State v. Pulsifer

• Decision Date: 01 December 1930
• Citation: 152 A. 711
• Parties: STATE v. PULSIFER.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

152 A. 711

STATE

v. PULSIFER.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Dec. 1, 1930.

Report from Superior Court, Franklin County.

James A. Pulsifer was charged with fishing in inland waters of State without having in his possession proper license. On report to the Supreme Judicial Court on an agreed statement.

Judgment for the State.

Argued before PATTANGALL, C. J., and DDNN, STURGIS, BARNES, FARRINGTON, and THAXTER, JJ.

Carll N. Fenderson, of Farmington, for the State.

Pulsifer & Ludden and James A. Pulsifer, all of Auburn, for defendant.

THAXTER, J.

The respondent, a resident of this state, is charged by complaint with fishing in the inland waters of the state without having in his possession the license required by the provisions of section 14 of chapter 331 of the Public Laws of 1929. The case is reported to this court on an agreed statement, which admits that the respondent did not have such license, but that he did have in his possession the license prescribed by section 1, of chapter 121 of the Public Laws of 1923, which had never been revoked because of any act of his He contends that this license was valid and in force, and that under its authority he could lawfully fish as he was doing. The state claims that this license was not then effective, and that he could only fish lawfully when possessed of the license required by the terms of the later act.

Section 2 of the act of 1923 provides that any resident of the state may make written application to the clerk of the city, town, or plantation in which he resides for a license to hunt and fish, which shall be issued to him on the payment of a fee of 25 cents. Section 3 of the act provides that:

"Each certificate issued under the provisions of this act shall be valid so long as the registrant remains a citizen of this state."

Chapter 331 of the Public Laws of 1929 revised the fish and game laws of the state and provided for the repeal of all acts or parts of acts inconsistent with its provisions. In this act the requirements, under which licenses for fishing and hunting may be issued are set forth in separate sections.

Section 14 provides in part as follows:

"No resident of the state over eighteen years of age and no nonresident of whatever age, shall fish in any inland waters of the state except in accordance with the following provisions."

The provision which, according to the claim of the state, applies to this case, requires each resident to purchase a written license from the commissioner or his duly authorized agent, which shall be kept upon the person while fishing or transporting fish and shall be exhibited to any warden on request. Town clerks are appointed such agents, and licenses are issued by the clerk of the town in which the applicant resides upon the payment of a fee of 65 cents.

Section 16 of the act prohibits the hunting of any wild bird or animal without a license, which shall be kept upon the person while hunting or transporting game and exhibited to any warden on request. The license is issued in the same manner as the fishing license and for the same fee; but a combination fishing and hunting license may be issued for a fee of $1.15. By the terms of subsection 4 it expires on December 31st of the calendar year for which it is issued.

The respondent contends that his license, issued under the provisions of the act of 1923, which authorized him to hunt and to fish in accordance with the laws of the state, was still in force in spite of the provisions of the act of 1929, which was in effect at the time when the state alleges that the offense in question was committed. He claims, in the first place, that the state, having issued to him a license valid according to its terms and according to the requirements of the act under which it was issued so long as he should remain a citizen of the state, was without power to revoke it; and, secondly, that, if the state had power to revoke it, the act passed in 1929 did not purport to do so. We will consider these two contentions in their order.

A license granted by the state is in no sense a contract or property right, and may be revoked by the sovereignty which granted it at its pleasure and without notice. State v. Cote, 122 Me. 450, 120 A. 538; Appeal of Bornstein, 126 Me. 532, 140 A. 194; Burgess v. Mayor and Aldermen of Brockton, 235 Mass. 95, 126 N. E. 456; Commonwealth v. Kinsley, 133 Mass. 578; Doyle v. Continental Insurance Co., 94 U. S. 535, 24 L. Ed. 148.

The respondent contends that the right to fish is a species of property held in trust by the state for the public benefit, and he cites the language of Judge Savage to this effect in the case of State v. Leavitt, 105 Me. 76, 79, 72 A. 875, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 799. That very decision holds, however, that such right is subject to regulation by the state, and the respondent concedes...