliberating, and by failing to do so, he waived any objection to the charge. SeeRule 20(b), SCRCrimP () .3 Price argues, however, that the jury's question on the “conditions of ABWIK” demonstrates its deliberations were controlled by the recharge, not the initial charge. By objecting to the instruction that actually affected the jury's decision, Price argues, he preserved the issue. We recognize there is a substantial question as to whether Price preserved this issue for appeal. However, we choose to address the merits of the issue. Cf. Atl. Coast Builders & Contractors, LLC v. Lewis, 398 S.C. 323, 330, 730 S.E.2d 282, 285 (2012) ( ).
Whether a trial court will be reversed for instructing the jury that malice may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon depends on whether the jury was presented with evidence that, if the jury believed it, would reduce, mitigate, excuse, or justify the offense. Belcher, 385 S.C. at 610, 685 S.E.2d at 809 ( ). We agree with the trial court that there was no evidence of self-defense or anything else which could excuse or justify ABWIK. We disagree, however, with the court's conclusion that there was evidence of an absence of malice, which would reduce or mitigate the offense. In deciding to give the ABHAN charge, the court stated:
[S]ome of the testimony has indicated, indirectly though it might be, that this was something perhaps other than just a knocking down the door and going in there and shooting up everybody. And so there may be something there that is sufficient to indicate the absence of malice in this particular case.
We find no such evidence in the record. Our review of the record reveals no evidence that could reduce, mitigate, excuse, or justify this crime.
On appeal, Price points to testimony indicating that Deon and Deverol were drug-dealing gang members and that Deon's shooting may have been part of a drug deal gone wrong. We disagree that these facts would reduce, mitigate, excuse, or justify the crime. It is undisputed that someone shot Deon in the neck, causing him serious injury. The shooter raised the gun, pointed it at Deon, approached him, and shot him at close range as he stood with his hands up. There was no evidence to the contrary. There may have been conflicting evidence as to who did these things, but it is not possible to interpret the evidence to support any conclusion other than that the person who shot Deon committed ABWIK. Therefore, if the jury believed Price is the person who shot Deon, Price is necessarily guilty of ABWIK. See State v. Coleman, 342 S.C. 172, 177, 536 S.E.2d 387, 389–90 (Ct.App.2000) .
Belcher does not prohibit the trial court from instructing the jury that it may infer malice from the use of a deadly weapon where the only jury question created by the evidence is whether the defendant is the person who committed ABWIK. See Belcher, 385 S.C. at 612, 685 S.E.2d at 810 ( ). On the facts of this case, we find no error.
Price's ABWIK conviction is AFFIRMED.
Because I believe the issue raised on appeal is properly preserved and the trial court committed reversible error in charging the jury that malice could be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon under the facts of this case, I respectfully dissent. I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the only jury question created by the evidence is whether the defendant is the person who committed assault and battery with intent to kill (ABWIK). Rather, I would find there is evidence that would reduce or mitigate the alleged ABWIK, such that the charge on inferred malice from the use of a deadly weapon was reversible error.
Demetrius Price was convicted of first degree burglary, ABWIK, possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime, and possession of a handgun by a prohibited person. The trial court sentenced Price to life without the possibility of parole on both the burglary and ABWIK charges, and five years each on the weapon charges. Price appeals only his conviction and sentencefor ABWIK, asserting the trial court committed reversible error in charging the jury that malice could be inferred when the deed was done with a deadly weapon, because evidence was presented that would reduce the ABWIK charge to assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature (ABHAN). I would reverse Price's ABWIK conviction, and remand for a new trial on this charge.4
Price was tried for and convicted of the above charges along with his co-defendant, Lucius Simuel. The charges stem from an incident which resulted in severe injuries to two brothers, the younger being left...
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