State v. Pryor, 2008 Ohio 1249 (Ohio App. 3/17/2008)
| Decision Date | 17 March 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 2007-CA-00166.,2007-CA-00166. |
| Citation | 2008 Ohio 1249 |
| Parties | State of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ralph Pryor, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
John D. Ferrero, Prosecuting Attorney, By: Renee M. Watson, 110 Central Plaza South, Canton, OH 44702, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
George Urban, 111 Second Street N.W., Ste. 302, Canton, OH 44702, for Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J., Hon. John W. Wise, J., Hon. Julie A. Edwards, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Ralph Pryor appeals his conviction and sentence in the Stark County Court of Common Pleas for one count of failure to file notice of change of address of residence, a felony of the third degree, in violation of R.C. 2950.05. Plaintiff-appellee is the State of Ohio.
{¶2} On February 4, 2007, the appellant was released from prison. Appellant had a statutory duty to register his address with the Stark County Sheriff's office because he had been convicted of a sexually oriented offense. Further, appellant had a previous conviction for failing to register his address as required by law.
{¶3} On February 5, 2007, the appellant met with Matthew Steuernagle from the Adult Parole Authority. The appellant notified Steuernagle that he would be residing with his cousin, Jennifer Pryor, at 1708 5th Street, Canton. Steuernagle scheduled an appointment for February 6, 2007, with the Stark County Sheriffs Department for the appellant to register his address. The appellant utilized this appointment to register the 5th Street address. The appellant met with Deputy Emery who completed the registration and signed the 2007 Registration form. Deputy John Von Spiegel testified that the registration form advised the appellant that he would be required to notify the Sheriffs Department twenty (20) days prior to changing his address. He further testified that the appellant was instructed that he would need to notify the Sheriffs Department within twenty-four (24) hours of becoming homeless.
{¶4} On February 9, 2007, the appellant had a second meeting with Parole Officer Steuernagle. At that time, the appellant informed his parole officer that he was staying at the Refuge of Hope homeless shelter at 300 Walnut St. N.E. Mr. Steuernagle testified that he informed the appellant that he would need to re-register at this address. Appellant did not register the address of the homeless shelter with the Stark County Sheriffs office.
{¶5} On February 13, 2007, appellant was booked into the Stark County jail. During booking, appellant gave an address different from the address he had registered on February 4th. This discrepancy was relayed to Deputy VonSpiegel who then investigated the matter. He spoke with Ernest Six who works at the Refuge of Hope. Mr. Six confirmed that appellant signed into the shelter on February 7th, 8th, and 9th and that he spent the night at the shelter on February 7th and 8th. Deputy VonSpiegel then returned to the jail and spoke with appellant. Appellant admitted that he only spent one night at Jennifer's house. He further admitted that he did not notify the sheriff's office of his change of address as required.
{¶6} The second, unrelated offense was alleged to have occurred while the appellant was at the Stark County Jail awaiting resolution on charges arising from the above listed facts. Donald Bennett was also residing at the Stark County Jail. He was incarcerated for Receiving Stolen Property, grand theft and vandalism.
{¶7} While at the jail, appellant was out of his cell to take a shower. Donald Bennett was in his cell, but standing at the front of the cell talking to the inmate in the cell beside him. Appellant approached Bennett's cell put his arm through the bars and around Bennett's waist, and pulled Bennett tightly up against the bars. Appellant then put his hand inside Bennett's jumpsuit, rubbed his nipples and squeezed his testicles. He told Bennett he "knew him from the joint," knew he was "a fag" who liked "this kind of stuff," and told him he was "sprung for a white boy." He then told Bennett he would kill him if he told the deputies and let Bennett go. Bennett immediately hit the call button in his cell to summon deputies.
{¶8} Deputies Coats and McShane responded to Bennett's cellblock. They found Bennett upset and crying. He had scratches on his back. They referred Bennett to Gina Meese, a nurse at the jail. Meese examined Bennett and found that his scrotum was swollen and red, and noticed a laceration on the inside of his thigh.
{¶9} Appellant was indicted for one count of notice of change of address of residence, a felony of the third degree, in violation of R.C. 2950.05 and one count of gross sexual imposition, a felony of the fourth degree, in violation of R.C. 2907.05.
{¶10} Before trial, the State and appellant stipulated that appellant had a previous conviction for a sexually oriented offense and a previous conviction for failing to register his address.
{¶11} Appellant was acquitted of gross sexual imposition, but found guilty of notice of registration of new address. Additionally, the jury made two special findings; first that appellant had a prior conviction for a sexually oriented offense and second that appellant had previously pled guilty to or been convicted of failure to give notice of change of address.
{¶12} On May 29, 2007, the Trial Court sentenced the appellant to five (5) years of incarceration. Additionally, the trial court imposed all of appellant's remaining post release control time, nine years, one hundred sixty-five days, and ordered this time to be served consecutive to his sentence for failing to register his address.
{¶13} Appellant now appeals from the May 29, 2007, Judgment Entry, raising the following six (6) assignment of error on appeal:
{¶14} "I. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING OF GUILT IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE.
{¶15} "II. THE APPELLANT WAS DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS OF BY THE MISCONDUCT OF THE PROSECUTOR.
{¶16} "III. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO SEVER THE UNRELATED COUNTS OF THE INDICTMENT FOR TRIAL.
{¶17} "IV. APPELLANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS AND OF ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BECAUSE HIS TRIAL COUNSEL PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE.
{¶18} "V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE WHICH WAS UNFAIRLY PREJUDICIAL AND INADMISSIBLE.
{¶19}
{¶20} In his first assignment of error appellant maintains that his conviction is against the sufficiency and the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree.
{¶21} A review of the sufficiency of the evidence and a review of the manifest weight of the evidence are separate and legally distinct determinations. State v. Gulley (Mar.15, 2000), 9th Dist. No. 19600, at 3. "While the test for sufficiency requires a determination of whether the State has met its burden of production at trial, a manifest weight challenges questions whether the State has met its burden of persuasion." State v. Thompkins (1997), 78 Ohio St. 3d 380, 390.
{¶22} In order to determine whether the evidence before the trial court was sufficient to sustain a conviction, this Court must review the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution. State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St. 3d 259, paragraph two of the syllabus, superseded by State constitutional amendment on other grounds in State v. Smith (1997), 80 Ohio St. 3d 89.
{¶23} Specifically, an appellate court's function, when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, supra. This test raises a question of law and does not allow the court to weigh the evidence. State v. Martin (1983), 20 Ohio App. 3d 172, 175. The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St. 3d at 386.
{¶24} A weight of the evidence challenge indicates that a greater amount of credible evidence supports one side of the issue than supports the other. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St. 3d at 387. Further, when reversing a conviction on the basis that the conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence, the appellate court sits as the "thirteenth juror" and disagrees with the fact finder's resolution of the conflicting testimony. Id. at 388. An appellate court must make every reasonable presumption in favor of the judgment and Findings of Fact of the trial court. Karches v Cincinnati (1988), 38 Ohio St. 3d 12, 19. "The verdict will not be disturbed unless the appellate court finds that reasonable minds could not reach the conclusion reached by the trier of fact." State v. Clemons (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 438, 444, citing State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d at 273. Therefore, this Court's "discretionary power *** should be exercised only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction." State v. Martin (1983), 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175; See, also, Otten, 33 Ohio App.3d at 340.
{¶25} Because the trier of fact is in a better position to observe the witnesses' demeanor and weigh their credibility, the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are primarily for the trier of fact. State v. DeHass (1967), 10 Ohio St. 2d 230, syllabus 1.
{¶26} In State v. Thompkins (1997), 78 Ohio St. 3d 380, 678 N.E.2d 541, the Ohio Supreme Court held "[t]o reverse a judgment of a trial court...
To continue reading
Request your trial