State v. Price
| Decision Date | 12 April 1962 |
| Docket Number | No. 36041,36041 |
| Citation | 370 P.2d 979,59 Wn.2d 788 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | The STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Willie PRICE, Jr., Appellant. |
Willie Price, Jr., pro se.
Charles O. Carroll, Pros. Atty., Lewis Guterson, Deputy Pros. Atty., Seattle, for respondent.
May 15, 1959, by an amended information, Willie Price, Jr., was charged in King County with the crimes of (1) burglary in the second degree, and (2) grand larceny. Upon arraignment, he pleaded not guilty. June 2, 1959, the jury found him guilty as charged. June 4, 1959, he filed a motion in arrest of judgment or, in the alternative, for a new trial. June 24, 1959, a hearing was had on the motion which was denied.
Prior to being sentenced upon the verdict of the jury, a supplemental information was filed in which it was alleged that on or about November 20, 1940, Willie Price, Jr., was convicted of the crime of burglary in the second degree in Missouri; that on or about December 11, 1944, he was convicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri for violation of Federal counterfeiting statutes; that on or about July 5, 1950, he was convicted in the Superior Court for Franklin County, Washington, of attempted unlawful taking of an automobile; that on or about June 18, 1954, he was convicted in the Superior Court for King County of burglary in the second degree; that each of these crimes, at the time of its commission, was a felony under the laws of the State of Washington, and that the increased penalty provisions of the habitual criminal act should be imposed.
The defendant entered a plea of not guilty as charged in the supplemental information. October 20, 1959, the jury found that the defendant had committed the felonies as alleged in the supplemental information, and was an habitual criminal.
November 24, 1959, defendant was sentenced upon the June 2, 1959, verdict of the jury to imprisonment in the state penitentiary as an habitual criminal. October 28, 1960, defendant filed in the superior court a motion to vacate the judgment and sentence, as provided by RCW 4.72.010. April 26, 1961, the motion was denied. May 1, 1961, defendant gave notice of appeal from the order denying his motion to vacate the judgment and sentence.
On appeal, appellant contends that the court erred in its refusal to vacate the judgment and sentence 'For * * * irregularity in obtaining a judgment or order.' RCW 4.72.010(3).
The statutes relative to vacation of judgment apply to both criminal and civil cases. State v. Roberts, 136 Wash. 359, 240 P. 3 (1925). A judgment, unless void on its face, is given every reasonable intendment of validity and will not be set aside upon a motion to vacate it, except upon a clear showing of irregularity, together with a prima facie showing of a meritorious defense. State v. Williams, 51 Wash.2d 182, 316 P.2d 913 (1957), and cases cited.
A motion to vacate a judgment is not a means by which the court can review or revise its own final judgments or correct errors of law. In re Jones' Estate, 116 Wash. 424, 199 P. 734 (1921); In re Ellern, 23 Wash.2d 219, 160 P.2d 639 (1945); Muscek v. Equitable Savings & Loan Ass'n, 25 Wash.2d 546, 171 P.2d (1946).
Irregularities which can be considered on a motion to vacate a judgment are those relating to want of adherence to some prescribed rule or mode of proceeding. Such irregularities consist of either omitting a procedural matter that is necessary for the orderly conduct of a trial, or doing it at an unreasonable time or in an improper manner. Muscek v. Equitable Savings & Loan Ass'n, supra, and cases cited. None of appellant's alleged procedural irregularities comes within the purview of this rule.
We have held that the denial of a constitutional right in connection with an arraignment it an irregularity within the meaning of RCW 4.72.010(3). State v. Taft, 49 Wash.2d 98, 297 P.2d 1116 (1956). The first alleged procedural irregularity that appellant contends affected his constitutional rights is that an amended information was filed without his knowledge or consent, after he had pleaded not guilty to the original information.
Prior to trial, the court granted the respondent's motion for...
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State v. Hoffman
...art. 1, § 22 (amend. 10) that the state jury right extends only to issues of fact which determine guilt or innocence. State v. Price, 59 Wash.2d 788, 370 P.2d 979 (1962). Even if this court were inclined to do so, this is not a proper case in which to formulate a separate state constitution......
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State v. Myers, No. 32782-1-II (Wash. App. 8/8/2006)
...granted Myers's motion to vacate his conspiracy conviction. A motion to vacate judgment presents a question of law. State v. Price, 59 Wn.2d 788, 791-92, 370 P.2d 979 (1962). We review questions of law de novo. State v. Miller, 156 Wn.2d 23, 27, 123 P.3d 827 (2005). Myers relies on State v.......
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State v. Heald
...Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311, 21 S.Ct. 389, 45 L.Ed. 542 (1901); State v. Rigg, 258 Minn. 388, 104 N.W.2d 553 (1960); State v. Price, 59 Wash.2d 788, 370 P.2d 979 (1962); Tyson v. Hening, 205 Va. 389, 136 S.E.2d 832 (1964); State v. Washington, 47 N.J. 244, 220 A.2d 185, 187 (1966); State v.......
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Tyson v. Hening
...substantive offense. See State v. Hoffman, 235 Ore. , 385 P.2d 741, 744; Hunter v. State, Okla. Cr., 375 P.2d 357, 361; State v. Price, 59 Wash.2d 788, 370 P.2d 979, 982. Subsequent to the Chewning decision the General Assembly of Virginia made provision for the appointment of counsel to re......