State v. Taft, 33562

Decision Date07 June 1956
Docket NumberNo. 33562,33562
Citation49 Wn.2d 98,297 P.2d 1116
CourtWashington Supreme Court
PartiesThe STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Donald TAFT, Appellant.

James O. Ballou, Wesley W. Bergman, Longview, for appellant.

George W. Sibbald, Kelso, for respondent.

HAMLEY, Chief Justice.

Donald Taft pleaded guilty to an information charging the crime of rape. Judgment and sentence were immediately entered. Fifteen days later, he filed a motion to vacate the judgment and sentence and to permit him to withdraw the plea of guilty. After hearing, the motion was denied.

Taft then instituted this appeal. He contends that several of his constitutional and statutory rights were denied to him at the arraignment, and that the trial court therefore abused its discretion in denying the requested relief.

First, appellant argues that it is a denial of a defendant's constitutional right to accept a plea of guilty which is not voluntarily, unequivocally, intelligently, and understandably given, and that appellant's plea of guilty was not so given.

The constitutional principle upon which appellant relies is established in our decisions, and is not disputed by respondent. The right of accused persons to trial by jury is expressly guaranteed by Art. I, § 22, of the state constitution, as amended by the tenth amendment. That right is denied where a plea of guilty is not voluntarily, Pennington v. Smith, 35 Wash.2d 267, 212 P.2d 811, unequivocally, State v. Stacy, 43 Wash.2d 358, 261 P.2d 400, intelligently, and understandingly made. Burgess v. Cranor, 39 Wash.2d 428, 235 P.2d 830.

As we said in State v. Cimini, 53 Wash. 268, 101 P. 891, in affirming an order denying leave to withdraw a plea of guilty,

'* * * If the appellant entered his plea without hope or fear, without improper influence or promise, with full knowledge of his legal and constitutional rights and of the consequences of his act, the ruling of the court below should be affirmed.' 53 Wash. at page 271, 101 P. at page 892.

Whether, in this case, the plea of guilty was voluntarily, unequivocally, intelligently, and understandingly made, is a question of fact which the trial court resolved against appellant. That finding must stand unless it is cosntrary to the clear preponderance of the evidence.

The record shows as follows: On Saturday morning, October 8, 1955, a justice court complaint was issued, charging appellant with carnal knowledge of a fifteen-year-old girl on the previous day. He was immediately arrested at his home and taken to the office of the Cowlitz county sheriff. Late that afternoon, in the presence of the prosecuting attorney and a court reporter, appellant made a statement admitting that he had had sexual intercourse with the complaining witness. The facts, as related by him, would appear to at least present a jury question as to whether there was that degree of force and resistance which would be necessary to characterize the crime as rape.

After making this statement, Taft was held in the Cowlitz county jail over the weekend, while authorities conducted an investigation. During this period, appellant did not see an attorney or any friend or relative. At 9:50 a. m., on the following Monday, an information was filed charging appellant with rape. During the next forty-two minutes, Taft was served with this information and arraigned, he pleaded guilty, and was adjudged guilty and sentenced to the penitentiary.

The entire proceedings, after the reading of the information, were as follows:

'The Court: Mr. Taft, you are now before the court for the entering of your plea to the charge of rape as set forth in the information just read to you. Before entering your plea, you are entitled to an attorney, if you desire to have an attorney. If you are not able to secure an attorney, the court will appoint an attorney for you. If you do desire an attorney, you are entitled to further time to plead and for the entering of your plea. Do you have an attorney?

'The Defendant: No, sir.

'The Court: Do you desire to have an attorney?

'The Defendant: No, sir.

'The Court: Are you ready at this time to enter a plea to the charge of rape?

'The Defendant: Yes, sir.

'The Court: What is your plea?

'The Defendant. Guilty.

'The Court: Are you pleading guilty because you are guilty of the crime charged?

'The Defendant: Yes, sir.

'The Court: No promises or threats were made against you to induce you to plead guilty?

'The Defendant: No, sir.

'The Court: Your plea of guilty will be received. Have you anything to say why the court should not pronounce sentence on you?

'The Defendant: No, sir.

'The Court: On your plea of guilty, the court finds you are guilty of the crime of rape. As punishment, you will be sentenced to the state penitentiary at Walla Walla for a term not to exceed twenty years. The court is now signing the judgment and sentence just now pronounced on you and you will be remanded to the sheriff for execution of the sentence.'

Neither at the arraignment nor before was appellant specifically told that a different and more serious charge had been filed against him. No effort was made to explain to him the difference between the crime of carnal knowledge and the crime of rape.

It is true that the term 'rape' was used in appellant's presence several times by the authorities. He also used the term himself on at least one occasion in discussing the case. Appellant asserts, however, that he was then under the impression that the term 'rape' included both nonforcible carnal knowledge of a female under the age of consent and sexual intercourse by force with any female. He stated that he had used the term, and understood others were using it in his case, in the first sense indicated above.

Appellant also stated that, in pleading guilty to 'rape,' he has had in mind only the circumstances described in his statement made after arrest. It was not, appellant said, until seven days after the arraignment that he learned from newly-employed counsel of the difference between the two crimes to which reference has been made.

Affidavits were filed by prosecuting officials to the effect that, in his conversations with them, and in his demeanor at...

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17 cases
  • Petition of Lee
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • 31 d3 Dezembro d3 1980
    ...ours.) The rape conviction of the defendant on a guilty plea was reversed and the case remanded for jury trial in State v. Taft, 49 Wash.2d 98, 102, 297 P.2d 1116 (1956), because the defendant was not told of the nature of the crime and had "pleaded guilty under a misapprehension as to the ......
  • Woods v. Rhay
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • 12 d4 Maio d4 1966
    ...of his act. It cannot be the product of or induced by coercive threat, fear, persuasion, promise, or deception. State v. Taft, 49 Wash.2d 98, 297 P.2d 1116 (1956); In re Palmer v. Cranor, 45 Wash.2d 278, 273 P.2d 985 (1954); State v. Stacy, 43 Wash.2d 358, 261 P.2d 400 (1953); In re Burgess......
  • State v. Angevine
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • 26 d4 Setembro d4 1963
    ...against such findings. We will not disturb them. Thorndike v. Hesperian Orchards, Inc., 54 Wash.2d 570, 343 P.2d 183; State v. Taft, 49 Wash.2d 98, 297 P.2d 1116; State v. McLaughlin, 59 Wash.2d 865, 371 P.2d Petitioner contends, however, that because of his youth at the time of his arraign......
  • State v. Holsworth
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • 14 d4 Fevereiro d4 1980
    ...ours). The rape conviction of the defendant on a guilty plea was reversed and the case remanded for jury trial in State v. Taft, 49 Wash.2d 98, 102, 297 P.2d 1116, 1119 (1956), because the defendant was not told of the nature of the crime and had "pleaded guilty under a misapprehension as t......
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