State v. Kozlowski

• Citation: 199 Conn. 667,509 A.2d 20
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Garret D. KOZLOWSKI.
• Decision Date: 20 May 1986
• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut

Page 20

509 A.2d 20

199 Conn. 667

STATE of Connecticut v. Garret D. KOZLOWSKI.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 11, 1986.

Decided May 20, 1986.

John M. Massameno, Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on brief, were John J. Kelly, Chief State's Atty. and Robert G. Hall, Asst. State's Atty., for appellant (state).

Joseph I. Lieberman, Atty. Gen., with whom were Arnold B. Feigin and Richard F. Kehoe, Asst. Attys. Gen., and, on brief, Clarine Nardi Riddle, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Bernard F. McGovern, Jr., Associate Atty. Gen., amici curiae.

Ronald D. Williams, Jr., Deputy Asst. Public Defender, for appellee (defendant).

Before PETERS, C.J., and SHEA, DANNEHY, SANTANIELLO and STOUGHTON, JJ.

PETERS, Chief Justice.

The sole issue on this appeal is whether the passage of a public act effecting changes in General Statutes § 14-227a impliedly repealed another public act passed earlier in the same legislative session and dealing with the same statute. The defendant, Garret D. Kozlowski, was arrested on October 3, 1985, and charged with driving under the influence of alcohol, in violation of General Statutes § 14-227a. ¹ Claiming that the legislature had passed two public acts during the 1985 session, each of which authorized a different penalty for a violation of § 14-227a, the defendant moved for a declaratory judgment to determine which of the two penalty provisions would apply in the event of his conviction. The trial court, Buzaid, J., ruled that the later enacted act, Public Acts 1985, No. 85-596, had impliedly repealed the earlier enacted act, Public Acts 1985, No. 85-387, and therefore established the applicable penalties for a violation of the statute. The state has appealed from this decision. ² The underlying facts are not in dispute. In May, 1985, ³ the Connecticut legislature passed Public Acts 1985, No. 85-387, entitled, "An Act Increasing the Imprisonment Penalties for Drunk Driving to Meet Federal Standards." Section one of this act changed subsection (h) of General Statutes § 14-227a by repealing the penalties provided for first, second, and third offenders, and substituting more severe penalties in their place. The Governor signed this act on June 28, 1985.

Subsequent to the passage of this act but prior to its signing by the Governor, the legislature passed, in early June, 1985, ⁴ Public Acts 1985, No. 85-596, entitled, "An Act Establishing a 'Per Se' Standard for Operating a Motor Vehicle While Under the Influence of Intoxicating Liquor." This act changed subsection (a) of General Statutes § 14-227a to provide that operating a motor vehicle "while the ratio of alcohol in the blood ... is ten-hundredths of one per cent or more of alcohol, by weight" would in itself constitute the offense of driving under the influence of liquor in violation of the statute. The act also made changes in subsections (c), (d), and (h) of § 14-227a to conform with the new per se standard contained in subsection (a). To effect these changes, and in accordance with the format prescribed by General Statutes § 2-18, ⁵ Public Acts 1985, No. 85-596, recited § 14-227a in its entirety, capitalizing new sections to be added and placing brackets around sections to be omitted. The act was prefaced by the phrase, "Section 14-227a of the general statutes is repealed and the following is substituted in lieu thereof."

In ruling that this act impliedly repealed Public Act No. 85-387, the trial court found that, by republishing § 14-227a in its entirety without reference to the increased penalties contained in the recently-passed Public Act No. 85-387, the legislature had effectively reinstated the previous penalty provisions. Since these provisions differed from the penalties contained in Public Acts 1985, No. 85-387, the court held that "[t]he acts [were] directly in conflict with each other on their face." Consequently, invoking the doctrine that, "when two legislative enactments are in conflict and cannot reasonably be reconciled, the later one repeals the earlier one to the extent that they are in conflict," the court declared that "Public Act No. 85-387 was repealed by implication by the subsequent enactment of Public Act No. 85-596 and, therefore, would not be controlling over the defendant." In reaching this conclusion, the trial court rejected the state's argument that a different result was mandated by General Statutes § 2-30b, ⁶ which provides that concurrent effect should be given to "two or more acts passed at the same session of the general assembly [which] amend the same section of the general statutes ... except in the case of irreconcilable conflict ...." The trial court concluded that § 2-30b was inapplicable to the present case because it applies, by its own terms, only to amendatory acts, whereas Public Acts 1985, Nos. 85-387 and 85-596, were legislatively characterized as repealing acts.

On appeal from the court's decision, the state claims that the trial court erred both in failing to apply General Statutes § 2-30b, and in finding an irreconcilable conflict between the two public acts. Our resolution of the state's claim, therefore, requires us to undertake a two-step analysis. We must decide first whether Public Acts 1985, Nos. 85-387 and 85-596, are amendatory acts within the meaning of § 2-30b, thereby triggering the application of that statute to the present controversy. Second, if we find that § 2-30b does in fact apply, we must determine whether it requires us to give concurrent effect to both public acts.

Our interpretation of the meaning and scope of § 2-30b takes place within well defined limits. The fundamental objective of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. Hayes v. Smith, 194 Conn. 52, 57, 480 A.2d 425 (1984); State v. Delafose 85 Conn. 517, 521, 441 A.2d 158 (1981); 2A Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4th Ed.1984) § 45.05. In seeking to discern this intent, we look to the words of the statute itself; Dukes v. Durante, 192 Conn. 207, 214, 471 A.2d 1368 (1984); to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding the enactment of the statute; DeFonce Construction Corporation v. State, 198 Conn. 185, 187, 501 A.2d 745 (1985); State v. Parmalee, 197 Conn. 158, 161, 496 A.2d 186 (1985); State v. Delafose, supra, 185 Conn. at 522, 441 A.2d 158; to legislative practice and policy; Doe v. Manson, 183 Conn. 183, 187, 438 A.2d 859 (1981); and to judicial construction.

I

The state's first claim of error concerns the scope of application of § 2-30b. The question therein raised is whether a statute which refers specifically to amendatory acts applies equally to acts which the legislature has denominated as repeals. The state concedes that both acts in question are characterized in their prefaces as repeals, and concedes further that other acts passed by the legislature are expressly characterized as amendments. It argues, however, that these labels are not determinative of § 2-30b's application.

In construing the extent of § 2-30b's reach, we look first to its express language. If the words are clear and unambiguous, "it is assumed that [they] express the intention of the legislature"; Mazur v. Blum, 184 Conn. 116, 118-19, 441 A.2d 65 (1981); and we need inquire no further. Hayes v. Smith, supra, 194 Conn. at 58, 480 A.2d 425; Doe v. Manson, supra, 183 Conn. at 186, 438 A.2d 859. Although § 2-30b refers specifically to an "amendment," it does not define what is meant by that term, or indicate how broadly "amendment" is to be read. In order to determine the statute's scope, therefore, we must look beyond the words to determine the legislature's intent. Tramontano v. Dilieto, 192 Conn. 426, 433-34, 472 A.2d 768 (1984); State v. Delafose, supra, 185 Conn. at 522, 441 A.2d 158; see 2A Sutherland, supra, § 46.07, p. 110.

An examination of the legislative history of § 2-30b indicates that the legislature intended the statute to apply to all acts which make changes in existing legislation, regardless of whether those acts are denominated as amendments or as repeals. Section 2-30b was passed in response to our decision in Menzies v. Fisher, 165 Conn. 338, 334 A.2d 452 (1973). See 17 H.R. Proc., Pt. 1, 1974 Sess., p. 430, remarks of Rep. James F. Bingham. In Menzies we held, on facts similar to the present ones, that a public act passed during the 1967 legislative session amending General Statutes § 31-298 was impliedly repealed by a public act passed later in the same session, which set forth § 31-298 in its entirety, and substituted new language for some of the old. Neither of the public acts at issue in Menzies was characterized in its preface as an amendment. Instead, both acts contained the identical "repeal and substitute" prefatory language that is found in Public Acts 1985, Nos. 85-387 and 85-596. Nevertheless, in enacting § 2-30b to clarify the status of such multiple acts, the legislature chose to use the word "amendment." This legislative history evidences an intent that § 2-30b encompass any and all acts which expressly change prior statutes.

A broad reading of § 2-30b is supported by an examination of the practice followed by the legislature in altering existing statutes. The legislature characteristically casts acts which alter language within existing statutory subsections in the form of repeal and substitution, reserving the label of amendment for acts which add entirely new subsections. ⁷ This format complies with the requirements of § 2-18 that an act altering a statutory subsection set out that subsection in its entirety, with changes clearly marked. Nevertheless, the legislature itself commonly refers to both types of acts as amendments, without regard to their prefatory denominations. See Public Acts 1985, No. 85-613, § 134, which refers to Public Acts 1985, No. 85-254, as amendatory, even though that act contains a repeal and substitute preface; and Public Acts 1985, No. 85-613, § 142, referring to ...